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Frontispiece 
"Leaving Port" 
A prawn trawler putting to sea. The skipper on the right hand 
trawl arm and a crew member on the other have just swung out 
and secured the trawl arms. The trawl boards, with nets attached 
are winched up tight to the blocks at the ends of the trawl arms. 
The codends of the net have been winched up tight to blocks at the 
top of the "A "frame. The author and a crew member are standing 
on the back deck near the opened sorting tray (icebox). All is in 
readiness for the night's work. 
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ABSTRACT 
Prawn fishers are a distinctive occupational and class group - many are artisanal and petite 
bourgeoisie - which means they have a particular orientation to the world. Their work involves 
harvesting a distinctive and renewable resource : prawns. There has been a general paradigmatic 
shift in fisheries management from biological to bio-economic and, it is argued here, to now 
socio-bio-economic. Government and industry organisations interact to develop management 
policies for the sustainable exploitation of fish populations. Organisational cultures can influence 
such policies, which in turn have marked implications for the class positions of fishers. Prawn 
fishers are very distinctive among an occupation/class (fishers generally), which is itself very 
distinctive. This study examines the general nature of the prawn fisher, by contrasting social 
demographics and class positions among Australian prawn fishers, subject to differing 
management policies. It then contrasts the specific with the general by considering, as a case 
study, the origin, implementation and effect of such policies in the Queensland prawn trawl 
fishery through an empirical study of the group, and in particular, how class position may 
influence attitudes to policy change. 
In Australian prawn fisheries, the timing of the imposition of limits to further vessel entry, and 
other policy decisions, have allowed a differential aggregation of ownership of the means of 
production, and the penetration of capital may pose long term threats to the continuafion of the 
petite bourgeoisie prawn fishers. Capitalism, including the control of export markets, may see 
an increase in wage labour and diminution of the owner-operator among prawn fishers. Current 
organisational structures of government and industry are unlikely to provide policy solutions that 
will allow long term change and survival of this class in the Queensland prawn fishery. A 
number of future research areas are identified. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I began my career as a fisheries biologist examining constraints to prawn productivity. My 
research focussed on the theory of quantitative methods of examining the response of prawn 
populations to exploitation. As my career progressed, 1 became involved in fisheries 
management, the decision making process and the consequences of such decisions. This 
evolution perhaps mirrors that of fisheries management itself - preoccupation with the natural 
history of the species involved; an increasing consideration of the biology and economics of the 
fish, fishery and markets; and realisation that successful fishery management relies on an 
understanding of the sociology of fishers and policy development needed to achieve management 
objectives. 
During my evolution, the question of why fisheries are "managed" was central. In this study 
"management" refers to government intervention through negotiated agreements and other legal 
arrangements between fishers and government, which promote conservation and sustainable 
harvest. Governments, through fisheries agencies, play the key management role. They 
facilitate consultation, they develop policies and make management decisions, they commission 
research which provides the information upon which to base policies and decisions, they draft 
legislation and they encourage compliance with this legislation. This thesis is concerned with 
management policies and their impacts on prawn fishers. Prawn fishing is carried out by 
trawlers fishing the bottom with trawl nets, and such vessels may fish singly, or more usually, 
in aggregations. In the case of Australian prawn fishers and fisheries, a number of questions on 
fisheries management were apparent to me. Were management decisions logically arrived at, 
were such decisions for the benefit of sustainable management of natural resources, or were they 
for the fishers? It soon became clear that such management decisions were rarely based solely 
on biological sciences, and that in the real world, the consideration of economics, politics and 
sociology all influenced policy development. 
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Prawn fishers are a distinctive occupational and class group - many are artisanal and petite 
bourgeoisie - which, if they are similar to other such groups, means they have a particular 
orientation to the worid. Their work centres on harvesting a distinctive type of resource: prawns. 
Natural resources such as fish have been considered as belonging to no one ("common property") 
until they are captured. Some authors have argued (Hardin, 1968) that when tenure to such 
resources is unspecified, more and more people seek to capture individual benefit with tragic 
consequences - over exploitation. The emphasis today on sustainable development of "fisheries" 
(the commercial harvest by fishers of fishes) - together with the potential threats to long term 
survival of stocks - is stressing the need to more carefully manage fish stocks: the resource. 
Governments do this management and are now introducing new forms of management. Such 
change, which is essential if we are to achieve ecologically sustainable fisheries, has marked 
implications for the fishers, and prawn fishers are very distinctive among an occupation/class 
(that of fishers generally) which is very distinctive. 
The prawn industry has rapidly developed since the 1970s - a period of great global change as 
well as fishing technological development, and there is some suggestion of a move from an 
artisanal-based (petite bourgeoisie-hased) industry to one which is more capitalist: the big 
operators. Such a move may originate in individual attitudes to policy changes. 
Prawn fishing originated in New South Wales, and spread quickly northward to Queensland. 
Exploratory prawn fishing soon followed in South Australia, Western Australia and the Gulf of 
Carpentaria in the mid to late 1960s and commercial fisheries were subsequently quickly 
established. Interestingly, differing management policies were initially adopted for New South 
Wales/Queensland than for South Australia/Western Australia and these differences provide an 
opportunity for an examination of the effects of such policy on the class position of prawn 
fishers. 
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Into this bouillabaisse of prawns, prawn fishers and policy is added a liberal dose of industry 
politics, the zest of science and a thickening of bureaucracy! In order to appreciate this 
wonderful stew, an understanding of the composition of the main ingredients and how they have 
been combined - the recipe - is important if one is to learn from the experience. This work 
intends to apply sociology - descriptive, analytical and the explanation of causal processes - to 
the policy program pursued in the management of the Queensland prawn fishery. It attempts to 
espouse a multi-disciplinary approach linking sociology with natural sciences and fisheries 
management science. 
The theory as to why problems arise in fisheries has relied on the bioeconomic paradigm that 
when tenure to resources is unspecified, a "tragic" (in the dramatic sense) situation will 
inevitably occur, since more and more fishers will continue to enter a profitable fishery until 
overexploitation and overcapitalisation occur. Intervention to prevent such a situation, it has 
been argued, is thus a "moral obligation" of governments on behalf of society, both to protect 
resources from overexploitation, and to prevent the waste of society's resources through 
overcapitalisation. Early opponents of this view (prior to the 1960s) argued that the self-
regeneration capabilities of most fish species are such that, prior to biological overfishing 
occurring, exploitation would become uneconomic and fishers would, of their own volution, 
cease fishing. In other words, fishers should be left to make economic decisions free from 
government. Thus governments were faced with the choice of government intervention (limiting 
entry) versus non-intervention (or open entry). More recently, debate has included the degree 
of intervention, particularly the option of converting common property to private property - the 
privatisation argument of economic rationalism. 
Such debate of course is not confined to the management of fisheries as these two extremes -
absolute government control and private ownership - also exemplify the philosophical extremes 
adopted in the wider debate as to the best way to organise human societies and economies. As 
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with this debate, the fisheries solution may lie elsewhere. Fisheries management observers 
generally advocate solutions that fall somewhere in the middle - managing the fishery as 
common property, but limiting access to select individuals (see for example, Harrison (1991) 
who has coined the descriptor "mongrel socialism"!). Economic theorists deride such a solution 
since costs associated with this approach and the "return" to society ("rent") are not collected, 
but retained by the fisher, ensuring fishers are so-called economic "free riders". 
The commencing period chosen for this study - 1970 - began a period of profound change. For 
example, for all fishing nations, the late 1960s and early 1970s coincided with a realisation that 
the world's fish catch had plateaued and was unlikely to increase in the future (Garcia, 1997). 
It was also a time when Australia and other nations were being drawn into a more integrated, 
global economic, political and social system. Such globalisation was accelerated for Australian 
prawn exporters by enhancing market accessibility, ease of electronic funds transfer, cheaper air 
cargo transportation and increasing foreign affluence. 
In addition, throughout Australia in the mid to late 1960s - particularly Queensland, New South 
Wales, Western Australia and South Australia - prawn fishery exploration had been driven by 
the promise of lucrative export markets in USA and Japan. This initial exploration and 
development was largely characterised by artisan prawn fishers - small scale, owner-operators -
but also an increasing presence of the capitalist fisher - but less so in the Queensland east coast 
and New South Wales than in Western Australia, the Gulf of Carpentaria and South Australia. 
So what were the determining factors for class structure among prawn fishers? 
The scale of the fishing enterprise varied with the remoteness of prawning grounds and thus 
capital commitment and aggregation of vessel ownership (White, 1989) but, it is also contended, 
the scale of the enterprise was also influenced by government policy. This thesis examines the 
development of the Queensland east coast prawn fishery in detail, and then uses this case study 
more generally to understand the comparative role of management, defined previously as 
government intervention in the operation of the fishery - in both the sustainable harvest of the 
prawn resources and how this has impacted upon the prawn fishers in four Australian states. 
Thus I will explore the complexities of fishery policy and decision-making in the east coast 
prawn trawl fishery and the effects that these policies have had on the fishery and fishers. In 
particular, I will examine the way contemporary changes to the Australian prawn trawl fisheries 
- changes both externally imposed (eg. global changes) and those imposed by Australian State, 
and Federal Governments - are affecting the nature of the fisheries and the fishers. This 
analysis will then be linked to the management of the industry. 
Today's fishery management seeks to define the 'constraints' to the sustainable exploitation of 
a fish population (and thus the conservation of resources). A variety of technical advisers along 
with industry and public participants, then interact with a decision-making entity which 
establishes fishery regulations intended to achieve specified objectives (allocation). It is these 
two processes (conservation and allocation) that are the basis of modem fishery management. 
Of crucial importance is the advisory process which should provide impartial analyses of all the 
consequences of alternative controlling actions. 
Although much has been written regarding fishery management, and about the east coast prawn 
trawl fishery, the processes by which fishery management decisions are reached, modified and 
then frequently discarded are not as readily known. It is difficult to generalise about these 
processes because quite different relationships between producers and governments evolve for 
different fisheries. 
The broad objectives of this study are to investigate the organisational structure of the 
management of a major Australian fishery, to identify the suite of management objectives (both 
stated and unstated, biological, economic, political and social) for this fishery and to evaluate 
their achievement. It is intended to provide a focus on critical facets of fishery policy 
development, including the use of biological information, the extent to which discretionary 
authority is applied in fishery management and the ability of special interest groups to alter 
policy through political activity. 
Many authors have adopted the collective term "fishers" to describe persons engaged in the 
fishing industry because the terms "fisherman" and "fishermen" do not take into account women 
who fish (See for example Anson, 1965 and McGoodwin, 1990). This convention will be used 
in this study, except for acronyms and direct quotations. 
Australian prawn trawl fisheries are of interest since their management has been diverse and has 
historically ranged from open entry to limited entry, owner-operator to company operation, 
artisanal to large exporter. The time period considered in detail, 1970-1995, has been 
deliberately selected since it encompasses both major changes in jurisdictional responsibilities 
as well as major management philosophical shifts that have dramatically influenced management 
of prawn trawl fisheries in Australia. The east coast prawn trawl fishery has been chosen as a 
case study since it has evolved significantly during that period, as have the industry and 
government bureaucracies concerned with its management. In addition, the management of this 
particular fishery has moved from one of laissez faire to government regulation of participation. 
The structure of this study is in generally discrete chapters, though since all are related, there 
is a degree of overlap apparent in some chapters. Chapter 2 explores the literature surrounding 
the theory of fishery management - what it seeks to do, who benefits, the uncertainty in 
management decision making and processes underlying such decisions. Chapter 3 outlines the 
methods and empirical approach, data sources and procedures applied in this study. Chapter 4 
holistically describes the Queensland east coast prawn trawl fishery - the nature of the natural 
resources, the evolution of the fleet and prawn markets. It examines the management paradigm 
- constraining fishing effort is an appropriate regime for sustainably managing fluctuating, 
ephemeral populations of aquatic organisms - from the view of the prawn fisher, specifically 
addressing issues arising from such a regime. Chapter 5 examines the nature of the prawn fisher 
by contrasting social demographics and class position among prawn fishers from different state 
jurisdictions subject to different management policies (open entry versus closed to further entry 
regimes). The Chapter also explores one such state's management regime in detail from the view 
of the prawn fisher. The quantitative general approach for all Australian prawn fisheries, is thus 
able to be contrasted with a specific, in depth, organisational case study of Queensland prawn 
fishers. Chapter 6 dissects organisations with a stake in management of the east coast prawn 
trawl fishery - those representing research and management, industry and, marketers - and their 
interactions. Given these, the Chapter provides an analysis of the policy milieu and examines 
outcomes of policy implementation. The final Chapter 7 evaluates the management of the 
fishery in totality, including the apparent contradictory tensions between class position and the 
attitudes of prawn fishers to policy and assesses the current management approaches. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SPILLING* THE CODEND: 
PRAWNERS, PRAWNING AND MANAGEMENT 
Up until the nineteenth century, the dominant fisheries paradigm was that living marine resources 
were inexhaustible and that fishing could not diminish fish populations (Pontecorvo, 1986). The 
impact of the industrial revolution was as profound on the fishing industry as it was on many 
other industries. As sail was replaced by steam and then fossil fuel power, fishing vessels were 
no longer confined to shallow coastal zones and were able to range further offshore. 
Increasingly larger vessels and technologies, such as refrigeration and on-board processing, 
allowed dramatic increases in fishing time, efficiency and fish catches. This increased effort on 
fish stocks began to translate into both a reduction in the mean size (age) of fish and the total 
catch. The recognition of this impact and the questioning of the paradigm of inexhaustible 
fisheries resources, were the beginnings of modem fisheries management and government 
intervention in fisheries. 
Fisheries management, the sustainable husbandry of a natural resource, became an international 
concern. The intervention of two World Wars saw shipping (and fishing) severely curtailed on 
the rich fishing grounds of the North Sea. Such reductions in fishing effort and the concurrent 
rebuilding of fish stocks provided the first empirical evidence of the effects of fishing and 
encouraged the application of developments in mathematics to assess such effects. Baranov 
(1918) formulated a relationship (the catch equation) equating fishing effort with variation in 
recruitment, mortality and growth pattems of fish. 
Footnote: * The Codend is the tied bag at the end of the net into which all the trawled prawns are collected. The 
codend is spilled by untying the bag. 
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Russell (1931) and Graham (1935) provided a formal mathematical treatment of the theory while 
Beverton (1935) and Beverton and Holt (1957) refined and applied these mathematical 
formulations to a large number of fish stocks and fisheries. Basically, these techniques allowed 
an understanding of the impacts of fishing effort on the structure of fish stocks, the age structure 
and reproductive capacity of the stock to annually sustain itself, and hence, the sustainable catch 
from the fishery. 
At a more basic level, other researchers sought to examine the relation between fishing effort 
and catch. Notable among these workers were Gordon (1953, 1954), and Schaefer (1954), the 
latter whose model predicted the maximum size the stock could attain and the theoretical 
maximum catch the stock could produce, for all levels of effort, on a sustainable basis. This 
latter parameter, termed the maximum sustainable yield, or MSY, was eagerly seized upon by 
fishery managers since it provided a means of defining sustainable levels of exploitation for a 
fishery. 
Other disciplines were quick to adopt Schaefer's model with debate focussing on what was 
economically as well as biologically sustainable. Schaefer's model lent itself to the 
microeconomic theory of supply and demand, since biological productivity and consideration of 
the effect of fishing effort on fish stocks could also be visualised in terms of changing costs of 
production and fish prices. This approach identified the maximum economic yield, or MEY, a 
level of fishing effort that maximised the economic retum from a fish stock at a yield 
considerably below that proposed for MSY. The theory suggested that fishers would enter an 
unexploited fishery and extract large catches and profits. As effort increased, catch rates and 
total catch peaked first at the MEY, then at the MSY and would then begin to reduce as the 
fishery was overexploited. An increasing level of effort then returned a decreasing level of 
catch. 
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The problem with both MSY and MEY was that they both advocated particular levels of effort 
under equilibrium, or stable conditions. In the case of MSY it is assumed that the fish 
population is in equilibrium and that population fluctuations are due to fishing and in the case 
of MEY, it is assumed that fish prices are in equilibrium with a certain level of production and 
that fluctuations are due to supply. In both cases, the reality of fisheries and markets is that they 
are not stable; one subject to environmental vagaries, for example rainfall or inconsistent 
oceanic currents, the other, subject to the ubiquitous "market forces", which may include equally 
unpredictable variables such as interest rates, exchange rates, price of substitutes and production 
costs. In terms of "the fishery" - the fish, the fishing effort, the fish market and the fisher -
both also ignore the social component, the fisher. 
A variation on the MEY theory is that of the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968). It 
ascribes the root cause of problems in many fisheries to their status as "common property" 
(belonging to no one) and advocates that when tenure to such resources remained unspecified, 
a "tragic" consequence results, with more and more competitors entering a profitable fishery. 
The expression "tragedy" is defined by Hardin (1968) as "... the essence of dramatic tragedy ... 
resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things". Acute competition, over-
capitalisation and resource depletion follow, presumably "remorselessly". The model is based 
on assumptions about human nature or behaviour under certain circumstances. Once the 
numbers of competitors in a fishery are sufficient to cause declining yields for a given amount 
of effort, individual fishers, rather than exercising restraint to conserve stocks, will increase their 
efforts to maintain their own catch. This intensifies as stocks shrink, with fishers taking what 
they can today since there will be fewer fish tomorrow. Or, as Hardin (1968) put it: "The 
individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society, as a 
whole, of which he is a part, suffers." 
For these reasons, fisheries managers have imposed government-run management regimes that 
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restrain fishing effort ("input controls"). They reason that fishers are unable to exercise self 
restraint because of characteristics of strong individualism, isolation and parochialism. In other 
words, fishers are viewed as the last of the "hunter-gatherers" : self sufficient, reaping rewards 
from the inhospitable ocean environment through personal exertion (Acheson, 1980; Cove, 1975; 
McGoodwin, 1990 and Poggie, 1980). A dangerous occupation, touched with frequent, 
potentially fatal challenges and periods of solitude (Wamer, 1983). 
An extension of the open access - intervention debate has been the arguments for privatisation. 
Economists have reasoned that intervention per se is an imperfect solution and advocate full, 
private ownership of common property, open access fisheries, through allocation of rights to the 
catch (quotas or "output controls") or the means of production (gear or "input controls"). They 
argue that full privatisation provides a more compelling incentive for fishers to restrain fishing 
effort (in order to conserve stocks) and to be responsible for bearing the costs associated with 
management actions. This "Rousseauesque" (Farmer, 1981) view of the "noble fisher" should 
be treated with caution, since there are marked differences in fishers' attitudes to conservation, 
particularly when personal financial circumstances are taken into consideration. Private property 
status provides no guarantee that resources will be conserved. Overgrazing of pastures (Gillies 
and Jamtgaard, 1981), depletion of highly migratory fishes such as Tuna (Meltzer, 1994) and the 
over-allocation of water rights in Australia, are all examples of how privatisation of public 
resources has failed. 
Nevertheless, the debate over whether the fisheries commons represents a tragedy (economists) 
or a comedy ("a drama of humans as social rather than private beings, a drama of social actions 
having a frankly corrective purpose". Smith, 1984) continues unabated. The logic in the "tragedy 
of the commons" agreement has been challenged, particularly by sociologists (Marchak et at. 
1987). The notion that a property right over natural resources would somehow diminish the 
desire to catch more fish, that greed would dissipate and that the hunter-gatherer would 
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overnight become an agriculturalist patiently harvesting a known crop, has been shown to be a 
nonsense in many cases. Resource sustainability interests always come a distant second to those 
of individual profit-taking. 
These two extremes - absolute government control and absolute private control are as much 
philosophical as they are policy prescriptive. Both rarely evaluate culture - knowledge, beliefs, 
customs, needs, values, and the social - or how people actually behave. In the case of fisheries, 
the more valuable and pressured a fishery is, the more social concerns occupy fisheries 
managers, since it is in such fisheries that extremes of behaviour, including conflict, ill-will and 
even violence, tend to be expressed. 
Sociologists are not as convinced that the tragedy model is robust. Indeed McCay and Acheson 
(1987, pg 34) observed that"... by equating common property with open access, the tragedy-of-
the-commons approach ignores important social institutions and their roles in managing the 
commons". The concept of co-management (co-operative, collaborative, joint, participating or 
multi-stakeholder) encourages partnerships, provides local incentives for sustainable use and 
allows the sharing of power and responsibility for resource management and conservation 
(Berkes, 1997). 
Recent studies of local fishing peoples have illustrated that users of common property resources 
can successfully manage exploitation systems (Leibhardt, 1986; Ruddle and Johannes, 1985; 
Berkes, George and Preston, 1991 and Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen, 1996), and in fact govemment 
intervention or privatisation can weaken or destroy local institutions that have been effective in 
preventing the "tragedy" (Berkes et al. 1991). 
Sen and Nielsen (1996) reviewed 22 case studies on fisheries co-management in small-scale. 
semi-industrial and industrial fisheries in developing and developed countries in Africa, Asia, 
the Caribbean, Europe, North America and the pacific. They classified a continuum typology 
of co-management arrangements - instructive (govemment dictates), consultative (consultation 
but govemment decides), co-operative (equal decision making), advisory (users advise, 
govemment endorses) and information (govemment delegates decision making entirely, users 
inform govemment). They argued that the determinants of which arrangements were adopted 
included the capabilities of fisher groups, the difficulty of the decisions required, the stage in the 
management process, the political culture and fisher norms. To these I would add the precision 
of definition of the fishery - that empowerment and delegation by government are more likely 
to occur in a well-defined fishery where property rights are codified. Thus fishery management 
arrangements can, depending on the conditions present, range from total control to total delegated 
authority. It is the examination of these determinants which is central to this study. 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT BENEFICIARIES 
The major question that follows from an examination of the above has to be ... why intervene? 
We have already discussed management objectives such as the need for conservation or 
protection of the stock of fish to prevent biological overfishing - where the biological capacity 
for replenishment is compromised (biological paradigm) and the need for explicit allocation 
(Reiger and Grima, 1985) of rights to harvest to prevent economic overcapacity - where 
economic inefficiencies cause the dissipation of economic rents (economic paradigm). But what 
about the human element, after all "... the management of fisheries is intended for the benefit 
of man, not fish; therefore the effect of management of fish stocks cannot be regarded as a 
benefit per se " (Burkenroad, 1953). It is this management "... for the benefit of man", that is 
at the core of fishery management. 
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Development of Australia's natural resources has played a significant role in the growth in 
national income and society since European settlement (Rose and Cox, 1991) and has been the 
principal goal of govemments. Indeed Harris and Taylor, (1982) refer to development as \..the 
secular faith of National development,' and that this faith is 'our national religion' (cited from 
Harrison, 1991). 
Harrison (1991) argues the common property concept (the right of all members of the community 
to utilise a resource) cannot properly be applied to most Australian fisheries, since govemments 
have confined access to fish resources for profit to a subset of the population - the licensed 
fishers. These fishers have competed for the resource under the control of govemments. Thus, 
Harrison (1991) argues that the Crown, usually 'in right of the States' has exercised at least de 
facto ownership of Australian fisheries and that they are 'public property' in the same way that 
the Australian state in the nineteenth century "owned" the land. 
For resources, such as fisheries, under explicit public ownership, the question vexing 
govemments is how the returns from these resources should be shared between the resource users 
(fishers) and the rest of the community. In December, 1989, the Commonwealth Govemment 
released an economic policy statement in which the future directions for managing 
Commonwealth managed fisheries was set out (Kerin, 1989). A central tenet of this policy was 
a desire to ensure allocation so as the Australian community received a direct retum (a resource 
rent) from those who used fish resources for their private gain, in addition to a supply of fish. 
Hitherto, there had been no attempt to charge Australian fishers for access rights to fish in 
Commonwealth waters and the concept of a 'resource rent charge' (a tax for the privilege of 
using common property) was new. Previously, fishers were required to obtain an appropriate 
license to operate in a fishery and abide by whatever management regulations were in force. 
The concept of economic rent arose in the early nineteenth century from the realisation that rent 
for land was not set by the owners of the land but rather by the potential profitability which 
users could reap by using the land (Barlowe, 1958; Campbell and Haynes, 1990). Rent thus 
reflected surpluses acquired after all other costs incurred in the production processes had been 
met. Economic rent became the term used to describe any eamings in any activity over and 
above that required to make the activity economically justifiable in the long term (Wessel, 1967). 
Thus the "New Directions' policy had, as a principal objective, recovery of all the costs of 
management and the collection of economic rent. This was a new concept in Australian fisheries 
management* 
State fisheries management agencies have evolved a suite of fisheiy management approaches 
ranging from open entry laissez-faire policies (New South Wales, Queensland) to limited entryi 
immediate interventionist policies (South Australia, Westem Australia). The genesis of these 
differing policies has been philosophical (New South Wales, South Australia), driven by inertia 
(Queensland) or political lobbying (Westem Australia). Whatever the reason, such initial policy 
decisions have shaped subsequent management regimes for each State's fisheries. Interestingly, 
in the case of prawn fisheries, such policies were firmly in place at the advent of prawn fishery 
development in the mid to late 1960s. In the case of New South Wales and Queensland, the 
prawn fisheries were conceived as open entry fisheries which subsequently reverted to limited 
entry regimes. In the case of South Australia and Westem Australia, the prawn fisheries were 
managed as limited entry fisheries from inception. 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT UNCERTAINTY 
Many non-fishers perceive that the lives of fishers are comparatively free and uncomplicated. 
Few are aware of how complex and difficult the occupation really is. For example, in the 
quinquennial national census, the Australian Bureau of Statistics apparently ranked the fishers' 
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occupation just above unskilled labourer and far below other primary producers such as farmers. 
Although largely placed at the lower end of the social, economic and political spectrum, many 
prawTi, rock lobster and abalone fishers eam nett incomes ($50-100K per annum) and enjoy 
standards of living comparable to, or considerably better, than the national average. 
By the very nature of their calling, fishers must be able to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Fishers are well aware of the vagaries of nature and the dramatic outcomes of environmental 
fluctuations. It is this constant striving against the elements, the umemitting danger inherent in 
their occupation, that has evolved a certain resiliency both in their psyche and in day-to-day 
dealings. The fishers' world could be said to be encompassed by the natural environment, 
technology, govermnent, markets and the community in which they live (including family). This 
world is extremely changeable. 
A high level of uncertainty is unavoidable in marine resource management (Walters, 1984; 1986) 
and the immediate problem is not to attempt to explain this variability (Glaister, 1978), but rather 
to find more imaginative ways of coping with it (Walters, 1975). A reliance on deterministic 
models (those dependent on forecasting on the basis of past events) is being superseded by a 
stochastic (governed by probabilities) approach that embraces uncertainty, essentially a return 
of the empiricism : rationalism debate. For example, abiotic factors such as sea surface 
temperatures play a major role in determining survival rates in the early life history stages of 
many species of fish. Such factors are stochastic and introduce great uncertainty into stock 
dynamics and hence, scientific advice as to their management. As Peyton (1985) has observed 
\..the informational product of science is always tentative, subject to change and rarely 
complete'. 
The fishing industry is dramatically impacted by technological change. "Fish catchers as hunters 
and gatherers from the sea are ready adaptors of new technologies" (Vanderpool et al. 1986). 
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The most obvious effect is to enhance efficiency so that fishers become better equipped to take 
the catch. Adoption of technological change is due primarily to fishers wishing to maintain a 
competitive advantage. Such technology is rapidly adopted. Competitors (other fishers) embrace 
the same technology so that management policies designed to constrain levels of exploitation can 
be rapidly subverted through technology creep. Thus management often focuses on the control 
of fishing effort. 
In fisheries where such change has occurred, the resultant effort increase has invariably led to 
difficult restmcturing decisions that attempt to coincidentally reduce effort. Conversely in those 
few remaining fisheries where increasing economic gains have not been apparent, fishers have 
persisted with more traditional methods and restmcturing has not been necessary. Thus fish 
resources have been able to sustain (in a biological sense) existing exploitation levels. This is 
not to suggest all change is bad, but rather that increasing economic efficiency has a social price. 
In social terms, the expansion of capital-intensive fishing technologies has not only increased 
economic inequalities, but has also had a direct negative impact on small-scale fishers and those 
using traditional methods, by reducing their ability to compete. The similarities between this 
dilemma facing fishers and other small business entrepreneurs is apparent - the so-called petite 
bourgeoisie stmggle to survive. 
Modernisation and technological advances in fishing fleets have occurred rapidly in recent years 
with "bigger" almost universally acclaimed as "better". Centralised, highly-capitalised company 
operations have been paradoxically seen by national governments as more significant, 
economically promising and worthy of govemment support then more traditional, owner-
operated regional fleets. The Federal ship-building bounty (subsidy) paid to prawn fishing 
companies in the Gulf of Carpentaria in the 1970s is perhaps the best Australian example (see 
Anonymous, 1982). Here, a 27.5% subsidy to encourage new vessel constmction was used by 
fishing companies with larger fleets in the Gulf of Carpentaria prawn fishery to immediately 
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modemise their entire fleets since economies of scale meant that for every four new vessels 
constmcted, a fifth was virtually free (Department of Primary Industries, 1982). The same 
subsidy was thus not as accessible to the small owner-operator. 
When fishery resources are fully exploited, competition between fishers often resembles a 'zero 
sum game' in which technological advantages employed by certain individuals or groups of 
fishers have a direct negative effect on the catch (and income) of others, the "tragedy" debate. 
Where competition is heightened, as say with a sudden adoption of some technological advance, 
the elimination or marginalisation of the least efficient producers (small scale fishers) can occur. 
Thus fishery managers can be faced with the dilemma of opting for economically rational 
policies favouring larger company operators or promoting economically irrational, but socially 
responsible policies that "protect" small scale operators by imposing inefficiencies. 
Govemment poses another uncertainty in the fishers' world . Imposition of policy changes 
without consideration of the impact of such changes is a commonly held concem. Changing 
legal regimes at local, national and international levels are having profound consequences for the 
stmcture of fishing industries around the world. 
POLITICS AND FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
One of the more difficult realities that fishery managers face is that the behaviour of fishers is 
largely unpredictable and that unforeseen consequences of management decisions can occur. 
Each attempt to alleviate a condition implies some idea of its origin. However, it is usually not 
only the fishery that is to be managed, but rather, the fishers. In our society, human behaviour 
is controlled by social arrangements called govemment and public administration, while the 
process through which decisions are made as to what is done, is called politics. Together they 
comprise a system of social decision-making and control. Caldwell (1970) has described politics 
as ' .... the art of implementing values through the actions of people.' 
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Thus fishery management is a political activity as well as a scientific one. The scientific process 
is '.... embedded in a sociopolitical process which in turn has to be understood in terms of social 
structures, social values, and social behaviour (Yarbrough, 1985). Thus fishery management is 
a combination of the institutional control of human behaviour (govemment) in a context of 
competing values (politics). 
The application of politics to fishery management is that once fishery conservation issues have 
been addressed and satisfied - in other words that the biological sustainability of the resource 
is assured - then questions of allocation (who gets what) need to be addressed. Such allocative 
management decisions have in the past usually been based on equity and natural justice 
considerations, but also largely influenced by short term political expediency. In other words 
'.... fisheries allocation and management are ultimately political' (Usher, 1985). The ad hoc 
nature of many of these decisions has meant fishers have faced considerable uncertainty about 
management decisions that have a direct bearing on their livelihoods. Without clearly defined 
management statements of intent (plans), fishers tend to revert to politics and direct action, in 
order to influence these decisions. Fishery managers are also impacted directly by politics since 
they, as public servants, serve political masters, the govemment of the day. An example is 
whether or not govemment intervenes in the economy (Westem et al. 1991). 
This political reality has its own objective existence which is equally as genuine as the natural 
world confronted by the biologist (Yarbrough, 1985). It is 'govemed by its own laws' 
(Morgenthau, 1978) and in order to improve fishery management decision making, it is necessary 
to appreciate the laws by which political reality operates. It is also necessary to be aware of 
politics. Politics arise out of conflict and in every political situation there are contradictory 
tendencies at work. 'The very concept of politics .... assumes that there are different interests 
whether material, ideal, or commonly both, which have to be commanded (govemmentally) or 
conciliated (politically)' (Crick, 1973). 
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Thus there are perennial political forces that shape the present as they have the past. These 
forces need to be understood if change is to follow intent. As Schattschneider (1960) has put 
it '.... at the root of all politics in the universal language of conflict.' 
In the case of fishery management, politics determines the overriding philosophical 
underpinnings of the management approach - that of the distribution of economic power and 
thus the social production of value and, ultimately, wealth (Westem et al. 1991). Such policy 
positions (intervention in the economy or not) may impact the trajectory or the evolutionary 
direction of a fishery. 
THE CULTURE OF THE FISHERS 
The term "culture" has been used to describe all that in human society which is socially rather 
than biologically transmitted. Culture is thus a general term for the symbolic and learned aspects 
of human society - knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, law and values (Tylor, 1871; Geetz, 
1978; Poggie, 1980). 
The culture of fishers is not simple - for individuals its form may be influenced by occupational 
longevity - how long the individual has been in the industry. Thus a recent entrant has a 
different suite of knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, law and values than does a second, third 
or fourth generation fisher. Culture may also be influenced by where an individual is located 
on the ownership continuum. In other words, whether the fisher has a highly capitalised, modem 
efficient vessel, equipped with modem electronic systems and employing other people or, at the 
other extreme, is an owner-operator with simple equipment, a lifetime's knowledge of fish 
behaviour and seasonal variability, where success relies on personal skill (McCay, 1995). 
The role of culture is significant when considering fishery management. Culture may be 
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important as causal or motivating factors in historical circumstances, as concepts in interpreting 
fishers' attitudes and hence as personal modes of thought or understanding; as indicative of 
community preferences and finally as to the validity and justification of values (PoUnac, 1988). 
This last point is of particular relevance to fishery management since any policy must have an 
argument - why do it? - which involves a rationale supported by values (strong, semi-
permanent, underlying and sometimes inexplicit dispositions). 
Values in historical settings may be understood as causal origins of individual, group and social 
behaviours. Like intentions, motives and objectives, values are guides to action (Wildavsky, 
1979). Values are also concepts, and "concepts" are ways of interpreting what one perceives, 
hence they may be considered modes of thought or understanding (Caldwell, 1974). Thus values 
have explanatory power since they influence conduct, generate expectations and lead to real 
outcomes. 
Fishers derive their livelihood from the sea. They are inherently conservative since such 
livelihood involves considerable risk taking (financially, occupationally and as a result of the 
vagaries of Mother Nature) and their social, political and economic clout is relatively minor 
(McGoodwin, 1990). Nearly all fishers identify their occupation with independence, self-
reliance, freedom from regimentation and challenge. A high degree of independence and self-
reliance is necessary for coping with fishing activity, particularly aboard ocean-going vessels 
(Poggie, 1980 a,b; Poggie and Pollnac 1988 and McGoodwin 1990). 
A major role of values, however, is as indicators of community preferences. Values and norms 
which are conventionally accepted in a society, guide the behaviour and form the basis of 
judgment for most of its members. Such values define the mles of conventional morality. This 
is of direct significance to fishery management because a principal obstacle to any management 
plan or to any policy '.... is normative, a matter of values and priorities' (Meehan 1979). What 
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is further apparent is that unless such plans and policies are supported by the values, interests 
and beliefs within the community stmcture, they will fail. On, as Meehan (1979) puts it '.... 
laws unsupported by norms will fail.' 
In respect of fishery management, irrespective of scientific soundness, logic, intense conviction, 
or govemmental persuasion, policy that lacks supp)Ort in the fundamental value stmcture of the 
fisher's society cannot succeed;'.... particularly if they involve significant cost' (Meehan 1979). 
Examples of this sort of disjuncture include prohibition in the United States and the six o'clock 
closing of hotels in Australia. Efforts to circumvent the need for normative support are futile 
and they '.... make for tokenism and sham, for resistance and disobedience and, ultimately, for 
violent resistance' (Meehan, 1979). Thus the value stmcture of communities limits the potential 
for accomplishment of any public policy. 
Thus any fishery management programme is necessarily culturally based and value-oriented, as 
well as biologically / economically oriented, and architects of such programs need to understand 
why persons act as they do, as well as why they should prefer certain values, situations and 
policies, to others. These architects then need to focus on values as facts (fishers), values in 
light of all the facts (enlightened fishers) and on ways to refine, restate or change values as 
social experience brings to view new data which need to be evaluated (the fluid situation faced 
by the fishery manager). Thus, individual fisher attitudes to policy are cmcial to the acceptance 
of policy and policy change. 
CLASS AND THE PRAWN FISHER 
General 
The evolution of the management of prawn fisheries in Australia has either been through a policy 
of free entry followed by the imposition of limited entry (Gulf of Carpentaria, Queensland East 
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Coast and New South Wales) or more directly, by the immediate adoption of limited entry 
(Westem Australia, South Australia). Open entry policies in prawn fishery management have 
allowed the ownership rights to be initially less precisely defined among large numbers of small 
operators. In tum, such policies have fostered the gradual adoption of technological 
improvements - for example, adoption of advanced electronic equipment; replacing ice-
refrigerated seawater ("wet" boats) with on-board snap freezer capacity ("dry" boats); 
progressive vessel replacement with larger vessels with greater carrying capacity as grounds are 
proven and the market differentiation for targeted species (local bait markets versus high value 
export products). The end result has been weakly-defined ownership of the means of 
production. 
Adoption of an immediate, limited entry policy in prawn fishery management on the other hand, 
has precisely defined ownership rights among small numbers of operators, allowed immediate 
adoption of technological advances, the deployment of optimum classes of vessels and the 
exclusive ability to target optimum sizes and species of prawns in order to maximise economic 
retums. The end result has been strongly defined ownership of the means of production. 
Capital investment has been largely driven by the degree of exclusiveness and value of the 
ownership right, by the species and quantities of prawns able to be harvested on the particular 
grounds, remoteness and weather pattems, and operational stmcture (company versus owner-
operator). The exclusiveness of the ownership or property right in a prawn fishery thus has an 
intrinsic value, since fewer participants ensure consensus on management issues. The greater 
the exclusivity, the more valuable the right. However, the value of the catch is similarly 
important. For example, the current annual prawn catch in New South Wales is about 2,500 
tonnes and is taken by 400 vessels. Approximately the same level of catch is taken in South 
Australia by 38 vessels. Thus the property right (the ownership of the means of production) in 
South Australia is valued at far more than that in New South Wales. 
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The biology of prawn species also can determine fisher behaviour - some species may 
congregate in large aggregations for breeding and thus large catches can be taken in limited 
trawling time (as is found with Banana prawns) whereas other species are more evenly dispersed 
and thus more modest catches could be expected for relatively longer trawling time (as is found 
with King prawns). Thus the need to handle large catches of Banana prawns in limited time, 
influence the design characteristics of vessels used in the Banana prawn fishery. The distances 
needed to travel to reach prawning grounds, and potential exposure to severe weather pattems 
(cyclones), may also influence the choice of size and seaworthiness capabilities of vessels. A 
vessel able to stay at sea for months and travel long distances, has different design characteristics 
to one fishing immediately adjacent to its home port. 
The variation in size of vessels has thus been also influenced by the nature of the prawn 
resources and location. New South Wales and Queensland fleets are highly variable, ranging 
from small open vessels less than 9m to large ocean-going vessels (Table 2.1). South Australia 
has legislated a maximum size (19.8m) and so has a uniform fleet, whilst Westem Australia has 
no regulations goveming vessel size, which is largely limited by economics (however, net size 
is limited in both South Australia and Westem Australia). Since 1977 there has been a tendency 
towards larger vessels to take advantage of the Commonwealth Govemment boat-building 
subsidy in which a bounty of 27.5% of the cost of constmction was met by the Commonwealth 
for vessels over 150 tonnes or 21m (Anonymous, 1982). This in tum has distorted investment 
pattems by attracting a greater level of capital than can be sustained by the fishery. 
Table 2.1 
Size distribution (percentage) of prawn trawl fleets in 
NSW and Qld. 
Description 
Small, open vessels <9m 4 
Small enclosed 9-1 Im vessels 17 
Inshore trawlers l l -15m local waters 34 
Ocean going >15m offshore vessels 45 
* Excludes approximately 120 beam trawl vessels of the 5 to 9m class 
Sources: BAE (1984), Glaister and McDonall (1983), Bowen and Hancock (1985). 
NSW Qld 
1* 
17 
61 
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Economies of scale are also apparent when considering the composition of prawning fleets. For 
example, a company operation would be expected to standardise the design and class of prawn 
fishing vessel across its fleet, whereas the individual owner-operator would more likely purchase 
or design a prawning vessel of unique design and characteristics, to satisfy his or her needs. 
Thus the ownership and composition of Australian prawning fleets has been influenced by many 
factors but including the choice of management policies by govemments - that of free entry or 
that of immediate limitation. Such a choice, in tum, may have depended upon the philosophy 
of the govemment of the day. Fishers have less of a commitment to philosophy and more a 
self-interest in "... preserving control over what they do and how they do it." (Westem et al, 
1991: 324). As seen above, other factors including biological characteristics and value of prawns 
available and the location of prawning grounds and infrastmcture available have also influenced 
the ownership (company versus individual owner-operator) and composition (size and class) of 
the prawning fleets. However, the original decision regarding access, has been of most 
significance in the subsequent evolution of Australian prawn fisheries, and in particular, the 
strength of the ownership of the means of production, in a Marxist sense. 
Class Relations 
In Marxist theory, there are two main classes in society - capitalists, who own the means of 
production and workers, who do not. By virtue of the productive assets which they own (capital 
and labour power), they each face constraints on how they can best pursue their material interests 
(Wright, 1997). Marx argued that the "... continual tendency and law of development of the 
capitalist mode of production is more and more to divorce the means of production from labour, 
and more and more to concentrate the scattered means of production into large groups, thereby 
transforming labour into wage-labour and the means of production into capital," (Marx, Capital, 
Vol III, last chapter). 
Marx argued that the two classes capitalists (bourgeoisie) and workers (proletariat), were 
engaged in a class stmggle over exploitation, and that such class divisions are defined primarily 
in terms of the linkage between property relations and exploitation (Wright, 1997). For example, 
a slave master (who owns property rights in people) generates exploitation by appropriating the 
fmits of labour (the surplus) of the slave. 
Marx also recognised that there were more than two classes, and throughout his work, he refers 
to the petite bourgeoisie (self employed who employ little or no wage labour) as a "transitional" 
class. However, he maintained that an increasingly polarisation between the two "pure" classes 
would see the middle class disappear. The debate over the durability of Marx's middle class, 
social positions that fit into neither the working class or capitalists, has been a focus in sociology 
(Wright, 1985). 
The traditional marxist concept of class struggle and exploitation is a special case of a more 
general concept of economic inequality. In Marxian exploitation, one class appropriates the 
surplus labour performed by another class, so that the income of the exploiting class is derived 
from the labour of the exploited class. Roemer (1982) defined up to five classes, where classes 
are defined by distinctive locations within the social relations of production - Capitalists, small 
employers, petty bourgeois, semi-proletarian and proletarians - based on inequities in the 
distribution of productive assets. Wright (1985) has expanded this model by considering, 
empirically, differential ownership of assets in the means of production. Thus the two traditional 
polarised classes of the capitalist mode of production - workers who own no means of 
production, and who sell their labour, and capitalists, who own substantial means of production, 
hire wage-eamers to use those means of production and do not need to work themselves - are 
interspersed by at least three other class positions. First, there are people who own just enough 
means of production to reproduce themselves, but not to hire anyone else (the traditional petite 
bourgeoisie). Second, other persons own some means of production, enough to provide for some 
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of their subsistence, but not enough to reproduce themselves, thus forcing them to also sell some 
of their labour (the semi-proletarianised wage-eamer) and finally, there are people who own 
enough means of production to hire workers, but not enough that they really have the option of 
not working at all (small employers who work alongside their employees doing much the same 
work as the people they hire). 
Wright (1985: 151) has empirically defined an operational scheme for an exploitation - asset 
concept of class stmcture based on the number of employees (his table 5.3). In a comparative 
analysis of class based on such definition, Wright (1985) contrasted class stmcture in the USA 
and Sweden. He found a marked dichotomy between owners of the means of production and 
non-owners. In both countries, the tme working class was numerically the largest class, up to 
40 per cent of the labour force and when marginal elements were added, this increased to about 
60% in each country. In both countries the bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie constitute a small 
proportion of the labour force: about 5 to 7 per cent are pure petite bourgeoisie, 5 to 6 per cent 
small employers in both countries and less than 2 per cent fully-fledged capitalists. 
Westem et al. (1991) describe an Australian extension of a larger intemational study into the 
class stmctures of Europe Asia and North America (Wright 1985). As with Wright's results, the 
working class make up the largest class numerically, with the bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie 
constituting a very small proportion of the overall class stmcture. But does this vary with the 
different economic sectors of Australia - say primary, secondary tertiary? 
Mullins (1988) proposes that there has been two stages in the urbanisation of Australia - a 
mercantile stage and a corporate one. In the former, the economy was largely driven by the 
export of primary produce and the import of manufactured goods. This has been replaced by 
Australian capitalism becoming part of the world capitalist system, driven largely by 
globalisation. This globalisation trend is discussed in greater detail, particularly as it relates to 
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the prawn fishing industry, in a later section. 
In a similar vein, Browning and Singelmann (1978) have described how employment in the 
industrial sector has changed and have argued that such transformation has been characterised 
by a shift of labour out of the primary sector (including fishing) and the movement of labour into 
the tertiary or services sector. In Australia for example, in 1911, 25% of the employed 
workforce was in the mral sector, but by 1986 only 6% remained (Baxter et al. 1991). 
Browning and Singelmann (1978) elaborated this with an expanded 6 sector model to explain 
relations between economic sector and class. Westem (1991) employed this classification to 
examine the Australian context and found the extractive sector (agriculture, fishing, forestry and 
mining) accounted for less than 4% of the workforce. Interestingly, the extractive sector had 
the highest proportion of self employed (42%) and an interpretation by Westem is that 
productive services (agriculture, fishing), are becoming increasingly capital intensive. 
Consideration of prawners class structure thus allows insight and an understanding of historical 
events in the context of the evolution of an industry. In the case of the fishing industry 
generally and the Queensland prawn fishing industry in particular, the high proportion of self 
employed would indicate the importance of understanding the petite bourgeoisie as a class, in 
discussing their acceptance of govemment management policies. 
The Petite Bourgeoisie and Prawn Fishers 
Mullins (1994) has summarised the principal recent literature describing the petite bourgeoisie. 
With the onset of industrialisation, primary producers inevitably felt threatened by capitalist 
industrial modemisation (Conway, 1981). As capitalist industrialists expanded and were able to 
take advantage of economies of scale, small scale producers were faced with the choice of either 
expanding at the expense of fellow small producers or going out of business and joining the 
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ranks of wage-labour. The areas of the economy not as conducive to wage-labour - those of 
agriculture, fishing, building and constmction and small retailers - have tended to support an 
active petite bourgeoisie (Mullins, 1994). 
In their definitive work on class in contemporary Australia, Baxter et al. (1991) in Chapter 14 
examine the link between class and politics. In particular, they surveyed attitudes to government 
intervention and the so-called "free enterprise" system. Interestingly, the "Extractive" economic 
sector, which includes fishers, contained the highest proportion of self employed (Westem, 1991) 
and this class(es) had generally conservative political views, as would be expected of a group 
having high property ownership. 
In general, Baxter et al. (1991) found that employers and petite bourgeoisie were opposed to 
govemment intervention, supported free enterprise and opposed trade unions. Such views, by 
prawn fishers, would seem contradictory in practice. For example, as capitalism (through 
increased aggregation of fishing property rights) has impacted the prawn fishery, it has tended 
to polarise small scale and larger operators. Small scale operators denounce larger vessels as 
adversely impacting the resource through technological advances yet they simultaneously support 
their own adoption of such technological advances. Such a populist phenomenon is complex, 
contradictory and a generality. Lenin (1963) noted that such populism was inevitably a political 
response by the agrarian petite bourgeoisie to the threat posed by capitalist modemisation - in 
other words the threat of the transformation of the small property of the many into the large 
property of the few. Such a political response is evident in any discussion of fishery 
management issues, the economic dualism argument referred to previously. 
Mullins (1994) noted that the employing/?ef/Ye bourgeoisie employed few people and that they 
worked alongside their employees, concluding that negligible amounts of surplus value were 
extracted from employees. In the case of prawn fishers, the catch is usually allocated on a fixed 
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percentage basis to the running costs of the vessel (30-40%), owner (20-30%), skipper (20-
30%) and crew (10-20%) (Williams, 1980). Thus the class relationship is more one of mutual 
dependence or fratemal (Bechhofer and Elliott, 1981; Scase and Goffe, 1982), than would be 
expected from the capitalist-exploiting working-class dichotomy espoused by Marx. 
It would seem from these few examples that prawn fishers as a class could be of interest, when 
in a stmctural Marxist sense, the concentration of ownership of the means of production seems 
to be a key evolutionary process in the management of these fisheries. In other industries, the 
class effects of such a progression has been an increase in the numbers of workers who neither 
control nor own the means of production. Work has been progressively deskilled as an 
increasingly extensive division of labour through the adoption of technology emerges and 
traditional craft skills disappear (Vanderpool, 1987; Westem and Westem, 1988). 
It could be argued that a similar progression has occurred in Australian prawn fisheries - the 
gradual industrialisation of a sector of the fleet, a movement from artisanal fishers to company 
operations, and the rapid adoption of technology. The particularly interesting aspect of prawn 
fishers is that they both own the means of production and many are self-employed, employing 
few crew - tmly petite bourgeoisie. These petite bourgeoisie use their own, limited capital to 
purchase or part purchase a vessel and licence, and then apply their own labour to catch and 
market prawns. They are capitalists (though the capital may be small), but use their own labour 
and may draw upon the assistance of family members (spouse or children) and hire one or more 
others to work alongside them (Mullins, 1994). Mullins (ibid) also distinguishes two types of 
petite bourgeoisie: employers and the "pure" petite bourgeoisie, the self-employed (Bechhofer 
and Elliott, 1981). At the other extreme are fishing family dynasties or fishing companies who 
are "pure" capitalists in that the means of production are aggregated within the company (vessels, 
licences, processing facilities) and skippers and crew are employees. Surpluses are appropriated 
by the Company and investments allocated on the basis of profit-maximisation (Wright, 1997). 
What has driven such an evolutionary shift and has it occurred in all of our prawn fisheries? 
There appears to be significant differences between fisheries and some of these differences may 
be a consequence of management policies. Other factors such as the globalisation of the 
Australian economy may also be important. How this has impacted Australian prawn fishers is 
discussed in the following section. 
GLOBAL CHANGE AND IMPACTS ON AUSTRALIA 
Since the 1950s, the developed countries of Europe have tended to gravitate towards a European 
free trade bloc. Thus the Treaty of Rome (1957) saw West Germany, France and Italy combine 
in what was to become the European Union. The price of Britain's "entry" in 1973 was the 
adoption of a European agricultural policy and the resultant devaluing of the Britain-Australia 
agricultural relationship (Gleber, 1966). Australia had enjoyed a period of unparalleled 
prosperity following the Second World War by pursuing a policy of part capitalism and part 
State socialism through tariff-protectionism through promotion of a mixed economy (the so-
called Dirigiste model of Catley, 1996). The uncoupling from Britain forced Australia to look 
towards other countries, particularly South East Asia. 
The period saw Australia as ".... a semi-peripheral settler democracy .... wealthy in a poor 
colonial region" (Catley, 1996). The boom of 1949-66 saw strong population growth fuelled 
by European immigration, good retum on commodity exports and an inflow of foreign capital 
(Cochrane, 1980). The Cold War (1948-73) and the Depression had seen the evolution of 
Marketing Boards and other commodity price maintenance schemes. The emergence of Japan 
and China in the 1960s largely occurred as a result of the American strategy of promoting free 
trade with South East Asia. 
Coincidentally, the Japanese Govemment sought to diversify sources of imports so as to make 
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their supply less vulnerable to dismption. The freeing of the Japanese markets coincided with 
Britain's entry to the European Economic Community, thus it was logical that Australian interest 
would tum to Asia. 
However, as Britain industrialised, agricultural production decreased and importation of 
commodities from the former colonies of America and Australia became increasingly necessary. 
Industrialisation spread to Europe and then America and by 1914 was largely complete. The 
advent of World War 1 intensified the process, as did World War 2. The World trend has thus 
been toward the evolution of high-income urbanised societies with small agricultural workforces. 
Politically, Australia was dominated by policies of agrarian socialism under conservative (Liberal 
Country Party) govemments after World War 2. Following the Government of R.G. Menzies, 
Prime Ministers Holt, Gorton and McMahon pursued tariff protectionism and export growth, 
particularly to the USA market. The expansion of the Australian mining sector in the 1960s 
(Fitzgerald, 1974) coincided with Japanese industrialisation and, with Japan being resource-poor, 
rising production caused a rapid increase in foodstuffs demand. The discover}' of large prawn 
resources in the Gulf of Carpentaria in the late 1960s was thus timely. 
The election of an Australian social-dem6crat (Labor) government in 1972 saw a more outward 
focussing of Australian policy to that of a world market, particularly that of Asia. In July 1973, 
the Govemment announced a 25% across-the-board tariff cut, which had a profound impact on 
the protected Australian industry and the import : export ratio. This unfortunately was closely 
followed by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) induced price escalation 
of oil prices and consequent world recession, and caused the dismissal of the Whitlam Labor 
Govemment and the election of a conservative replacement. 
The conservative govemment of Prime Minister Malcolm Eraser (a former primar>' producer), 
33 
attempted a retum to a regime of tariff regulation similar to that promoted during the Menzies 
era. An attempted engineering of a commodities boom at the onset of a global downturn had 
disastrous economic consequences and the national deficit exploded. 
The conservative govemment of Fraser was in tum replaced by the social democrat Labor 
Govemment of R.J. Hawke. This govemment stimulated the national economy whilst 
simultaneously constraining wages policy through a national Accord between the Govemment, 
major employers and the principal unions. This was the start of the globalisation of the 
Australian economy, although, because of the reliance on commodity exports, the Australian 
economy was still subject to intemational fluctuations. 
In 1983, the Hawke Govemment deregulated the financial sector, floated the Australian dollar 
and pursued policies of creating competitive markets, pursuing "world's best practice" and 
achieving intemational standards. At the 1986 National Labor Party Conference in Hobart, the 
Federal Treasurer observed that the outlook for the Australian economy was bleak and that the 
nation was headed towards the status of a "banana republic" unless reforms were made. This 
statement was followed by Govemment action in cutting expenditure and borrowings to support 
the Australian currency and retire debt. The privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank and 
opening of the national telecommunications network to competition followed. All these 
decisions were based on the premise that ".... the World market had rendered national fiscal 
policies unable to operate in isolation" (Catley, 1996). 
The food industry is one of Australia's oldest productive sectors and there are significant links 
between the manufacturing sector and vast food production capabilities, especially through 
value-adding to raw commodities. Since the 1980s, there has been increasing competition for 
world markets in the areas of processed food, linked to transportation and global currency. This 
has accelerated with the development of transnational corporations which have sought to 
integrate global production. The "world car" is an example, where different car components are 
manufactured in many different countries and assembled in another. It has been estimated that 
25% of world production of goods was produced by such transnational corporations by the mid 
1980s (Dicken, 1986). 
A further important trend was the locational shift of the world economy to Japan (Gregory, 
1991). The Gross Domestic Product of Japan increased 13% per annum during 1960-73, more 
than double the OECD average (Fagan and Webber, 1994). During the same period, the extent 
of value-adding raw commodities more than quadmpled, a feat replicated in the period 1968-88 
(Fagan and Webber, 1994). 
The 1980s also saw the deregulation of the intemational airline industry, plus more efficient 
aircraft, reducing the costs of intemational airfreight. The simultaneous deregulation of the 
Australian Dollar further reduced the relative costs of Australian export commodities, for 
example, facilitating exports of unprocessed seafood. The effect of floating the Australian dollar 
was a depreciation of 50% against the US Dollar and 200% against the Japanese Yen. 
The social costs of restmcturing have included labour shedding and technological change. 
Labour shedding has both stmctural and cyclical unemployment components, and is largely 
driven by changes in growth pattems of the world market (Gregory, 1991). World market 
troughs in 1974-75, 1981-83 and 1990-91 had global consequences and both the level and 
duration of unemployment grew. Technological charge resulted in an increase in productivity, 
lower prices, increased demand and employment but also displaced workers, made certain jobs 
obsolete and, when rapid and following a period of stmctural rigidity resulted in intense labour 
shedding. Thus technological change resulted in the loss of jobs in entry-level, low skill, low 
experience occupations which disproportionately caused high youth unemployment. 
Thus there has been the emergence of a global cultural system. Causative factors include a 
world satellite information system; global pattems of consumption and consumerism; the 
cultivation of cosmopolitan life styles, global sport (Olympics, soccer, tennis); world tourism; 
the decline of the sovereignty of the nation state; global militarism; the recognition of a world-
wide ecological crisis (global warming, decline of the ozone layer, acid rain and declining 
rainforests), world-wide health crises (AIDS, famine); global politics, global religions and the 
growing awareness of the concept of human rights (Hauser and Gmsky, 1988; Vanderpool, 1987; 
Frobel et al. 1980, McGoodwin, 1990 and Sachs, 1998). 
Hence globalisation is certainly more than economic globalisation, although arguably, economic 
globalisation has been most significant for fisheries evolution. Some authors argue that such is 
the transnational character of capitalism in the world today, that it is inappropriate to study class 
differences within single national units (Wright, 1997). The last two decades have also seen 
growth in multinational corporate industrial investment in third world countries (Frobel et al. 
1980 and Nash and Femandez-Kelly 1983). In the case of the fishing industry, Australian 
vertically-integrated companies have established processing facilities in South East Asia -
SAFCOL Tuna, for example. 
Capitalism is a global system of production (Wright, 1997). This suggests that the proper unit 
of analysis for understanding capitalist class stmctures should be the world, not specific firms, 
countries or regions. For example in studying the phenomenon of proletarianisation, it could be 
argued that the proportion of the employees of American corporations world-wide who are in 
the working class has increased, but there has been a shift of employment to workers outside the 
borders of the USA (Third World country factories such as is the case with Nike). Equally, 
however, one could argue that what is immediately and socially important is what is happening 
at the local level, which is the reason for the local focus in this study. 
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It can also be argued that economic globalisation has not been universally welcomed. Indeed 
poorer countries have found it difficult to share in the dream of universal economic growth. 
Developing-country leaders have pointed out that their economies have fallen behind in 
technology, that their monetary systems are being destabilised by financial flows they can neither 
track nor understand, that commodity prices are plummeting and they are drowning in debt 
(Sachs, 1998). With such forces at work, there is little in a practical sense that can be achieved 
other than describing the world environment and the effects of globalisation. 
The impact of globalisation and consequent restmcturing in Australia has been that 
unemployment is high, money wages are restrained, real average wages have reduced and there 
has been an increase in the national foreign debt. As corporate Australia's profit margin has 
increased there has been a shift towards stmctural change in the economy in reaction to the 
intemational market. 
Globalisation of world markets has impacted upon Australia, particularly since 1983, as 
Australia's products have been progressively excluded from traditional European markets. Raw 
commodities have more and more been value-added through processing prior to export. As the 
Asian Tigers have awoken, Asian markets have attracted Australian investment in Asia. Value-
added commodities are increasingly being'directed toward population centres of natural resource 
- poor countries of South East Asia. 
The Japanese bubble economy finally burst and resulted in the most serious post-war recession 
in 1991-93. The mling LDP Govemment lost office and was replaced by a series of coalitions 
focussed on opening the severely restricted Japanese market and a policy of fiscal stimulation. 
This was reinforced by the November OPEC, Heads of Economies Summit in Seattle supported 
an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Zone and a liberalising of markets (Catley, 1996). 
These initiatives were further supported twelve months later under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade Agreement to reduce further obstacles to free trade. In such an environment, 
capitalist states found ".... that nationally determined interventionist policies designed to protect 
or regulate economic activity only served to restrict adjustment to intemational change and to 
reduce national competitiveness" (Catley, 1996). 
In the last decade, Australia has repositioned its economy so as to be part of the Asia-Pacific 
region. The Keating Govemment had focussed on closer ties through defence, education and 
trade. The State of Queensland has benefited through accelerated growth of mainly commodity 
exports. Seafood has been at the forefront. 
The changes in the distribution of the workforce by industry point to marked changes since 
federation. The mral sector experienced a substantial decline in the period 1911 (24.5%) to 
1986 (6%) (Westem, 1991). Head (1986) observes that "... the Australian economy exhibits 
many of the features typical of settler-capitalism societies like Canada, New Zealand and Latin 
America," citing among others a reliance on raw materials for export. Mullins (1988) supports 
this view, identifying a dependence on a resource-based mral economy, seasonal work, labour 
mobility and small-scale employment. 
There have been marked differences between the states in the composition of exports and 
production. For example, in 1961, there was 38% (of that State's workforce) employed in the 
primary sector of Queensland and Westem Australia versus 25% in South Australia and 20% 
in New South Wales. Primary production in these least populous States has declined at a lesser 
rate than that in the most populous. In Queensland and Western Australia, production of 
commodities has expanded to a greater extent than other States with employment (numbers) in 
the Agriculture-Forestry-Fishing-Hunting sector having increased. In all other states 
employment in this sector has declined by more than 15% (Fagan and Webber, 1994). These 
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differences between Queensland-Westem Australia and the other states have been largely fuelled 
by the resources discoveries of the 1960-1970s. In the case of Queensland, there are significant 
coal and mineral deposits but, importantly for this study, there has also been the exploitation of 
massive prawn resources in the Gulf of Carpentaria and the East Coast. 
Globalisation of capital has hastened vertical integration of fishing companies and offshore 
diversification of operations (processing in third worid countries) in many nations (European, 
American, Australian). Part of such a trajectory has been rationalising and restmcturing of fleets 
and the transition from self-employed owner-operator businesses to large company operations 
including distant water fleets. Examples of this include Japanese Tuna long-liners of Australia 
and American Tuna purse seiners in the South Pacific. 
Such a process has also been evident in Queensland primary production where export markets 
for beef, sugar, cotton have largely determined the scale and stmcture of industry. The 
Queensland prawn fishing industry is but one more example. The rapidity of development of 
the fishery has also been driven by export markets and, in tum, economic globalisation. But the 
complexity of the prawn market (Glaister, 1990) - domestic and export, processed and 
unprocessed - has meant that such development has not been unidirectional. It is this diversity 
that may be in part responsible for the diversity of the social stmcture of prawn fishers. 
SOCIOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF FISHERS 
The study of the social aspects of fishers and fisheries has generally focussed on community 
studies: the relationship between the fishing community and society-at-large (at both micro and 
macro levels), the organisation of the fishing activity and social impacts of fishery management 
(Hakon Hoel, 1991). 
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The study of fishing communities has included the role of industry (catching and processing 
sectors) in providing employment (Charles, 1988; Jentoft, 1989; Weber, 1994), as well as more 
traditional empirical ethnological studies of such communities (see Fox, 1978; Alegret, 1996 and 
Crean and Symes, 1996). The employment studies have tended to focus on "responsibility", that 
is the division of responsibility for the various tasks in the fishing community (vessels, 
households, authorifies and interdependencies). The role of fishing in providing informal 
education is also well-documented, with studies of how new recmits are started on simple tasks 
and subsequently graduate to more skilled and complex tasks as they have become more and 
more experienced (Charles, 1988). The role of women in fishing communities has also received 
some attention, but generally highlighting the supporting role played in the fishing business (the 
non-fishing tasks) (Gerrard, 1983). 
The study of the relationships between the fishing industry and general society have produced 
a far richer literature. Studies of the impacts of stmctural change in society on artisanal fisheries 
relating to the increasing centralisation of administrative power (Anderson, 1987 and Poetschke, 
1984), legal changes at the national and intemational level and impacts on the "commons" 
paradigm (Hamilton and Seyfrit, 1994) have all contributed to a greater appreciation of social 
science in fisheries administration. Increasingly, attention is tuming to the issue of the 
legitimacy of commercial fishing - authors are exploring the increasing tension between 
commercial fishers on one side and scientists, conservationists and promoters of rational 
management on the other. Palsson and Durrenberger (1982) have argued that cognitive models 
of fishers are influenced by the inherent variability of natural resources - that fluctuations in fish 
abundance have conditioned fishers to pessimistically evaluate the legitimacy of their own 
occupation. This in tum, can directly impact the success or otherwise of regulatory and 
administrative programs (Smith, 1990). 
Legitimacy issues also have their roots not only in material or economic matters but also in 
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conflicts over "life style" or ways of living. Threats to extinction of small fishing communities 
can be both extemal and intemal. For example, discouraging entrepreneurial flair through 
restrictive practices (intemal) or encouraging foreign fleet ownership through facilitating 
company trading opportunities (extemal) (Thompson, 1983). Central control of regulatory 
functions can also adversely, regionally, impact fishing communities. The lack of co-ordination 
between central agencies responsible for overlapping functions (eg. environmental protection and 
fisheries) can result in conflicting goals, cormpting anticipated benefits of policies and producing 
unexpected outcomes. This uncertainty, when combined with the previously mentioned vagaries 
of Mother Nature and markets, can cause additional concerns in small fishing communities. 
The organisation of the fishing activity has been addressed by many authors, and Hakon Hoel 
(1991) provides a summary of major Westem European studies. Barth (1963) is widely credited 
with providing the neoclassical economic theoretical foundations explaining transactional analysis 
- that is, that fisher fleet behaviour is a result of social transactions between skippers and crews. 
Barth's theory sought to explain why some skippers are more successful than others in herring 
fisheries. He concluded that ".... a vessel's chance of finding herring is greater if it strikes out 
on its own than if it follows other vessels (but that a skipper needs the tmst of his crew in order 
to do so)". The reason for the rider is that the magnitude of the crew share of the catch (wages) 
depends upon catching success of the ve'ssel (this is the so called skipper's skill or "skipper's 
effect"). 
Barth's theory has been challenged by recent work including that catch size is related directly 
to vessel size and frequency of fishing trips (Palsson and Durrenberger, 1982). They argued that 
there is no such thing as a "skipper effect" and that hard work (size and trips) plus a degree of 
luck explain success. White (1989) also contrasted a "fleet effect", the additive effect of 
"skipper effects" (individual and small-group behaviours such as interactions between skipper 
and crew or skipper and skipper) over many vessels and the behaviour of the fleet (in other 
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words a systemic "fleet" effect beyond individual success or failure). White noted that Barth 
assumed an additive relationship between individual and larger group behaviour (access to more 
information by staying in a fleet) whereas White considered that what mattered was the variety 
of information, not the amount and Gatewood (1984) similarly supports the value of non-
redundant information. White (1989) also hypothesised that spatially well-defined work fleets 
would always occur in fisheries where : the target species is mobile and patchy in occurrence 
(behaviourally through spawning behaviour, or environmentally through, say, sudden rainfall); 
the physical environment allows fleet behaviour; the available technology allows fleet behaviour 
without unacceptable levels of conflict amongst fishers and technology also allows altemate 
dispersion and convergence. Prawn fisheries and vessels fit these criteria (see Johnson and 
Orbach, 1990). 
Management and regulation are currently the favoured topics in multi-disciplinary research of 
fisheries. Symes (1996) has suggested, correctly in my view, that the crisis pervading global 
fisheries is largely the result of the failure of the present focus of policy development 
(input/output controls, restmcturing, cost recovery) to address fundamental problems of 
sustainability; in other words, policy is directed at symptoms, not the illness. 
Much has been made of the role of local co-operation in local communities, but more often, 
fisheries management is a zerosum game - some win and others lose. Thus managers face the 
daunting task of defining criteria - establishing how high the hurdles are set, which vessels are 
excluded, which fishers are forced out. The effects of regulation is also an area of increasing 
interest from social scientists since it is the users of the resources and not the resources 
themselves which are regulated (Johnson and Orbach, 1990). For example. Die and Watson 
(1992) simulated the dissipation of spatial area closure benefits as a result of non compliance 
(cheating) by fishers. They found that the effects of such cheating are substantial and quickly 
erode the benefits of imposing such closures, even though they are a commonly applied measure 
in managing prawn fisheries. 
The role of the social sciences has been subservient to the favour of biological and then 
economic/bioeconomic constmcts. Govemments, however, regularly intervene in order to 
promote social sustainability and unstated political agendas. Thus policy settings (eg levels of 
Total Allowable Catch or quota) are set above those recommended by scientists or policy levers 
adjusted (eg financial subsidies and cushions) to distort the economics of fisheries managed for 
economic objectives. Such px)licies arguably are mirror images of sustainable management, in 
other words, unsustainable. 
Social science may provide a needed paradigm shift in fisheries management. Biological 
scientists are retreating from the policy cutting edge as decision litigation increases and there is 
a growing lack of confidence in stock assessments (witness the increasing intemational reliance 
on risk assessment and simulation modelling, removing biological and population scientists from 
the recommendation process). Fundamental to the debate is the role of institutions in fishery 
management and it is this area that offers the greatest scope for a social science approach. 
m 
CHAPTER 3 
SHOOTING* THE GEAR: A METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING 
PRAWN FISHERS, PRAWN FISHERIES AND MANAGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two, I demonstrated that a fishery is a complex and dynamic, bio-economic-social 
system, having interactions across the environment, natural resources, fishers and organisations. 
Such interactions also generate conflicts over allocation of fish resources between competing 
resource users and between fishers and organisations and coastal communities. Such decisions 
include philosophical debates over ownership and control of fish resources. In addressing the 
research questions posed in this study (Chapter 1) it was necessar>' to examine organisational 
ecology, decision making processes, the fishers themselves, and interactions. This Chapter 
examines the methods and general approach to the empirical research and includes the 
application of social research, research procedures and data sources applied in the research 
strategy adopted, the choice of this study and the data sources. 
APPLICATION OF SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE FISHERIES CONTEXT 
Social research is concemed with gathering data that can help answer questions about aspects 
of society and thus enable a greater understanding of society. In this study, social phenomena 
have been selected to increase our understanding of the prawn fisheries "society". Social 
researchers have vigorously debated what is actually meant by "society". For some, as Ragin 
(1994) has suggested, "society" could be restricted to formal properties of human organisation 
and interaction. 
• The trawl net(s) is "shot" by releasing the winch brake and uncoupling the winch so that trawl wire free spools, 
all whilst the vessel is moving. The shearing action of water across the trawl boards then forces open the trawl 
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In the case of the prawn fishers society, this could encompass peak industry and agency 
organisations, their degree of hierarchal structures, their interactions, obligations and rights. A 
range of North American workers have examined fishing industry dynamics and hierarchal 
stmctures (Marchak et al. 1987; Calhoun, 1991) for example. Others have focussed on 
interactions between fishers and the bureaucracy (McGoodwin, 1990; Cozzens and Gieryn, 1990 
and Findlayson, 1994). Similar approaches have also occurred in New Zealand (Clark et al. 
1988), other parts of Oceania (Johannes, 1978) and Europe (Hannesson, 1991). However, social 
research also includes the study of people - the how and why of what people do. 
Commercial fishers have particular behaviours and values that have been well researched. 
Pinkerton (1989) addresses issues of conflict (particularly with indigenous fishers) through the 
process of shared responsibility (co-management). Lamson and Hanson (1984) describe a series 
of case studies that examine social, economic, biological and political processes that have shaped 
fisheries management decision-making on the Canadian Atlantic Coast. Like this study, these 
cases range from the behaviours of institutional entities to that of the individual fisher groups. 
These behaviours, taken in isolation are merely ordinary, everyday reactions to sets of 
circumstances. The sum of such behaviours examined in chronological sequence, give some 
insight as to how decisions occur. In other words, to understand how the particular condition 
of the fishery (health of the resource, the institutional milieu and fisher relationships) came to 
be (Ragin, 1994). 
Some social research is predicated on the scientific method based on deductive reasoning. That 
is, an examination of the literature is followed by the formulation of a (or several) hypothesis, 
the development of a research design, the collection of information and analysis and testing the 
hypothesis via predictions and subsequent acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis. Whilst 
some workers (Ragin 1994) assert that social research that follows the scientific method can 
claim the "legitimacy" of the so-called hard" sciences, others (the social constructivist school) 
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researching the sociology of scientific knowledge (Findlayson, 1994) have queried the legitimacy 
of science in a reflexivity sense (ethnomethodological) - that is the bricks of science (our sense 
of order) are really straw and a result of conversational processes, created in talk. 
At face value, such a statement would be viewed as heresy by fisheries scientists. Hagendijk 
has argued that constmctivism holds ".... scientific knowledge is constmctive (..."created" by 
scientists...) rather than descriptive and that (social) stmcture is at best a consequence (but never 
the cause) of what people do (Hagendijk, in Coussens and Gieryn, 1990). Such an argument 
seems inconsistent with the essence of the scientific paradigm. Fisheries scientists would argue 
that "facts" are irrefutable and that the rational interpretation of facts is what distinguishes good 
science from flawed science. However, both Hagendijk (ibid) and Findlayson (1994) point out 
that the leap from "facts" to considered "scientific" view of an issue, invariably contains elements 
of subjectivity or opinion very necessarily influenced by societal factors. 
The second approach is more comparative and this research, by way of contrast is inductive. 
A wide range of data is collected on a particular topic and the researcher pulls threads together 
to make sense of the topic and allow empirical generalisations. 
Thus depending upon whether a deductive, quantitative (survey-based) research approach or, 
an inductive qualitative and comparative research approach is adopted, the application of social 
research to a fisheries "society" can be as broad or as focussed as any other topic of sociology. 
In this study I examine the east coast prawn fishery and the distinctive occupational and class 
group to which prawn fishers belong. Historically important events are interpreted through 
linking the fishers and decision-makers through qualitative analyses of stmctures, groups and 
individuals. 
4 i 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
In any social research, the researcher is faced with the choice of an intensive, qualitative 
approach, a comprehensive, comparative approach, or an extensive quantitative approach. Such 
a choice between research strategies is generally predicated on the question of what is the goal 
of the research. In the analysis of social stmctures, the choice is between the values of a 
detailed analysis of a single historical case and the correlation and generalisation potential of a 
broader but more superficial treatment of a wider range of cases. In this study, there is a balance 
in this dilemma by both pursuing a limited comparison (of the general) across several prawn 
fisheries (cases) for the institutional organisational stmctures as well as an in-depth qualitative 
analysis (of the specific) Queensland prawn fishery and the fishers in that fishery. 
In a similar approach, in examining the origins and persistence of mral poverty in the USA, 
West (1982) examined six major institutions and how they exerted influence over the stmcture 
of property rights within mral, primary resource regions, West (1982) acknowledged the 
advantages of broader comparative analysis but also emphasised the value of an in-depth 
institutional case study. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argued in similar terms to West. 
Although somewhat dated, a study by Lipset et al (1956) states the point well: 
"Intemal analysis has no great disadvantage with respect to comparative analysis. 
It may, in fact, have one important advantage: by taking simple comparative 
correlation out of the reach of the investigator, it focuses his attention upon the 
underiying processes which operate within the system. In this way, the intemal 
analysis may lead to a deeper explanation of the phenomena and the 
generalisarion of a more fundamental kind." (p.479). 
4t 
The strategy here is thus to interpret the historically-significant events in the management of 
Queensland's prawn fishery in an attempt to constmct new understandings of fishery management 
phenomena and the organisational cultures that prevailed during the period examined, and in 
particular, whether such events could be constmed as influencing class position of prawn fishers. 
The efficacy of the Queensland case was examined by limited comparisons with prawn fishery 
management policies in other states. Finally, to further understand subtle aspects and features 
of the prawn fishery group, representations of their experiences were constmcted via an in-depth 
empirical study of prawn fishers. 
DATA SOURCES 
Secondary analysis of existing data sets were an essential component of this work. Some 
sociologists have voiced concems on the use of secondary analysis (see Nelson and Nelson, 
1969), though given the reliance on historical events in this study, the interpretation of published 
historical analyses, official statistics and descriptive analyses of historical events in joumal 
articles, was considered reasonable. 
Primary institutional archival data was sourced from minutes of routine and special meetings of 
the Queensland Fish Management Authority (later to become the Queensland Fisheries 
Management Authority), the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation and Queensland 
Fish Board. Such data are recorded chronologically and allow the systematic examination of 
particular issues as they unfold. Various discussion papers, policy documents, position 
statements, working group documents, management plans and correspondence between 
organisations and client groups was also examined. State Govemment intemal papers. 
Ministerial briefings and Departmental files allowed a more in-depth appreciation of issues, 
since, unlike the summary of outcomes usually resulting from the minutes of meetings, such 
documents were more candid and insightful. General statistical data was extracted from 
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Departmental records, catch data from individual fisher logbooks, annual reports and the 
Australian National Census. Specific sources follow: 
Prawn Fishers 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics' 1991 Census of Population and Housing Database was 
interrogated for the major Australian prawn fishery states of New South Wales, Queensland, 
South Australia and Westem Australia. The analysis did not include the Gulf of Carpentaria 
fishers. For each State, fishers were defined by occupation (occp). In the Census, occupation 
for all employed persons aged 15 years and over was defined by title of main job (Q.34) and by 
main tasks and duties performed in that occupation (Q.35). Occupation Coding for the 1991 
Census was classified according to the 1986 Edition of the Australian Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ASCO) and was coded to the occupation level. In ASCO, a job is a set of tasks 
performed by one individual and an occupation is defined as a set of jobs which require the 
performance of some or all of a common set of tasks. 
The ASCO is a hierarchically-stmctured classification based on the kind of work defined in 
terms of skill level and skill specialisation. There are six levels. 
Major groups are the broadest level and are distinguished from each other on the basis of skill 
level. Each of the eight major groups - managers/administrators; professionals; para-
professionals; tradespeople; clerks; salespeople/personal service workers; plant/machine 
operators/drivers; labourers/related workers - may consist of up to nine minor groups. Minor 
groups may be distinguished from each other on the basis of broadly defined skill specialisation. 
Minor groups can be further reduced to Unit groups and thence to Occupations. For the 
purposes of this study, the persons and occupations which defined fishing were "Ships pilots and 
Deck Officers" (Skippers) (3305 in ASCO) and "Fishermen/women, deckhands and 
4 i 
seamen/women" (8925 in ASCO). 
The industry classifications are defined by questions 36-38 on the 1991 Census for persons aged 
15 years and over. The Australian Standard Industrial Classification (ASIC) is applied to 
classifying answers to these questions. Note however, that there is not necessarily any 
relationship between the occupation of an individual and the industry in which he or she works. 
For example, in the case of a van driver for an establishment designated as in the transport 
industry, the establishment may employ many people in different occupations but they are all 
coded to the designated industry. For the purposes of this study, the industry which defined 
prawn fishing was the ASIC "Prawns" (0432). 
Elements of the population captured for this study were thus defined by the State of Usual 
Residence by Occupation (8925) Industry (3305 and 0432). For this subsample of the 
Australian population, a number of variables were examined. Family type (FMPT) was defined 
as a group of related individuals where at least one person was aged 15 years or older. Related 
can mean related by birth and by the formation of a marriage or marriage-like relationship. The 
household may consist of one person living alone, a primary family unit with or without non-
family members or two or more non-related people. In this study, family type was examined at 
the person level (in other words, for each' prawn fisher). Gender (SEXP) was defined for each 
person enumerated. Qualification (highest) level recorded the highest level of qualification 
obtained by a person since leaving school (higher degree, postgraduate diploma, bachelor degree, 
undergraduate diploma, associate diploma, skill vocational, basic vocational, level inadequately 
described, level not stated and no qualifications). 
Labour Force Status was a derived variable and classified all persons over 15 years and over 
as employed, unemployed or not in the workforce. The variable is derived from questions on 
full/part time job, looking for work, main job held last week and number of hours worked 
so 
(Q.30-33). The derivation methodology takes into account the majority of answers to these 
topics to derive the most appropriate labour force status. 
Age was recorded in five year groupings with a total of 20 such groupings. Age left school was 
an indicator of the educational level attained by people who do not have tertiary qualifications. 
This variable also provided for those still at school and those who did not go to school. The 
birth place contained the country of birth of each person (Q.ll). Hours worked recorded the 
number of hours worked in the main job held by employed people aged 15 years and over during 
the week before census night, excluding any time off but including overtime or extra time 
worked. 
Income was a record of the income level of people aged 15 years and over. People were asked 
to state their usual gross weekly income before any deductions (taxation, superannuation, health 
insurance) were made. Gross income included the above deductions as well as family allowance, 
pensions, unemployment benefits, student allowances, child support maintenance, wages, salary, 
overtime, dividends, rents received, interest received, business or farm income (less operating 
expenses) and workers compensation received. People were not asked to state exact income, but 
only to indicate the range into which their income fell. Household income was the summation 
of the personal incomes of each resident' present in the household. For any absent persons or 
persons with income not stated, household income was calculated using indices. 
The nature of occupancy was a derived variable and indicated whether households are renting, 
purchasing or owned the dwelling in which they were enumerated on census night. It applied to 
private dwellings, including occupied caravans in caravan parks, but not to non-private 
dwellings. 
In order to understand prawn fishers' views on management policies, a program of consultation 
and discussion was held with fishers and their peak organisation, the Queensland Commercial 
Fishermen's Organisation (QCFO). Such consultation and discussion was either through formal 
meetings with groups of fishers or other meetings with individuals. For formal meetings a venue 
would be arranged and advertised in the industry magazine, local newspaper and by word—of-
mouth. Venues included hotel lounges, community halls, bowls clubs and Court House meeting 
rooms. Such meetings could be "one off" or part of a State-wide series, depending on the issue 
for discussion. Examples of the former could be to discuss boundaries and timing for a local 
closure such as the Jumpinpin/Southport fishing closure and of the latter, coastwide discussion 
on a management plan for the fishery. Formal meetings were generally called by the QCFO to 
gauge member fishers' opinions on issues or by the Queensland Fisheries Management Authority 
(QFMA), the State management agency when formal dialogue was required. The author was 
either an invited expert/contributor or staff, and generally part of the "Official" delegation. A 
summary of formal meetings with prawn fishers follows: 
Table 3.1 
Listing of major formal consultation events by time and role of 
the author during meeting. 
"Delegate" indicates part of official party, "Member" indicates 
membership of committee, "Invited speaker" indicates present as 
expert, and "Chair" indicates chairing role. 
Meeting 
Queensland Port Meetings 
Queensland Port Meetings , 
QCFO State Trawl Committee 
QCFO State Council 
Queensland Fishing Industry 
Research Advisory Council 
QCFO Branch Meetings 
- Scarborough 
- Redlands 
- Southport 
- Brisbane 
- Mooloolaba 
QCFO Management 
Committee 
QFMA Trawl Management 
Advisory Committee 
Period 
July 1988 
October 1991 
1988-1995 
1990-1995 
1986-1995 
1 
) 
) Various 
) 1986-1990 
) 
1992 
1993-1995 
Status 
Delegate 
Delegate 
Member 
Invited speaker 
Delegate 
Invited guest 
Invited speaker 
Chair 
f* a. Port Meeting at Cairns 1991, part of delegation seated at table. 
Pictured (L to R) 
A Hansen (QCFO) 
J Storey (QFMA Board) 
J Glaister (author, QDPI) 
fi b. Audience at Cairns Port Meeting. Note two prawn fishers in front row. 
PLATE 1, Port Meetings 
Formal meetings were insightful as they allowed exposure to the formal debate on issues, but 
during coffee and lunch breaks, also enabled focussed discussion with individual or small groups 
of fishers, on the background to some contentious issues. An example was the northem versus 
southem ports debate on seasonal closures in the late 1980s. Other meetings were held with 
individual prawn fishers. 
During the period of this investigation between 1986 and 1995, the author held in depth 
discussions concerning fisheries management policies and their impacts with the following 
individual prawn fishers: the late P.Conaty, J.Cavanagh, A.Bauer, R.Harris, V.Lee, P.McKenzie, 
G.Kay, R.Greenhill, F.Bradley, J.Story, C.Greenhalgh, A.Hanson, M.Vanderheiden, B.Ehrke, the 
late R.Lacaze, R.Bowman, J.Wilson, P.Seib, W.Izzard, D.Hart, J.Finlay, J.Duggan, the late 
P.Hatfield, R.Green and C.Olsen. 
During public port meetings with fishers, it became apparent that such meetings could be 
dominated by one or two individual prawn fishers who were articulate, held very strong views 
on an issue, or both. The majority would remain silent with arms folded. The body language 
of some participants in some meetings (Plate 1) suggested suspicion or even hostility to the 
subject matter, their colleagues or the meeting convenors. Conversations with individual fishers 
following such meetings elicited feedback that suggested individual fishers were sometimes 
intimidated, reluctant to voice an opinion, reluctant to voice a contrary opinion because of peer 
pressure or simply not used to speaking in a public fomm. Such reticence related to a range of 
causes including a lack of self-confidence for some fishers only having mdimentary formal 
education - for example arguing against a knowledgeable and emdite colleague; concems at 
voicing opinions that were seen as "... going against the flow" - for example voicing 
disagreement over a locally popular closure, favoured by the majority; speaking against a view 
proposed by a local power broker - for example a vertically-integrated fisher who controls the 
local processing works; or finally, individuals who do not like speaking at a public forum, but 
are comfortable one-on-one. An alternative method of identifying fishers' views was thus 
necessary, 
A questionnaire instmment was designed, following consultation with Queensland prawn fishers, 
principally to validate oral outcomes of public meetings (port visits) and to provide primary data 
on fishers values (what was important to them individually in the Queensland Govemment's 
management of the resource), their problems (which they faced as prawn fishers), their security 
(how was their business doing), their views on Govemment intervention (industry restmcturing 
and whether the coast should be zoned) and satisfaction with the consultation process. 
A draft of the questionnaire was discussed with the President of the QCFO. A major change 
requested was the removal of the last question on altemative consultation mechanisms (direct 
polling of fishers through referenda rather than dealing indirectly through the QCFO). The 
President considered that such a question could prove divisive. The wording and design of the 
questionnaire (Appendix 1) avoided double-barrelled questions, ambiguity, leading the 
respondent or resulting in normative responses (Bailey, 1978). 
Fishers at each meeting were asked to fill out a questionnaire during the meeting. At the start 
of each meeting, the questionnaire was discussed word-by-word to ensure all in attendance 
understood what was meant by each question. Time was allowed for additional explanatory 
questions and then a period to enable the questionnaire to be completed. The forms were coded 
by port but otherwise remained anonymous. Completed forms were placed in a locked ballot 
box at the end of the meeting and then collected. At three ports, QCFO Branch Secretaries 
requested additional questionnaires for absent fishers and these were subsequently retumed by 
mail. 
Prawn Fisheries 
An important source of information in fisheries is the data actually generated by the fishers 
themselves and which is recorded on a routine basis in fishery logbooks. Such information often 
provides the only consistent record of the evolution of the fishery over time and thus can be 
invaluable historically. A difficulty of course, is the accuracy with which such statistics are 
recorded, since declaration of catches is an admission traceable in terms of income declarations 
and thus taxation. The issue of declaration of "tme" income has been a vexing issue for the 
fishing industry generally and misreporting of catch data has been as traditional as giving fellow 
fishers false radio information regarding current on ground prawn aggregations! Recent well 
publicised investigations by the Australian Taxation Office together with the use of historical 
catch data to validate fishers catch histories (and thus fishing right entitlements) have in the last 
ten years diminished this tendency to misreporting. Fishery data are thus an important source 
of information. 
The east coast prawn trawl fishery now extends along most of the coastal regions from the 
Queensland-New South Wales border to Cape York and annually produces approximately 7,000 
tonnes of prawns. Commercial, licensed, fishers are legally obliged to provide individual details 
of their daily operations through a commercial fisheries (CFISH) logbook program, administered 
by the Queensland Fish Management Authority (QFMA). This program began in 1988 and has 
successfully completed the development phase with the data now being automatically checked 
for missing values and validated through cross referencing with a subsidiary program of prawn 
buyers production data ("Buyers Retums"). In addition to the compulsory daily data, a total of 
100 prawn fishers voluntarily provide more detailed information on a trawl-by-trawl basis. 
These more precise data are essential for standardisation of actual fishing effort for stock 
assessment studies but are not necessary for the present study. This analysis relies on the 
routine, compulsory information, provided by all participants in the prawn trawl fishery. 
Three components can be distinguished in these data: catch; effort required to take that catch; 
and catch per unit of effort. The catch or total production from the fishery measures what has 
been caught by trawlers, when it was caught and where it was caught. The what refers to the 
breakdown of species by weight (kg) provided by fishers on their logsheets and is limited to 
those species classifications used for retail purposes. For example, daily catches are recorded 
as so many kilograms of "Tiger", "Endeavour", "Banana", "King", "Bay" or "Other". There is 
no facility which would allow red spot king (Penaeus longistylus) to be distinguished from 
eastem king (Penaeus plebejus) or brown tiger (Penaeus esculentus) from grooved tiger (Penaeus 
semisulcatus) prawns. 
The effort needed to take the catch can be thought of in the number of days (24 hour periods) 
a vessel actually trawls. It does not include periods at sea where trawling was not undertaken 
such as days steaming to new grounds or days lost due to bad weather or mechanical 
breakdowns. A coarser measure of effort is the number of vessels providing catch data for the 
time and area specified. Both indices are considered from CFISH data. 
The third component able to be extracted from the database is the catch per unit effort (CPUE) 
which is calculated simply by dividing the total prawn catch by the total number of days fished 
for the particular time and area or by the total number of vessels fishing for the particular time 
and area. If the individual vessel effort is assumed to be constant over time (unlikely) or 
technological advances can be included through standardisation (much as inflation is accounted 
for through standardisation using the Consumer Price Index), then the CPUE is interpreted as 
an index of prawn abundance. In other words, if the CPUE increases or decreases over time, 
an interpretation could be that there are more or less prawns in a particular area (assuming the 
area does not change). Such information (catch per vessel per day trawled) is important for 
stock assessment purposes but, in the case of this study, also gives some insight as to trends in 
the fishery and for particular areas of the coast. The total catch per vessel over a year would 
also provide an estimate of economic viability of that operation. 
Management and Organisational Ek:oIogy 
Interviews were held with current and retired fishers, bureaucrats and industry leaders from the 
QCFO, QFMA and QDPI during the period 1987-1993. These were primarily one on one, face 
to face, oral interviews through supplementary telephone conversations helped in follow-up. 
Oral histories were compiled from notes from these interviews together with individual and 
group discussions with fishers. Official minutes of meetings held by the QCFO (Queensland 
Professional Fishermen's League, Queensland Regional Fishermen's Council, Queensland 
Commercial Fishermen's State Council and Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation 
State Council) and the QFMA (Queensland Fishing Industry Advisory Committee, the 
Queensland Fish Management Authority meetings and the Queensland Fisheries Management 
Authority meetings) were examined and analysed. Current and past Executive and Board 
members were also interviewed. All of these discussions occurred whilst the author was an 
employee of the QDPI and the QFMA, whose primary duties were focussed on prawn fishery 
research and the development of management plans for the fishery. 
The issues of confidentiality and anonymity were of major interest to both the author and the 
fishers. Names mentioned in the text are only used when statements are part of the public record 
(eg. Meeting minutes, reports or publications), or respondents had specifically agreed to 
identification. Direct quotes are used sparingly and only to identify historically significant 
events. 
The following individuals were interviewed during the period 1987-1993 and provided insight 
as to fishery management policy: 
57 
Table 3.2 
Listing of individuals with whom prawn fishery 
management was discussed during this study. 
Name 
P.Conaty (dec.) 
T.Loveday 
J.Storey 
A.Hanson 
C.Greenhalgh 
F.Bradley 
G.McCormack 
R.Pearson 
P.Neville 
D.Mitchell 
R.Bygott 
R.Densley 
J.Tanzer 
Organisation 
QCFO 
QCFO 
QCFO 
QCFO 
QCFO 
QCFO 
QDPI 
QDPI 
QDPI 
QFMA 
QFMA 
QFMA 
QFMA 
Position 
President 
President 
Chair Trawl 
Chair Trawl 
Vice President 
Branch 24 
Management Director 
Research Director 
Director/QFMA Board 
Chair QFMA 
Chair QFMA 
Chair QFMA 
Chair QFMA 
In addition to interviews, general conversations and formal, workplace interactions (particularly 
those associated with formal meetings described above) all contributed to the author's 
understanding of disparate views on management policies adopted in the Queensland east coast 
prawn fishery, and their effects on fishers. 
The interviews were generally unstmctured in that no questions were written in advance and 
notes, rather than a verbatim record, were taken by the interviewer. The interviews commenced 
with respondents being asked to recall well-known historical events (for example the freeze on 
the further entry of fishing vessels to the prawn fishery) and then to outline their own 
recollection of events. This provided a starting point for interviews, with the methodological 
perspective being participant observation. Questioning then examined views on particular issues, 
the origins of policies and how such policies had worked in practice. 
Such an approach acknowledges each individual's perspective of what happened in the fishery 
is valid because it is an expression of their own understanding of the reality they perceive 
(Reinharz, 1992). It was also apparent that the interviewer's perspective would not be simply 
SS 
a "disinterested observer" examining interesting though remote phenomena. The fact that the 
author was an active participant in some of the events investigated meant that my own personal 
values necessarily intmded. The myth of value-free sociological research is well exposed by 
Gouldner's (1962) paper where, as he succinctly put it: 
"Before Hiroshima, physicists also talked of a value-free science; they, too, 
vowed to make no value judgements. Today many of them are not so sure." 
In this study, the author has attempted to make personal values explicit wherever possible. 
DATA MANAGEMENT ANALYSES 
The constmction of quantitative fishery trend indices in this study were sourced primarily from 
periodical statistical summaries and individual fishers logbook data. These data were held on 
QFISH, the Queensland Fisheries Information System. It is a comprehensive information system 
containing commercial (CFISH) and recreational (RFISH) fishing data, fish processors' data, 
research data and subsidiary data such as shark meshing information. Within the CFISH Trawl 
database resides information on the prawn trawl fishery. As at June 30, 1997, the prawn trawl 
fishery database contained 892,921 records from 1988 to 1997. 
A potential source of bias in such data (previously alluded to) can be misreporting and non-
reporting (illegal sales) of fishing activity. In addition to the previously mentioned changes from 
the Australian Taxation Office, it was also assumed that such errors were minimal since routines 
within the program code are able to detect outliers including misreporting (for example, prawn 
catches reported taken remote from recognised fishing grounds) or illogical records. In addition, 
cross validation with processors' data highlighted illegal sales through inconsistencies. The 
QFMA has a dedicated team for data entry, processing and analyses of catch and effort statistics. 
The QFMA also supports a system of fishery licensing in Queensland waters. Vessel and fisher 
licence issue, renewal and transfer are processed according to licensing policies described in 
fishery management plans (QFMA Annual Report, 1997). Physical descriptions of all prawning 
vessels are thus part of the licensing database. Details on the ownership of the means of 
production are thus able to be analysed. 
Finally, official records of meetings allowed an appreciation of voting trends - for example the 
industry debate over the closure regime within the QCFO or the kinds of issues given 
consideration in decision making by the QFMA. Such privileged information was treated as 
confidential and only data on the public record is explicitly referred to in this thesis. Other 
confidential insight, however, helped influence the author's ideas and interpretations on issues. 
CHAPTER 4 
SETTING THE COURSE: 
THE EAST COAST PRAWN TRAWL FISHERY 
The thmst of Chapter 2 was the rationale for fishery management - the objectives and 
beneficiaries, the uncertainty, the role of politics and culture - and the theory of why 
management is attempted at all. This chapter will describe how such management has in the 
past influenced the east coast prawn resources and the fishers. It will describe the resources, the 
study area, how the fishery has developed and the fishing fleet itself. 
INTRODUCTION 
What exactly is meant by the term "fisher>'"? For some it is a geographical location where 
fishing occurs: the "Queensland east coast fishery" or the "Gulf of Mexico fishery". For others, 
the term refers to the method by which fish are caught: the "trawl fishery" or the "longline 
fishery". Others may combine all: "the Queensland east coast prawn trawl fishery". In 
whichever sense it is used, a fishery includes the fish, the fishing gear necessary to capture the 
fish (sometimes called fishing effort) and fishers, the people who deploy the fishing gear. It may 
also include the market. Much of the study of fisheries has focussed on the fish and the effort, 
whilst few have studied the most fundamental component of the system, the fisher:- the human 
dynamic. The market is sometimes also considered, but usually in isolation from the other 
components. 
In this study, a specific fishery, the Queensland east coast prawn trawl fishery is examined. The 
prawn trawl method involves a motorised vessel towing a net across the sea floor at a ground 
speed sufficient to maintain the net open and to catch prawns. Prawn trawling is thus an active 
method and is one that has principally evolved since the 1950s. 
PLATE 2, Beam Trawl 
A rigid beam, supporting a trawl board at each end. Towing points on the 
leading edge of these boards are connected by a bridle to the main single trawl 
warp, which runs through a block at the top of the "A" frame above the (pictured) 
fisher's head, down to a winch. The ends of the net are attached to the trailing 
edges of the trawl boards. 
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In the days when fishing boats were propelled by wind and sail, towing speed was dependant 
upon the tides and vagaries of the wind. This meant that often the trawl net was scarcely 
moving and that hydrodynamical means of holding the net mouth open could not be relied upon. 
Consequently, the mouth of the trawl net was kept open by a rigid and self-supporting frame 
stmcture, the resultant gear being known as a beam trawl (Plate 2). The length of the beam was 
limited by the length which could be handled safely on the vessel; this in tum set a maximum 
size of the net and hence the fished area swept during trawling operations. 
The introduction of steam power to fishing vessels permitted faster and better controlled towing 
speed (Anonymous, 1974). This revolution in power also allowed the introduction of 
hydrodynamically-supported and controlled spreading devices to replace the rigid beam. Flat, 
rectangular grates, known as otter boards, were attached to each side of the net and the towing 
wire attached to the centre of each board. When towed over the bottom, the uneven shearing 
force of water over each board would then cause it to move away from the vessel, causing the 
mouth of net to spread open (Figure 4.1). With the rigidity across the net removed, trawlers 
could not only tow faster and with greater manoeuvrability, but could use wider opening nets 
and cover more ground. As will be seen later, the Queensland east coast prawn trawl fishery 
evolved from hand-held scoop nets to beam trawls in rivers and estuaries and finally to estuarine 
and oceanic otter board trawling. The current Queensland east coast prawn trawl fishery 
includes both beam and otter board trawlers. This study is focussed on the otter board prawn 
trawl fishery. 
m 
Figure 4.1 
Double net arrangement used for otter trawling for prawns 
Source: Kailola et al. 1993 
The Queensland fishing industry was not an industry able to attract substantial investment, and 
hence expansion, simply because likely financial retums were modest. A major reason for the 
lack of development was that most fish products were for local consumption, and it was not until 
the advent of rail-freight to inland towns in the 1880s that consumption trends allowed 
marketing of the catch (Department of Harbours and Marine, 1986). People did not enter the 
industry in the expectation of windfall profits. People became fishers because of family reasons 
(father, brother, uncle were fishers) because they lived in a fishing port where fishing was the 
only viable opportunity for employment, because the lifestyle was attractive or for some other, 
similar reason (Department of Harbours and Marine, 1986). 
Given the fishing industry in Queensland had been slow to develop for mainly marketing and 
supply/demand reasons, what were the factors that contributed to the sudden and recent 
development of the prawn fishery in Queensland? What management policies historically 
developed and why? How did the Queensland approach differ from similar policies in other 
Australian states? Before we explore those questions, a description of the resource base is 
warranted. 
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PRAWN RESOURCES 
All of the commercially important prawns of Australia belong to the Cmstacean Decapoda. 
Within the Order Decapoda, the Family Penaeidae includes the majority of commercially-
important prawns caught in the east coast prawn trawl fishery (Grey et al. 1983). These are 
listed below Table 4.1. In addition several marketable bycatch species (scallop, fish, bugs, crabs 
and squid) are either also targeted or coincidentally captured with prawns. Up to four times of 
the retained catch is discarded into the sea, as it is unmarketable (Glaister, 1984). This latter 
practice is of increasing concem to managers. 
Table 4.1 
Common and scientific names of principal Australian species of prawns 
Common Name 
TIGER PRAWN 
* Brown Tiger Prawn 
* Grooved Tiger Prawn 
Giant Tiger or Leader Prawn 
KING PRAWN 
* Eastern King Prawn 
* Red Spot Prawn 
* Westem King Prawn 
* Banana Prawn 
ENDEAVOUR PRAWN 
* Blue or Endeavour Prawn 
* Red Endeavour Prawn 
* Greasyback or Greentail Prawn 
* School Prawn 
Hardback Prawn 
CORAL PRAWN 
Southem Velvet Prawn 
SCALLOPS 
* Saucer scallop 
Mud scallop 
FINFISH 
* Stout Whiting 
BUGS (Shovel nosed lobster) 
* Mud bug 
Sand bug 
Scientific Name 
Penaeus esculentus 
Penaeus semisulcatus 
Penaeus monodon 
Penaeus plebejus 
Penaeus longistylus 
Penaeus latisulcatus 
Penaeus merguiensis 
Metapenaeus endeavouri 
Metapenaeus ensis 
Metapenaeus bennettae 
Metapenaeus macleayi 
Trachypenaeus fulvus 
Metapenaeopsis palmensis 
Amusium japonicum balloti 
Amusium pleuronectes 
Sillago robusta 
Thenus orientalis 
Thenus spp. 
Note: * denotes principal species 
Source: Grey et al. 1983 
i4-
The total Australian catch of penaeid prawns (hereafter referred to as 'prawns') today is around 
20,000 tonnes per annum, of which the Queensland east coast fishery contributes about 7,500 
tonnes or 35 per cent per annum. Of this total, otter board trawl contributes the bulk, with all 
other methods (beam trawl, stripe net and bait net) on average contributing less than 3% of the 
total (Glaister et al, 1990). 
The east coast prawn trawl fishery is characterised by a diversity of species, dramatic seasonal 
and inter-annual fluctuations in prawn abundances, a large efficient fleet (a proportion of which 
is highly mobile) and markets that range from lucrative export markets in Japan, domestic capital 
city fish markets and to local bait outlets in coastal Queensland towns. Prawns, scallops and 
bycatch species may be exported or sold locally, sold cooked or uncooked, processed in various 
ways and value-added or sold fresh on ice, depending upon demand (Glaister, 1990). 
Early Description of one of the major prawn species 
Source: Dannevig, 1926, 
65 
l i6"E l i lTE 
. M » 
AWS 
P W » 
.:»' 
i w^; 
.,iifS 
iKSgl 
,*%: 
.liS*^^ 
i ^ E 
^ J 
l ^ - E 
.^«-% 
f ^ 
, 
l ^ - E 
1 
IV6-E 
\ • 
, 
I ^ E 
1 
l ^ E 
.t 
, 
l i i ' i i ^ E 
1 . 
*W» 
I 1 
l ^ * E 
-
• 
-
-
. 
, 
• 
-
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 199* 1995 
bay prawns 
lA'E I3V"E 
.•U°i: 
t W ; 
r'ltS^' 
,:m. 
,im 
•,m 
« « s 
..•m-
.imi 
ub-E ni*E H^ 4°E nk=E HV-E Isb^E 15^ °E 15!4"E 
^ * 
# • 
T * 
^^ # • • 
OM 
^^——^ J ^ * 
ISI-E 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
1600 
1400 
1200 
£ 1000 
•5 800 
^ 600 
400 
200 
0 
50 
40 n 
-30 
-20 
- 10 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
endeavour prawns 
13t>E 
. 1(1°S 
. rr's 
. i < ^ 
. i < ^ 
. irs 
. 2 I « 
.2rs 
-2<»S 
. 2S^ 
. I T S 
' 
lA^E 
— _ J L _ _ 
nk"E 
«• 
1 
l<i»E lA«E 
• * 
/ ^ 
( ' ^ N 
_ - l ' 
lA-E lA'E 
• • 
w * 
^ ^ ^ 
— 1 — I 
i5b"E isIr'E ISIIT: 
, 
- — ^ ^ f**^ 
ISI'E 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-
. 
• 
' 
• 
40'o: 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
banana prawns 
Figure 4.2 
Distribution, catches and catch rates for bay prawns, 
endeavour prawns and banana prawns (after Williams 1997) 
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Figure 4.3 
Distribution, catches and catch rates for tiger 
prawns and king prawns (after Williams 1997) 
m 
The fishers have adopted common groupings for prawn species and based on similar features 
generally distinguish tiger, king, banana, endeavour and a "grabbag" known as Bay prawns. 
These groupings may thus include brown, grooved and giant tiger prawns ('tiger'), eastem, red 
spot and westem king prawns ('king'), banana prawns ('banana'), blue endeavour and red 
endeavour prawns ('endeavour' or 'debs') and a mixture of small eastem king, brown tiger, blue 
endeavour, banana, greasyback school and hardback prawns (' Bay'). Many of these species are 
broadly distributed with some species extending over the entire east coast whilst others are 
geographically contained in more localised areas. These may vary seasonally and/or inter-
annually, depending on the species. In general, tiger-endeavour groupings occur in coastal 
waters extending north from Townsville; Red spot king and banana prawns, scallops and bugs 
occur from Townsville to Bundaberg whilst eastem king prawns, squid and Bay prawns are 
found in the south-eastem Queensland waters (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Catches and, more 
significantly catch rates (assumed by fisheries scientists to approximate prawn abundances), have 
dramatically fluctuated annually, reflecting strong correlations between biological productivity 
and environmental parameters. For example, 1991 was considered a "wet" year and 
catches/catch rates of banana prawns (a species whose productivity is enhanced by rainfall) were 
above average, whilst catches/catch rates of tiger and king species (both of whose productivity 
is diminished by heavy rainfall) were below average. Similarly, for 1995, a drought year, the 
opposite was the case. Seasonal variations in prawn abundance also occur. Increased 
abundances at certain times of the year result in greater commercial catches since prawns are 
more vulnerable to capture. Thus catches fluctuate seasonally, depending on species, (Figure 
4.4) but generally peak in March each year. 
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Figure 4.4 
Annual seasonality of Queensland prawn catches (all species summed) 
Prawn fisheries are complex both with regard to the biology and life cycles of the prawns and 
the nature of the fisheries exploiting them (Penn, 1975; Glaister 1978; Staples, 1980; and Garcia 
and Le Reste, 1981). The high value of prawns and their consequent attractiveness to fishers 
have brought their own problems. Most fisheries have commenced as open-access and as with 
all open-access fisheries, they have eventually tended to suffer from excess catching capacity 
and a reduction in nett economic benefits from the fishery. Generally, gross yield from the 
fishery has remained relatively constant, but is taken with increasing levels of effort (amount of 
gear, time or numbers of vessels). 
The life cycle of prawns allows sequential harvest of the largest (adult) mature individuals 
(which attract the highest prices on export markets) on the deep water ocean grounds where the 
principal fishery by larger industrial vessels usually occurs. In addition the younger (and more 
abundant) inshore stages (adolescents and juveniles) may be the target of small-scale, 
subsistence or artisanal fishers. Such small-scale enterprises often supply local, human 
consumption and recreational bait needs and demand is for smaller prawns at a cheaper price 
than premium export-quality product. Optimum use of the prawn resource thus requires a fine 
balance between supplying the different markets. 
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THE STUDY AREA 
The study area was located on the east coast of Queensland between Cape York (10°4rS) and 
the Queensland-New South Wales border (28°10'S) and included all major east coast Queensland 
prawn fishing grounds and coastal fishing ports. 
The Queensland east coast includes a diversity of habitat essential to sustaining aquatic life. It 
is an extensive coastline extending from the tropics of Cape York to sub-tropical/temperate of 
the Queensland/New South Wales border. The coastal fringe is also influenced by the sheltering 
effect of the Great Barrier Reef, various islands and the vagaries of the East Australian Current. 
The coastline is also unique in having extensive, largely pristine (untouched) stands of mangrove 
forests, saltmarsh, seagrass beds, mud flats and other undisturbed habitat, essential for the 
maintenance of prawn populations (Boesch and Tumer, 1984 and Young and Glaister, 1993). 
Recent development of these coastal wetlands near urban centres of population for housing and 
in more remote areas for terrestrial and aquaculture farming purposes have also had an impact 
on production and the ability of these areas to sustain prawn populations to the same levels as 
in their virgin (unexploited) state. Alienation of habitat through dam and barrage (stmctures 
which impede the tidal movement of salt water up rivers) constmction has also incrementally 
degraded prawn productivity. With few exceptions however, (e.g. the Fitzroy River dam which 
helped to obliterate the banana prawn resource off that river system), these environmental 
changes have not yet decimated any known prawn resources (Glaister et al 1991). 
m 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FISHERY PRE 1950 
Chronology of Significant Events 
1839 Moreton Bay Settlement (Redcliffe) abandoned 
1840 Prawming with hand nets commences Brisbane River 
1848 Prawning spreads to Albert, Logan, Noosa Lakes, Mary and Fitzroy Rivers 
1853 Prawning commences at Port Curtis (Gladstone) 
1877 Queensland Fisheries Act 1877 - to preserve fish and regulate fisheries 
1886 Steamer Marwedel catches King prawns in Moreton Bay 
1887 Fisheries Act 1887 amended, prawning by scoop net only 
1902 Marine Department survey vessel Ostrea catches King prawns in Moreton Bay 
1907 Govemment establishes Brisbane Fish Markets 
1910 The Federal Fishery Survey vessel Endeavour discovers prawns at various 
locations along the east coast 
1910 Metropolitan Fish Board established 
1915 First Labour Govemment (TJ Ryan) elected in Queensland, fisheries focus 
1916 Fish Supply Act enacted 
1917 Fisheries recognised by establishment of a State Fisheries and Works Authority, 
Department of Labour and Industry 
1919 State research trawler Bar-ea-mul charters trawl grounds 
1920 Fishermen's Co-Operative Association formed (Brisbane Fish Supply Works) 
1923 Primary Producers' Co-Operative Associations Act 1923-1981 
1927 Order-in-Council - minimum size for prawns 
1932 Fish and Oyster Amendment Act 1932, push net for prawns in Brisbane River 
allowed 
1934 First Committee of Inquiry into Fish Marketing in Queensland, weekend 
closure in Moreton Bay - request of fishers 
1935 Fish Supply Management Act 
1935 Queensland Fishermen's League overtums weekend closure 
1936 Establishment of Fish Board of Queensland for marketing, inspection and sale 
of fish 
1947 Prawn stocks discovered in Stockton Bight, Evans Head NSW, and Moreton 
Bay, Hervey Bay, Qld 
1949 Otter board trawling commences in Moreton Bay by NSW trawlers 
Castlereagh, Memphis Belle and Les Freres 
The commercial fishery for prawns along the east coast probably commenced in the 1840s 
following the abandonment of the Moreton Bay Settlement at Redcliffe (Welsby, 1967). The 
relocation of the settlement to the Brisbane River (Brisbane) would have allowed access to 
shallow productive waters abundant with a range of species of prawns. Fishers in the Brisbane 
River commonly employed a large bow-shaped hand scoop net known as a 'scissors net' to catch 
prawns along the river shores or from a drifting row boat (Ruello, 1975). 
Hand scooping for prawn quickly spread to the rivers and shallow coastal lakes around Brisbane 
(Albert and Logan) and further north to Noosa Lakes, the Mary and Fitzroy Rivers and 
Gladstone. The major species taken included greasyback, school and banana prawns. However^ 
the major fishery was for finfish such as mullet. Large, seasonal aggregations of these fish 
would appear offshore as the first "Winter Westerlies" wind began each year. Surround nets 
(hauling nets) were used to gather large catches. 
Development of finfish fisheries was hampered, however, since the major market was for local, 
domestic consumption. The advent of railways allowed fish to be packed in ice and freighted 
to inland towns. Expansion of the fishery prompted the enactment of the Queensland Fisheries 
Act (1877) whose preamble included that it was '. . . desirable to make provision for the 
preservation of the fish in Queensland waters and to regulate the fisheries therein.' The main 
management tool to achieve such regulation was by mesh size. 
The Fisheries Act (1887) sought to prevent the use of fine gillnets for capturing prawns. 
Chinese fishers were considered the worst offenders (Department of Harbours and Marine, 1986). 
Provisions of the Act prevented the use of gill, drag or any other net other than a scoop net for 
capturing prawns and allowed area restrictions to fishing. 
Cecil S. Fison, Inspector of Fisheries in Brisbane, noted in his annual report of 1897 
(Department of Harbours and Marine, 1986) following some gear trials in Moreton Bay: 
'Two pairs of very large soles, measuring from 9 to 10 inches in length, were 
caught during the present month, which goes to show that the beam or otter 
trawl might, in enterprising hands, yet be worked successfully.' 
Inspector Fison noted the squat lobster (Thenus orientalis) along with '. . . gigantic prawns, 6 
to 7 inches in length' were plentiful between Green Island, Fisherman Island, St. Helena and the 
Cleveland Ship Channel. In his annual report the following year, he expressed disappointment 
that the success of his trials had not induced private enterprise to commence commercial trawling 
operations. 
Welsby's (1967) descripfion of prawning with scissor nets during the closing decade of the 
nineteenth century also included a reference to fishery management. 
'Prawn catching in the Brisbane River may be classed as one of the fine arts, 
for with a punt, either square ended or sharpie fashion, an amount of dexterity 
and cunning is required, more than the average amateur fisherman understands. 
Prawn catching also requires payment of one pound per year to the Queensland 
Govemment, otherwise Fred Baker or one or other of his satellites will have 
you.' 
A report of 1894-95, stated '. . . about eighteen men are employed prawning in the (Brisbane) 
river' (Queensland Marine Department Report, 1895), and this had only grown to 30 by 1905. 
An important consideration was that the prawning season in the Maryborough district (Mary 
River and Hervey Bay) extended through winter from April to October, a period of prawn 
scarcity in the estuaries of New South Wales. Thus large consignments of prawns were 
forwarded to the Sydney and Melboume fish markets from Queensland. 
By 1901, commercial trawling had still not been established. The then Inspector 
James H. Stevens commented in the 1901 annual report: 
'I would much like to see some trawling trials made, especially in the close 
vicinity of our large coastal towns, starting first with Moreton Bay.' 
Stevens also drew attention to the need for a fish market, a theme he was to reiterate over a 
number of years. He (rightly) considered the inconsistent supply of fish and the lack of an 
adequate distribution network as critical constraints to the development of a fishing industry. 
'If trawling and deepwater fishing with an improved style of net could be 
introduced as a successful means of supplying the fish demand of Brisbane and 
the State generally with a larger, cheaper and more certain supply, then must 
speedily follow the establishment of a public central fish market, the site of 
which would have to be within easy distance of the railways and river frontage, 
so that the fish could be distributed with as little delay as possible.' 
n 
Inspector Stevens considered a compulsory central market could assist in regulation of fisheries 
and data collection: 
'It might be made compulsory that all fish landed for use in Brisbane and 
suburbs should pass through this market, where it would be officially 
examined, to secure sorting and effectual check against immature fish. By this 
means too, records could be made for statistical purposes of all fish caught and 
sold.' 
Stevens persisted with his vision of a central market until, in 1904, he found a political ally. 
The then Treasurer ordered a review of fish marketing in other States (including legislation) and 
subsequently a new Fisheries Act to be prepared for submission to Parliament which was enacted 
in 1904. This relationship between marketing and the development of the east coast prawn trawl 
fishery was to become a focus many years later. 
The establishment of a trawl fishery may well have continued unrealised given the current 
pessimism. James Tosh, a marine biologist investigating the habits of the common food fishes 
of Moreton Bay, noted in the 1903 Annual Report of the Marine Department (Appendix 7): 
'As regards the future of trawling as far as Queensland is concemed, all experiments 
hitherto have been on too small a scale to enable one to speak quite conclusively. It 
is not likely however, that a great trawling industry can ever be established. The 
trawling area off the Queensland coast would be a mere strip, because of the presence 
of the coral region immediately to the north and the fact that the sea deepens very 
rapidly to the east.' 
w 
However on 6 July, 1910 the Federal Fisheries Investigation SteamtiawleT Endeavour caught 200 
large tiger prawns (Penaeus esculentus) off Bowen in 24 fathoms of water. This was followed 
by further success at Cape Gloucester and Edgecombe Bay from July to August 1910. These 
catches corroborated reports by local fishers that: 
'. . . large prawns are plentiful in the shallow waters of Edgecombe Bay, especially 
around the entrance to the Gregory River' (Postmasters Report, 1911). 
In the early 1900s, it was suggested that fishers and the consuming public were disadvantaged 
by gluts and shortages of product, exploitation by buyers, poor distribution systems, low levels 
of consumption of local fish products and - in common with other primary industries - low and 
unstable incomes. 
The reaction of govemment was to organise the orderly marketing of fish. In 1910 a 
Metropolitan Fish Board was established consisting of members of the various local authorities 
around Brisbane. The Board operated only in an advisory capacity and, despite the claims of 
success by its members, appeared to have very little real impact on fish marketing. 
With the election of the Ryan Labor Govemment in 1915, the first definite signs of the process 
of orderly marketing in the fishing industry began to appear. Ryan had fought the election 
basically on the issue of commodities and prices (Murphy, 1985). Public enterprises were 
established to overcome exploitation by unscmpulous 'free traders' operating in buying cartels. 
For the fishing industry, an authority called State Fisheries and Works was established on 2 April 
1917 and was placed under the control of the Department of Labour and Industry. In 1916, the 
Govemment had passed the Fish Supply Act which created the concept of fish supply districts. 
Under this Act, the State was divided into districts and all fish landed in a declared district had 
to be delivered to the statutory marketing authority. The concept of fish supply districts 
continued to be embodied in the operations of the Queensland Fish Board under the Fish Supply 
Management Act. 
From the outset, State Fisheries found difficulties in meeting its objectives. At the time, 70 per 
cent of the product sold at its Brisbane auction was mullet, which was delivered to the markets 
in a very short period, normally from about April to June. Despite attempts to preserve the 
product by canning. State Fisheries was unable to solve the problem of gluts and shortages. 
The marketing functions of State Fisheries were eventually taken over by an organisation known 
as the Fishermen's Co-operative Association in 1920. The Association rented premises from the 
Govemment and operated an auction. All product had to be delivered to the Association for 
inspection, and fees were charged for the various marketing and inspection services provided. 
Although information on its early activities is sketchy, it appears that the Association achieved 
only limited success. Fish sales were directed through the auction system and it was illegal to 
sell produce which had not passed through the auction. The chronic problems of gluts and 
shortages persisted and, as Queensland began to develop and expand, the issues of poor transport 
facilities and centralised decision-making began to arise. 
These haphazard attempts to market fish continued until 1934 when the Govemment, 
embarrassed by the large losses incurred by the Fishermen's Co-operative Association, ordered 
the first of a succession of inquiries into fish marketing in Queensland. The Committee of 
Inquiry that was established found that the previous marketing stmctures had resulted in 
considerable waste, and had not been capable of resolving any of the pressing problems of the 
fishers and the industry. Indeed, the Committee noted that the problems remained as pervasive 
in 1934 as they were prior to the formation of State Fisheries in 1917. Moreover, additional 
problems of transport, storage and distribution (especially in relation to country areas) had 
appeared. 
n 
The Committee was impressed by the potential of the fishing industry but was concemed that 
the existing marketing stmcture was not adequate to service the needs of the market. At the 
time, the annual per capita consumption of fish in Queensland was only 5.5kg, compared with 
11 kg in New Zealand and 19kg in the United Kingdom. 
The major conclusion of the inquiry was the need to ensure regular supplies of fresh fish to 
consumers at reasonable prices while ensuring that fishers received a 'fair' price for their 
produce. To achieve this aim and at the same time increase fish consumption and develop a 
better distribution system, the marketing stmcture needed to be revamped. In a State with a 
passion for agricultural marketing boards, it is not surprising that the Committee recommended 
the formation of the Queensland Fish Board. 
The Fish Supply Management Act was introduced by the Theodore Labor Govemment in 1935. 
The aim of the Act was to establish a statutory fish marketing board with more extensive powers 
than any of its predecessors. Despite the stated intentions concerning 'fair' and 'reasonable' 
prices, the Board was given only very general and undefined powers with respect to pricing. It 
was believed that the Prices Commissioner had sufficient powers to prevent profiteering and 
exploitation. Moreover, retailing again was not encouraged and the Board was unable to take 
complete control of the distribution system. The lack of explicit direction in these areas belied 
the claim that the Board would have extensive powers. 
The Fish Supply Management Act was proclaimed on 24 June 1936 and the Board officially 
commenced operations on 1 July of that year. The Board immediately took control of fish 
supply and the Brisbane Fish Supply Works (still ostensibly under the control of the Department 
of Labour and Works). It also set about improving Board facilities and opened a number of 
local depots. 
m 
In its first year of operation, the Board handled 1.6m kg of product with a value of $350 000. 
Despite these humble beginnings, by 1948-49 the Board had secured virtually sole trading 
powers over local production. In that year, the Board's intake of product at all markets reached 
4.5m kg with a value of $820 000. This represented more than 97 per cent of total Queensland 
production of 4.6m kg (valued at $860 000). 
However, several significant factors which had become apparent by 1948-49 were to have 
profound long term ramifications for fish marketing in Queensland. The Board had established 
markets in most of the major coastal centres. Prawns had become a more important product in 
terms of their share of the total catch. Apart from the war years, imports had continued to 
account for between 40 and 50 per cent of apparent Queensland consumption. Finally, a 
relatively small but disturbing amount of local product was being sold illegally outside the Board 
system. 
The Govemment had amended the Act in 1946 to allow for an increase in Board membership 
from time to time. Despite these amendments and the Board's apparent success in securing 
control over virtually all fish caught in Queensland, there was considerable discontent with the 
Board's operations. For example, many of the problems identified in the 1934 inquiry still 
remained. ' 
Following several damaging reports from the Auditor-General, the Govemment ordered a further 
inquiry into the efficiency and management of the Queensland Fish Board. The 1949 
Commission of Inquiry had wide terms of reference, including a direction to investigate specific 
allegations of malpractice by certain staff members and at certain depots. 
The Commissioners examined closely the Board's management, method of operation, staffing, 
accounting procedures and related matters. In their report, the Commissioners referred 
specifically to the problems of seasonal shortfalls, trading outside the Board system, and poor 
management at the branch level. The report severely criticised the Board's policy of leaving fish 
distribution in the hands of private retailers. It was also critical of the Govemment's decision 
not to include the Fish Board with other marketing boards under the wing of the Department of 
Agriculture and Stock. Prices, incomes and licences were other issues which received 
consideration. 
However, the report generally suppK)rted the existing marketing system and very few of the 52 
final recommendations were sufficient to overcome the problems which had been raised. 
Altemative marketing stmctures were not seriously considered. 
Although these marketing developments largely reflect the evolution of the fresh fish fishery (and 
in particular, that of mullet) the same infrastmcture supported the developing prawn fishery and 
it was in 1950 that this fishery really expanded. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRAWN FISHERY 1950-1970 
Chronology of Significant Events 
1950 Castlereagh, Memphis Belle, Les Freres, Nanango, Joean, Vanguard and New 
Era fish banana prawns off Woody Point, Moreton Bay 
1951 Prawns first exported to New York, US, as trial shipment 
1952 Commonwealth Fisheries Act passed 
1953 Offshore fishery commences between Jumpinpin and the NSW border 
1954 Cyclone devastates Brisbane prawn fleet, 9 vessels lost 
1954 Fish Board assumes control of marketing of prawns 
1955 Scallops discovered off Bundaberg following collapse banana prawn fishery 
1955 Radio first installed on prawn fishing vessels 
ii 
1955 Commonwealth Fisheries Act 1952-55 proclaimed Jan 1, 1955 - control 
fishing outside territorial waters 
1956 First commercial export of prawns to US with 45 tonne shipment 
1957 LFB Challenge Survey discovers prawn grounds from Princess Charlotte Bay 
to Fraser Island 
1959 Deepwater fishery develops following Challenge survey, Fraser Island 
1959 Echo sounders used to locate schools of prawns 
1959 Largest catch of prawns (4000t), most sent interstate for canning 
1959 Size limit regulation on prawns repealed following Racek's work 
1960 Govemment allows introduction of double-rig trawling in Queensland 
1960 Referendum on prawn closures in Deception Bay, Bramble Bay 
1961 Widespread drought 
1963 Substantial prawn catches off Caims 
1964 Deepwater (60-80fm) grounds discovered N.E. Cape Moreton 
1964 Prawn grounds near Swains Reef, Townsville discovered 
1965 Radar first fitted to larger prawn vessels 
1965 Compulsory catch and effort data required from fishers 
1966 North Queensland Fish Board Created, (South) Queensland Fish Board 
continued ' 
1966 Widespread drought 1966-1967 
1967 Reduction in King prawn catch of 20% in South east causes Bay (September 
December) and inshore (October - March) closures 
1969 Fisheries Branch scientists transferred from Department of Harbours and 
Marine to Department of Primary Industries in May 1969 
1969 Sonar first fitted to prawn vessels 
1970 Moreton Bay restricted entry permits introduced 
11 
If regulation of domestic markets coincided with the gradual spread of prawn fishing, it was the 
lure of export markets that fuelled the development of the fishery after 1950. The introduction 
of offshore trawling and promising catches of banana prawns showed Queensland fishers that 
a fishery for prawns could be worthwhile. 
Up until the 1950s the capture of prawns was limited to seine and stripe nets, set pocket nets and 
eventually beam trawl nets (Ruello, 1975). Catches were used both for bait and food. Banana 
prawns sometimes formed a portion of the catch in most rivers north of the Logan and regularly 
occurred in rivers north of the Mary River. (These estuarine fisheries still exist on a seasonal 
basis around Bundaberg, Rockhampton, Mackay and Townsville) In addition the length and 
engine power (5 H.P.) of beam trawl vessels were limited. These restrictions and the lack of 
otter trawl gear effectively limited the development of the east coast prawn trawl fishery in 
Queensland. 
Following lobbying from fishers and the fact that the method was successfully being used in 
New South Wales, the State's prohibition on the new efficient otter board trawling method was 
lifted in 1950, though restrictions on the length and power of vessels engaged in beam trawling 
in the Brisbane River remained. The Moreton Bay prawn fishery rapidly expanded with the 
introduction of otter board trawling, with catches reaching 136 tonnes in 1952-53 and 225 
tonnes in 1953-54 (Annual Reports of the Department of Harbours and Marine). 
The most important aspect of the development of the east coast prawn trawl fishery in the period 
1950-1970 was the discovery and expansion of fishing grounds along the east coast. A 
noticeable feature seems to have been the discovery and subsequent heavy and unsustainable 
exploitation of the banana prawn species Penaeus merguiensis. This was possibly due to the 
pronounced schooling (aggregating) behaviour of the species which made it particularly 
vulnerable to trawling. It is also worth noting that Grant (1965) stated that in the early days of 
prawn fishing in Queensland, the common name 'King Prawn' was applied to any large, white 
prawn and thus interchangeable for both the eastem king prawn (Penaeus plebejus) and the 
banana prawn (Penaeus merguiensis). Taxonomic research by Racek (1955, 1959) and Racek 
and Dall (1965), helped clarify the identity of prawns. 
In 1949, three trawlers from the Ballina-Evans Head area in northem New South Wales, 
ventured north to try their luck. As described in a newspaper article at the time (Blanch, 1951), 
a Ballina prawner, Bill Moss, outlined the sequence of events: 
'Things were a bit slack in the off-season for the prawners around Ballina and Evans 
Head earlier this year,' he said. 'A couple of them (Castlereagh, Memphis Belle and 
Les Freres)* decided to cmise north and have a look around, and eventually started 
trawling in the bay here (Moreton Bay)* with headquarters at Woody Point.' 
'They got a few good hauls and passed the word back to N.S.W., and a few 
n\oxe,(Nanango and Jo-Fan)* including myself, decided to give it a go.' 
'Now there are nine diesel trawlers from 72ft to 22ft operating here and we have 
formed our own company to freeze, pack and air freight the prawns to the southem 
market.' 
* (Note: words in parenthesis added for clarification) 
In 1952 banana prawns were caught off Wynnum near Brisbane, Cabbage Tree Creek and in 
Deception Bay (Walker, 1969). The catch per boat for the banana prawn season was 25 to 
30,0001b of prawns, a total catch of over 250,0001b (113t). Following the 1952 catches, only 
small quantities were caught in Moreton Bay until 1957. 
PLATE 3 
Early Prawn Trawling 
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The development of offshore fishing was also rather conservative. Small quantities of King 
prawns were taken off the coast south of Brisbane in the early 1950s but a regular fishery was 
not established until 1953 when the area between Jumpinpin and the New South Wales border 
was opened up to trawling (Plate 3), 
In Febmary 1954, the infant Moreton Bay prawning industry was all but destroyed by a severe 
cyclone and, largely as a result, prawn trawling intensified off Bundaberg to supply the available 
domestic markets. 
In 1949 two vessels from Ballina (Maybeth and Falcon) relocated to Bundaberg to search for 
prawns. They searched without success for two years, but introduced a local fisher, Reg Massy, 
to the then new technique of otter board trawling. In March, 1952 Massy found commercial 
quantities of banana prawns off the north of the Bumett River (Walker, 1969). At the same time 
a Bob DeCourtenay of Port Macquarie found commercial quantities of banana prawns off the 
Mary River. He also home-based from the Port of Bundaberg. Massy and DeCourtenay were 
able to keep the grounds a secret until 1954 when five vessels started the season inside the 9fm 
depth contour (4 to 5fm) between Bargara and the Kolan River (Walker, 1969). 
By 1955 there were 100 vessels and over'225t of banana prawns were caught, with the grounds 
extended north to Bustard Head. Catches remained high until 1957, when the fishery declined. 
There were promises of a good season in 1962 but a heavy infestation of 'weed' prevented 
fishing. The fishery continued in a depressed state until good catches in April to June of 1967. 
This was the last 'good season' at Bundaberg (Walker, 1969) and probably the earliest evidence 
that prawn stocks could be overfished. 
The discovery of scallop (Amusium balloti) beds off Bundaberg in 1955 allowed commercial 
fishing in 1957, following the collapse of the banana prawn fishery. The scallop fishery remains 
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the area's primary fishery. 
The early years of the Bundaberg banana prawn fishery included a season lasting from April to 
October. Following exploitation, the season reduced to March through to June, a now common 
experience with fisheries on this species. Like many fisheries of that era, no comprehensive 
records of catches at Bundaberg were kept until 1962-63, when prawn processors had to submit 
such data to the State Govemment (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 
Annual reported landings of banana prawns at 
Bundaberg and Gladstone 1962-69. Landings 
have been converted to tonnes, data from 
Walker (1969) original source, QDPI 
Year 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
Bundaberg 
141 
102 
86 
28 
330 
163 
20 
Gladstone 
76 
2 
2 
19 
13 
44 
24 
Individual records are also scarce, though Walker (1969) reported that early anecdotal catch rates 
were consistent with those virgin stock catch rates of more recently discovered fishing grounds. 
DeCourtenay is reported to have caught 16,0001b (7t) of banana prawns in one day in May 1954, 
and another (unnamed) fisher as having caught 30,0001b (14t) between April and September, 
1955 (Walker, 1969). 
Towards the end of the 1954 banana prawn season in Bundaberg, Frank Bardsley steamed north 
to Gladstone, looking for new grounds. He caught lOOOlbs (500kg) over Easter at the Port 
Curtis fairway buoy. Other fishers followed and by September that year, six boats worked the 
Gladstone grounds. After September, many of the Bundaberg vessels steamed north and fished 
the Gladstone grounds until Christmas (Walker, 1969). This pattern was repeated in 1957 after 
which the fishery declined. Fishing grounds extended from Bustard Head in the south to Curtis 
Island in the north. 
Again through competition, exploitation successively commenced earlier in the year and the 
duration of the fishing season reduced until the Gladstone fishery ceased in the late 1960s (Table 
4.2). 
In 1955, prawns were exported for the first time in commercial quantities when 45 tonnes of 
Queensland banana and king prawns were sent to the United States. These were favourably 
received though the exp>ort market was slow to grow. 
Probably the most significant single event in the development of the east coast prawn trawl 
fishery was the Australian Govemment's fisheries research vessel (FRV) Challenge survey of the 
prawn resources off the east coast of Australia. This Govemment initiative allowed the rapid 
development of offshore prawn grounds along the east coast. In July 1957, soon after the 
commencement of the survey, commercial quantities were found off Fraser Island and a lucrative 
fishery was soon established. Offshore trawling gradually extended up the coast and fisheries 
were soon established off other coastal centres (Ruello, 1975). 
The potential for a fishery for adult prawns off the mouth of the Fitzroy River and in Keppel 
Bay was first suggested by the FRV Challenge survey in 1957 (Department of Primary Industry, 
1959), with Bundaberg-based trawlers first exploiting these grounds in 1958. The fleet had 
largely operated from Yeppoon with prawns dispatched for processing from that port to 
Rockhampton. Trawlers based at Rockhampton fished much the same fishing grounds as those 
from Yeppoon. Again, large catches were made during the early years of the fishery, but these 
were followed by a marked decline and stocks never fully recovering to pre-exploitation levels. 
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The Sarina-Mackay-Proserpine region has no large freshwater riverine discharge, with the 
Pioneer River at Mackay being the largest system. Consequently, no large fishery on banana 
prawns developed. Most prawn vessels based at Mackay and concentrated on fishing King and 
Tiger prawns off Sand Bay, Hillsborough Channel and Repulse Bay. 
In Bowen, concentrations of tiger prawns associated with large seagrass beds off Edgecombe Bay 
were the focus of local, limited fishing from the early 1960s and this fishery continues. 
Banana prawns were sporadically caught around Townsville in the 1950s. Keith Bryson caught 
banana prawns off West Point, Magnetic Island in 1958, the FRV Challenge found significant 
quantities in Upstart Bay and off Magnetic Island in 1957 and 1958 (Department of Primary 
Industry, 1959) and Reg Massy had caught banana prawns in Bowling Green Bay in 1957 
(Walker, 1969). 
Major grounds off the Burdekin River (Upstart Bay) were first fished in 1964, and this is 
reflected in the marked increase for prawn receivals at the Townsville Fish Board in 1964. In 
1965, three vessels fished for banana prawns. In 1966, the fleet expanded to eight vessels and 
the season extended from May to July. In 1967, twelve vessels operated between April and 
June. By 1968, the fishing grounds were well known, the fleet had grown to sixty vessels and 
the season commenced in March and was virtually over by May. In 1969, the fishery for banana 
prawns failed (Walker, 1969). 
During the year 1963-64 and 1964-65, approximately 70,0001bs (30t) of prawns were landed 
in Townsville and this had grown to 102,0001bs (45t) in 1967-68. Less than 10001b QAt) were 
caught the following year. 
Vessels based at Lucinda operated between Lucinda and Dunk Island in Rockingham Bay. 
Grounds were first fished in 1965. By 1967 twenty vessels were fishing Rockingham Bay for 
banana prawns. By 1969, most vessels switched to tiger prawns because the stocks of banana 
prawns failed. Again catch data for the early years of exploitation do not exist, but anecdotal 
evidence (Walker, 1969) suggests catch rates for banana prawns were comparable to those seen 
on other east coast fishing grounds and appear to have followed the same trend - very high catch 
rates as the virgin stock is exploited for the first time, declining catch rates to less than half that 
of initial rates for some years, and then stock failure. 
Reports of successful catches during the FRV Challenge survey (Department of Primary Industry, 
1959) of banana prawns between the mouth of the Barron River near Caims and Double Island 
Point did not result in the development of any fishing grounds. It was not until 1968 that 
commercial banana prawn catches were made between Caims and Innisfail off Cooper Point, 
Brampton Beach and the Russell River. None of these resulted in the discovery of a regular 
commercial fishing ground. 
In 1959, the FRV Challenge recorded good catches of king prawns in deeper waters off Moreton 
Bay and this discovery caused the opening up of the 'deepwater' fishery (up to 150m in depth 
and extending from Mooloolaba to the NSW border). In 1960, the Queensland Govemment 
allowed the introduction of twin net fishing (double-rig) (Figure 4.1) and this method was 
quickly adopted by most of the inshore fleet, though 'deepwater' trawlers maintained the use of 
single gear for vessel stability purposes in the often treacherous offshore conditions. 
The widespread adoption of radar in the mid 1960 allowed more precise position fixing and was 
widely regarded as a quantum leap in fishing technology, and hence efficiency. It is certainly 
regarded as the prime cause of the rapid expansion of fishing grounds offshore during this period 
(Ruello, 1975). 
The emergence of lucrative export markets for prawns, scallops and other products in countries 
such as Japan encouraged private companies to establish large scale processing plants, 
particularly in North Queensland. These companies were able to attract large supplies of product 
away from the Queensland Fish Board because of better payment procedures and more flexible 
and competitive pricing policies. In addition, they vertically integrated and established their own 
fishing fleets to ensure continuity of supply and to maintain throughput in their plants. 
The activities of the private processing companies stimulated interest in the private marketing 
of fresh fish, both legally (mainly on interstate markets) and illegally on the black market. The 
1949 inquiry had drawn attention to the existence of sales outside the Board system. At the 
time, these sales were relatively insignificant, but it was the beginning of a major problem for 
the Board. 
In broad terms, the Board was able to retain close to monopoly control over the marketing of 
fresh fish during much of the 1950s and 1960s. However, sales outside the Board system began 
to have a significant impact on the market towards the end of the 1960s and more particularly 
in the 1970s. 
There were some cosmetic attempts to restructure the Fish Board. In 1965, the responsibilities 
of the Board were divided between two Boards with the creation of the North Queensland Fish 
Board by the Fish Supply Management Act of 1965. The northem Board was made responsible 
for fish marketing north of the twenty-second parallel, while the Fish Board continued to operate 
in the region south of that latitude. 
The two Boards operated independently between 1966 and 1972. However, the administration 
and regulatory functions of both Broads remained largely the purview of the southem Board. 
In 1972, the Boards were merged because the northem Board had only very limited sources of 
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finance. Cyclone Althea had virtually destroyed the Townsville depot, and finance was required 
to rebuild the facility. As a result, the Govemment enacted the Fish Supply Management Act 
1972, which created the merged Queensland Fish Board and repealed the North Queensland Fish 
Board. 
Thus the period 1950-1970 saw the introduction of otter board trawling, the expansion of fishing 
grounds northward and into deeper offshore waters, the establishment of shore-based support 
and marketing infrastmcture and ports, the initiation of prawn exports, the commencement of 
biological research and the introduction of fisheries-specific legislation. Examples of the latter 
included the endowment of the Queensland Fish Board with legislated responsibility for the 
control of the marketing of prawns; the imposition of licence fees for fishers; the closure of 
prawn nursery grounds in Moreton Bay (1959) and a range of Commonwealth legislation 
(Fisheries Act 1955, Fishing Industry Act 1956). 
The period also saw the definition of a bureaucracy responsible for the administration of fisheries 
located within the Queensland Department of Primary Industries, the emergence of organised fish 
marketing and 'orderly marketing' principles as a means of overcoming problems in the sale of 
Queensland seafood and the growing realisation from industry that they needed a voice in 
management and that a single, united voice through organisation, was needed. 
THE PRAWN TRAWL FISHERY SINCE 1970 
The Chronology of Significant Events 
1972 Cyclone Althea devastates Townsville 
1972 North and South Fish Boards amalgamated to single entity 
1972 Fish Supply Management Act 1972 
1973 Amendments to Primary Producers' Organisation and Marketing Act 
m 
1973 Deepwater grounds discovered off Fraser Island 
1974 Concem about over-capacity in Gulf of Carpentaria fishery 
1976 Amendment to Fish Supply Management Act allows the establishment QCFO 
State Council 
1976 Fisheries Act 1976-1982 
1976 Queensland east coast fleet 700 vessels 
1977 Freeze on Northem Prawn Fishery in Gulf of Carpentaria 
1979 Freeze on number of vessels in Queensland 
1979 Govemment - Industry Committee established under chair of D. Lapidge to 
inquire into marketing of fish in Queensland 
1980 First report of Lapidge Committee, 25 March 1980 
1980 Queensland east coast fleet peaks at 1,413 vessels 
1981 Freeze on further entry to the prawn fishery, November 1981 
1981 Amendment to Fish Supply Management Act; Final Report Lapidge 
1981 Amendment Primary Producers' Cooperative Associations Act 1923-1981 
1982 Recession 
1982 Fishing Industry Organisation and Marketing Act 
1982 Freeze on Licenses in NSW prawn fishery 
1982 The Fishing Sector Advisory Committee (FISHSAC) established with 
membership of QCFO, QAFC, QF&BP and QDPI 
1982 Formation of joint Commonwealth-State Working Group to assemble and 
assess the economic and biological information for the fishery 
1982 The Queensland Fish Management Authority established with Board swom in 
on 1 December 1982 
1983 The Industry Assistance Commission Inquiry 
1983 Ahem Ministerial Position Paper, 21 March 
1983 The Offshore Constitutional Settlement gazetted on 14 Febmary 
«l 
1984 Restriction on upgrade of prawning vessels 
1984 Commonwealth continues to allow entry outside 3nm off Queensland, 
effectively sabotaging Queensland controls 
1984 East Coast Prawn Fishery Task Force established May, 1984 
1984 Freeze on any new prawn vessels by Queensland Govemment, January 1984 
1984 Cape York limited entry fishery declared 
1985 The 2:1 replacement policy for vessels introduced 
1985 Closure regime introduced 
1985 Definition of vessel hulls (unitisation) policy introduced 
1987 First OCS Agreement, prawns to be managed by State 
1988 Offshore Constitutional Settlement 
1988 Freeze on replacement and up-grade 
1990 Freeze on upgrades 
1991 The 2:1 (units) replacement policy introduced 
1994 Fisheries Act 1994 
1995 New Fisheries Management Act and Regulations 
By the end of the 1960s, the Queensland east coast prawn fishery had expanded to include 
isolated pocket fisheries along the coast.' These were to gradually join up so that an almost 
unbroken chain of prawning grounds extended along the coast. In far north Queensland (Caims 
northward), prawn vessels worked the east coast, Torres Strait and the lucrative Gulf of 
Carpentaria grounds. Export markets were expanding and a general feeling of optimism was 
apparent among prawn fishers (Baulch, 1988). Vessel numbers increased from 356 Queensland 
based vessels in 1967, to 650 in 1972. The greatest period of expansion (mid to late 1970s) 
coincided with a growth in the predominantly export-based fishery during 1977 and 1981 
(Elmer, 1992), particularly in the ports of Caims and Townsville. 
This period also coincided with the decline of the centralised marketing system established by 
the Ryan Labor Govemment in the 1920s. The main reason for the decline of the central market 
was increased competition for prawns fi-om traditional markets to supply the expanding export 
market particularly to Japan (Glaister, 1990). The coincidental investment by the Queensland 
Fish Board thus had disastrous financial implications (see Chapter 6). 
The rapid, market-driven, expansionary development of the east coast prawn fishery was slowed 
by the Queensland Govemment imposition of limits to new entrants. Such intervention had been 
progressively introduced by Australian State Govenmients in the 1970s and 1980s. Such 
restrictions appeared to have had a "domino effect" in adjoining jurisdictions, since restrictions 
in a particular fishery have caused the relocation of surplus vessels into those adjacent, still 
unrestricted fisheries, causing effort increases in these fisheries (Glaister, 1983). This was the 
Queensland experience in the late 1970s. The Queensland Govenmient sought to become 
involved in both the fishery and domestic marketing of prawns at this time. Following concems 
about over-capacity in the Gulf of Carpentaria fishery (managed by the Commonwealth or 
Federal Govemment) largely caused by fleet replacement as a consequence of the Shipbuilding 
Bounty, the east coast had been inundated by dumped, replaced Gulf vessels in the mid to late 
1970s (Bowen and Hancock, 1985). 
The advent of lucrative export markets had also caused a speculative "gold msh" with investors 
and entrepreneurs seeking to purchase and locate vessels (any vessels) on the east coast so as 
to establish a participatory history. This demand artificially inflated the value of second-hand 
vessels in adjacent fisheries such as New South Wales, as well as cause an explosion in the size 
of the Queensland fleet. 
Co-incidentally, the Queensland Fish Board had fallen into financial strife as a consequence of 
inappropriate investment in processing facilities (Chapter 6) and this combination of escalating 
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fleet and domestic market failure caused the Govemment to establish a Committee of Inquiry 
(Lapidge Committee) to investigate marketing and by inference, the management of fisheries in 
Queensland. The outcome (in 1981) was a comprehensive restmcture and refocus of fisheries 
management in Queensland - the establishment of an industry represented market management 
authority by the enactment of the Fishing Industry Organisation and Marketing Act - together 
with an immediate freeze on further entry to the prawn fishery (1979). 
The establishment of the Queensland Fish Management Authority (QFMA) (and its evolution as 
a resource management agency) is discussed further in Chapter 6, but suffice it to say, it 
signalled some change from the existing govemment bureaucracy. A range of input (as in inputs 
to the fishery - vessels, gear, season of fishing, areas of fishing) controls became part of the 
management picture, the principal ones including: 
- limiting numbers of dimensions of vessels (limited entry) 
- limiting replacement of vessels (boat replacement) 
- limiting fishing times and areas (seasonal and area closures) 
- limiting dimensions of fishing apparatus (gear restrictions) 
Some of these interventions were designed to maximise the economic value of the catch to the 
fishers and marketers (seasonal and area closures) and others to constrain effort increases 
occurring through the adoption of technology (limited entry and boat replacement). These policy 
decisions are discussed in detail below. 
The marketing of prawns was similarly addressed by Lapidge, with controls introduced to 
regulate distribution, standards for product handling and presentation, to collect levies for 
promotion and to discourage illegal sales (black marketing). 
During the period 1982-90 further policy refinement meant changes to maximum limits on 
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vessel dimensions and marketing standards (Glaister, 1990). In addition, the 1985 delegation of 
powers from the Federal to the State Govemment meant that management arrangements applying 
in Queensland State waters (inside 3 nautical miles) were extended to the limit of Australia's 
jurisdiction, the 200 nautical mile limit. 
In order to better understand the complex changes during the 1970-95 period, a more detailed 
examination of management policy evolution is appropriate. 
Limited Entry Policy 
Up to 1970, the prawn fishery developed as an open entry fishery, gradually spreading along the 
coast as exploratory trawling identified new pravraing grounds adjacent to centres of population. 
Following the discovery and development of a major fishery for banana prawns in the Gulf of 
Carpentaria in the early 1960s, many east coast vessels relocated to the Gulf. By the mid 1960s, 
effort controls were being requested by fishers in the Gulf and in 1977 a licence limitation 
(limited entry) was introduced in the Gulf of Carpentaria fishery. Immediately prior to this, new 
vessels larger than 21m or 150 gross tons were being offered a 27.5% govermnent subsidy 
(Rothlisberg et al. 1985). After 1975, the Ship Construction Bounty Act 1975 and the Bounty 
(Ships) Act 1980, restricted this subsidy t6 Australian manufactured vessels for use in Australian 
waters. 
The limiting of the fleet size through the licence limitation together with the availability of a 
Govemment vessel building subsidy (designed to assist the troubled domestic boat building 
industry) encouraged vessel replacement in the Gulf fishery. This was particularly so for 
Company operations where every fifth vessel would be essentially free (Bowen and Hancock, 
1985). 
Owners of Gulf vessels thus replaced their smaller, ex-east coast vessels with larger freezer 
vessels and retired the replaced vessel back to the east coast. The Gulf prawn entitlements 
(licences) had also accmed a monetary value and some owners sold Gulf entitlements, purchased 
new vessels and retumed to the east coast. Subsequent new owners also attached the entitlement 
to new, purpose-built Gulf vessels and again, retired the replaced trawler to the east coast. 
Such a rash of activity fuelled speculative investment in prawn vessels, again causing east coast 
fleet expansion. Hill and Pashen (1981) provide a comprehensive review of developments to 
1979. They found that despite the increased fleet, greater time at sea, new grounds and 
increased efficiency, total landings only grew marginally and, as a result, landings per vessel 
declined. Increasing costs (fuel prices, interest rates, inflation) meant that the economic position 
of most fishers declined. In September 1979, the Queensland State Govemment (Minister 
Hooper) unilaterally introduced a freeze on the numbers of State licensed vessels (those able to 
operate within 3 nautical miles of territorial baselines) following intensive lobbying from fishers. 
Queensland east coast prawners were concemed that, as the last remaining open entry fishery, 
the east coast would become a dumping ground for replaced vessels from the Gulf and other 
States. 
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Contrary to expectations, the announcement of the "freeze on entry" had the exact opposite 
effect, with vessel numbers accelerating (Figure 4.5). The reason for the increase was successful 
lobbying of the Minister by speculators able to argue that they had "commenced building" a 
vessel prior to the announcement (Hill and Pashen, 1981). Proof of "notice of intent" included 
signed contracts, physical evidence of constmction (keel laid) or statutory declarations of 
discussions with shipwrights. Such loopholes allowed new vessels to continue to enter the 
fishery until the fleet peaked at 1,413 vessels in 1981, double that of 1977. 
The Minister for Fisheries, Mr Ahem, announced the freeze would continue in November 1981, 
and also strengthened the proof of intent provisions, effectively stopping further vessel entry. 
Vessels continued to enter the New South Wales fleet until they too announced a freeze on 
further entry in 1982 (Glaister and McDonall, 1983). All prawn fisheries had thus adopted a 
limited entry policy by 1982. 
Concems at fleet growth by both Queensland and New South Wales fisheries agencies and the 
fact that the Federal Govemment still controlled the waters outside 3 nautical miles, caused the 
two States and the Commonwealth to convene a tri-partite working group to consider problems 
with the east coast prawn fishery in 1982. This group failed to define any solutions, whilst the 
Federal Govemment continued to license new vessels to enter the fishery in Commonwealth 
waters (outside 3nm) (Elmer, 1992). A task force was established in May 1984 to develop a 
"management scheme" for the fishery (East Coast Prawn Trawl Task Force, 1984). Their report 
merely identified the issues and recommended access options in the border area (between New 
South Wales and Queensland vessels). 
It was not until the Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS) agreement of 1988, that the issue 
of new, federally licensed vessels accessing the east coast prawn fishery was resolved. The OCS 
recognised jurisdiction of a State, the Commonwealth or both, depending upon the fishery. In 
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the case of the east coast prawn trawl fishery, the jurisdiction was ceded to Queensland off 
Queensland and New South Wales off New South Wales with vessels near the border and with 
historical proof of activity, having access to both (Elmer, 1992). 
The limited entry policy could only be viewed as a failure, since it had the opposite effect to that 
intended and the outcome of double the vessel numbers required a number of other policy 
initiatives. The most important of these was the boat replacement policy. 
Boat Replacement Policy 
As well as attempting to halt the addition of new vessels to the Queensland east coast prawn 
fleet, policy initiatives were also taken to restrict the replacement of existing, older vessels with 
new, state-of-the-art vessels. The 1979 freeze had also limited trawlers working north of 
Caims to less than 20m (to prevent larger endorsed Gulf of Carpentaria vessels retuming to the 
east coast) and replacement of existing vessels on a "one-to-one" length basis (i.e. an existing 
14.5m vessel by a new 14.5m vessel). 
In 1983, the freeze on new entry continued and the replacement policy relaxed on the grounds 
it was too restrictive to allow "... not' more than one metre greater ..." increase for the 
replacement vessel. There were no constraints on engine power or gear, so more powerful faster 
vessels equipped with larger nets able to more efficiently trawl (increased fishing power), 
resulted. The recognition of the continuation of the escalation in fishing power prompted 
consideration of a more precise definition of vessel dimensions. 
The federal managers of the Gulf of Carpentaria fishery, faced with similar problems had 
quantified the fishing power of trawlers by precise definition of the linear dimensions of vessels 
and the horse power of engines and in late 1985, a similar, unitisation scheme was implemented 
on the east coast. The main elements of the policy included a total vessel unit allocation based 
on under-deck volume (length x breadth x depth) together with main engine units defined for 
each vessel. Vessel replacement was allowed on a one-for-one basis (units) with an upgrade 
to a larger vessel permitted on the acquisition of additional trawl vessel units (amalgamation) 
with the compulsory retirement of surplus trawl licences. Thus the system was a 2:1 policy on 
licences, and encouraged amalgamation of numbers of smaller vessels into fewer larger 
replacement vessels (Glaister et al. 1991). A maximum vessel limit of 20m length over all was 
maintained. 
Practical difficulties were encountered in enforcing the main engine unit component of the 
unitisation policy. Falsifying engine specifications, boosting power with mechanical alterations 
and such, meant that fishers were able to increase the engine power (and hence fishing power) 
of vessels without the necessity of purchasing additional engine units (Elmer, 1992). The engine 
unit component of the replacement policy was abandoned in August 1987 and all vessels were 
allowed a free upgrade to 300kw (300 main engine units). 
An outcome of the policy was that vessels started to be modified so as to be larger whilst still 
technically remaining within the existing unitisation description. A further concem was that 
small, comparatively inefficient vessels were being amalgamated into fewer though larger and 
more effective vessels. Thus the effective fishing power of the fleet was continuing to grow. 
In December 1988, Minister Harper announced a 12 month freeze on "... the replacement, 
upgrading and modification of all otter trawlers licensed to operate on the Queensland east coast" 
(Harper, 1988). 
In the Media Release the Minister stated that despite the necessity to buy a second licence before 
upgrading a boat, the present policy "... is no longer effectively constraining effort in the 
fishery", he added the freeze would "... provide the opportunity to prevent increases in fishing 
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effort in the short term and in the longer mn should allow policies to be implemented which will 
lead to an overall reduction in effort in the fishery to the benefit of the resource and the 
industry". 
In August 1990, the freeze and 2:1 licence replacement policy was replaced by a 2:1 unit 
replacement policy. In other words, for those fishers seeking to replace, say, a 30 unit vessel 
with a 40 unit vessel (units being underdeck volume), a total of 80 units would be needed to be 
purchased (that is a further 50 units to the 30 already held) and 40 of these compulsorily 
surrendered. This is the policy as it currently stands. 
Although the 2:1 licence replacement policy of 1985 resulted in a significant removal of licences 
(Figure 4.5), concem at the level of amalgamation of smaller vessels caused a freeze on 
replacement to be imposed in 1988. The mean proportional change (in terms of hull units) for 
replaced vessels under the two-for-one vessel licence policy showed a dramatic increase during 
1986-88 with the replacement vessels also increasing in size with time under this policy. Thus 
there was a dramatic reduction in numbers of licences though there was probably an increase in 
real effort, by the amalgamation of effort into fewer vessels. 
Length frequency distributions of the fleet for 1981, 1985 and 1989 show some evidence for 
vessel size increase with a decrease in the 6-1 Im range and a disproportionate reduction in the 
larger size classes. Overall, however, there has been a reduction in the mean vessel size for 
1981 (14.24m) and 1989 (13.34m). Even when the vessels greater than 20m are discounted, the 
1981 (14.64m) vessels were larger than 1989 (13.34m). This does not necessarily reflect 
catching capacity or efficiency. 
The age of the east coast fleet as at 1990 as evidenced from an examination of licensing data 
for the year-of-constmction data for the current fleet (Figure 4.6) shows that relatively few 
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vessels have been built since the boom of 1979-81. Since then there has been a dramatic 
decrease in constmctions of new vessels to pre-1970 values. Note that these data are for 
licensed vessels and hence there may be a time lag in notification between constmction and 
licensing. 
No. of boats No. of boats 
Age (years) 
Figure 4.6 
Age distribution of prawn vessels in 
east coast fleet as at 1990 
Management measures and general economic circumstances since the boom have either been 
effective in slowing new vessel construction or, altematively, have had little impact because the 
market for new vessels was satisfied in 1979-81. Irrespective, less than 20 per cent of the fleet 
is under 10 years old whilst 51 per cent is under 15 years old. The average age of the fleet is 
17.26 years. These data of course include older vessels which possibly do not participate in the 
more distant, major prawn fisheries, though they do suggest there has been a decrease in the rate 
of effort increase, other than by upgrade. 
Another index of replacement are the annual transfer data from the QFMA records. These data 
suggest the rate of vessel change has reduced. During the period 1984-90, 59% of the fleet had 
no transfers, 27% were transferred once, 12% of the fleet were transferred twice, 1% were 
transferred three times and 0.2% were transferred four times. Trading in vessels appears to have 
slowed as both economic conditions and boat replacement policies have mitigated against 
turnover (Table 4.3). 
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Table 43 
Transfer (numbers) of prawning vessels in Queensland. 
Source: QFMA records. 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Transfers 
146 
116 
68 
As Percentage of 
Fleet 
15.2 
11.6 
7.0 
The boat replacement policy could not be judged on success, assessed on outcomes. The upper 
limits on vessel units (70) and vessel length (20m) meant that configurations up to these limits 
were possible and such vessels were capable of exerting more real effort than older, smaller 
vessels and more than the combined two single vessels and units that were replaced. The 
overall effect of the current policy has been to slow the rate of vessel replacement and thus result 
in an aging fleet (Figure 4.6). The effect on fishers has been that insurance companies will 
either not insure old vessels or, if they do, the premiums are too expensive for fishers to afford. 
The third input control, that of the timing and area allowed for fishing, has also had a 
controversial history and we tum to that next. 
Seasonal and Area Closures Policy 
Closures of trawlable areas to fishing have been widely applied as a management tool in prawn 
fisheries. Permanent closure of areas as protection for nursery areas from physical damage by 
trawling, temporary or seasonal closure of areas as protection for aggregations of juvenile prawns 
of submarketable size and periodic seasonal closure over the entire fishery, have been routinely 
applied as management policies for prawn fisheries. The recent experience in the Queensland 
fishery follows. 
East coast closures originated in 1982 because of fishers' concem about the capture of small 
brown tiger prawns (Penaeus esculentus) north of Cooktown. A closure to protect small prawns 
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fi-om premature exploitation (so called "growth overfishing") was sought by fishers to protect the 
lucrative market for the export-oriented fishery. This was gradually accepted by all fishers and 
the decision to support the Torres Strait - Cape Tribulation closure was unanimously supported 
by the industry organisation in 1984 (Figure 4.7). The Queensland Fish Management Authority 
in addition extended (to State waters only) the closure south to Bowen. This was in order to 
protect a larger part of the nursery area and fears that there would be an increase in fishing effort 
on grounds between Bowen and Cape Tribulation by fishers excluded from the closed area. The 
fear was that these fishers would seek to fish in close proximity to the closure. 
Coles et al. (1985) provided an assessment of the 1985 closure. They reported the species 
captured included brown tiger (P. esculentus), endeavour (Metapenaeus endeavouri), grooved 
tiger (P. semisulcatus) and westem king prawns (P. latisulcatus). They concluded that the 
closure was effective in reducing the catch of juvenile brown tiger and endeavour prawns and 
less effective in protecting juvenile grooved tiger and westem king prawns. They considered that 
a longer closure, extending into December could be more appropriate. 
The east coast closure was again implemented in 1985/86 and a larger area included with 
Commonwealth waters closed from Cape York to Lucinda Point out to the outer boundary of the 
Great Barrier Reef. State waters were closed from Cape York to Airlie Beach (Figure 4.7). 
However, there was subsequent criticism from northem resident fishers at the influx of southem 
trawlers into the area once the closed area was opened to fishing - a pulse of extra effort. Many 
considered that the purpose of the closure - protection of juvenile brown tiger prawns to 
acceptable export market size - had not been achieved since a "pulse" of effort early in the 
season had negated any benefits. Die and Watson (1992) have vindicated such a point of view 
through simulation studies. 
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Figure 4.7 
Geographic variation in seasonal closures during 
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As a result of fishers' concems, the east coast closures were not implemented in 1987. The 
catching sector of the industry had as an altemative, proposed a differential seasonal licence 
endorsement system (a 9V2 months trawling endorsement plus observance of closure, versus a 
12 months trawling endorsement to fish anywhere except seasonal closures) to provide for a form 
of area management. This was not supported. 
The closure was again implemented in 1987/88 over a still larger area between Cape York and 
22°S, through an irregular line out to Hydrographer's Passage to the outer boundary of the Great 
Barrier Reef (Figure 4.7). Again it was criticised by some fishers and most marketers since the 
extended area of the closure included previously exempt king prawn grounds. Undertakings were 
given that future closures would be discussed on a port-by-port basis. 
These meetings reaffirmed fishers' desire for protection of juvenile brown tiger prawns and 
seagrass habitat but considered pulse fishing negated benefits of the closure. Debate within the 
fishing industry continued and the northem closure again was implemented in 1988/89. The area 
closed extended to the Offshore Constitutional Settlement line from Cape York to Clump Point 
(similar to that of 1985/86) and then south to 22°S in State waters (Figure 4.7). The stated aims 
of the closure were "... to protect the prawn stock and to allow the prawns to reach a larger and 
more economic size before they were caught". The total closure of all waters above Clump 
Point was designed"... to give maximum protection to the (brown) tiger prawn resource and the 
closure of inshore waters south of Clump Point continued that protection for tiger prawns whilst 
allowing king prawns to be fished" (Anon, 1988). 
Thus with the exception of the initial industry-generated decision to protect juvenile P. 
esculentus in the area north of Cooktown for essentially economic reasons (export marketability) 
- to protect against "growth overfishing" - the subsequent southern closure extension was largely 
negotiated to dampen the pulse fishing effect over a wider range of coast and provide for 
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additional protection to inshore prawn populations. The problems that have not been addressed 
are the impacts on small local fisheries for other species (multispecies problem) and the 
sequendal exploitafion by a mobile fleet (pulse fishing problem). 
In addition to changes to closure policies, there have been some demographic changes which also 
influenced fishers' views. Data from Williams (1980) and QFMA annual reports suggest a 
northerly shift of the port of residence for prawn trawl fishers. Beurteaux and Coles (1987) 
convincingly demonstrated a significant increase in effort for the northem sector of the east coast 
fishery between 1983 (pre-closure) and 1986. They found a threefold increase in the number 
of vessels berthing at Caims port, that the larger dual-endorsed (Gulf and east coast) trawlers 
spent a significantly longer time at sea than the smaller trawlers licensed for the east coast only 
and that annual effort expended had not changed significantly as a result of the closures 
(compression of effort). 
Williams (1980, Fig 3) demonstrated a sequential movement of fishing effort along the east coast 
(areas 1 to 5). Combining her data for areas 4 and 5 produces a bell shaped monthly distribution 
of numbers of trawl fishers in the northem region with a peak during June-July. Beurteaux and 
Coles' (1987) analysis of surveillance records show a similar distribution in 1983 (pre-closure) 
and an effort shift with a marked spike or concentration of effort at the opening of the closed 
area to fishing (pulse fishing) in 1986. 
Area closures (those areas permanently closed to protect nursery habitat such as seagrass) have 
been less controversial and are readily accepted as a sound investment in the future by fishers. 
Indeed the fishers peak body is a strong advocate for such declarations (see Chapter 6). 
The experience with seasonal closures has been varied, largely due to conflicting objectives and 
the multispecies nature of the resource. Thus when seasonal closures designed to protect small 
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brown tiger prawns are optimal, they are the opp)Osite for red spot king prawns. In other words, 
a policy that when applied in a local area for a particular purpose, can be quite surgical in effect, 
when applied globally, becomes a blunt instmment. Political concems over pulse fishing have 
seriously compromised the application of closure policy in the Queensland east coast prawn 
fishery. 
THE PRAWN TRAWL FISHERY TODAY 
A mean annual catch of over 6,500 tonnes of prawns are reported to have been taken during the 
years 1990 to 1993 (Table 4.3). King prawns (including eastem king, red spot king and westem 
king) comprised the largest component (37%) of the catch with over 2400 tonnes caught 
annually (Figure 4.8). Tiger prawns (including brown tiger, grooved tiger and giant tiger) 
comprised 27% of the annual catch. However, tiger prawns are usually closely associated with 
endeavour prawns (blue and red endeavour) and together, the tiger/endeavour component is over 
43% of the total catch with up to 2700 tonnes caught annually. Banana and Bay prawns each 
only comprise about 5 to 10% of the annual catch. 
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Figure 4.8 
East coast prawn fishery catch by species 
along the coast (1992). Source: QFMA 
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The interpretation of average catches between years can be misleading since environmental 
changes can cause major fluctuations in prawn abundances. However average annual data (Table 
4.4) show that the average catch of a vessel operating in the east coast prawn trawl fishery is 
about 87kg/day trawled and an annual catch of just under 7.5 tonnes with boat catch per boat 
and total catch declining. Catches are skewed across the fleet with a small proportion of the 
fleet taking a disproportionate proportion amount of the catch. 
Table 4.4 
Annual Queensland prawn catch and effort. 
Source: QFMA records. 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Mean 
Total Catch 
COOOkg) 
6,675 
7,006 
6,589 
7,128 
6,121 
6,309 
6,638 
Total Days 
Fished 
73,220 
79,927 
74,834 
78,855 
71,871 
76,164 
75,812 
Average 
kg/boat/day 
91 
87 
88 
90 
85 
82 
87.2 
Prawn catches in the east coast prawn trawl fishery peak in March each year at approximately 
1200 tonnes and decline to monthly catches of about 200 tonnes in December each year (Figure 
4.9). Almost half the annual catch is taken between March and May. This peak is due almost 
entirely to the larger catches of tiger and endeavour prawns in northem waters (Caims to Torres 
Strait). 
Effort (numbers of days fished, numbers of boats) also follows these pattems, with up to 8,000 
boat days per month expended during March to May involving over 600 vessels. By December 
these have declined to less than 4,000 boat days and 400 vessels respectively. 
Species composition changes markedly as the year progresses. Catches of both tiger and 
endeavour prawns peak in March-April, banana prawns in April, king prawns in May and Bay 
prawns in December. In terms of percentage catch composition, tiger-endeavour prawns 
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dominate the catch in March (65%) but by the end of the year, the majority of the catch (70%) 
is made up of king and Bay prawns. Representation in the catch by the latter group (king. Bay) 
appears to be declining. 
There are three major areas that altogether produce about 30% of the catch (Figure 4.8). 
. Princess Charlotte Bay 
. Townsville 
. Moreton Bay ("Brisbane" on the figures) 
If adjacent areas are included, the total from the three is approximately 60% of the annual catch. 
Princess Charlotte Bay is predominantly tiger-endeavour, Townsville is king-tiger-endeavour 
and Moreton Bay is king and Bay. There is a gradient north-south of increasing species 
complexity. Fishers have expressed concems of a long term decline in king prawn abundance 
(particularly off Townsville - red spot king - and Moreton (eastem king), and logbook data 
support this assertion. 
No boat days 
14,000 
12,000 
10,000 Princess Charlotte Bay ToWnsviire 
INo. boat days ™ N O . boats 
2,000 
0 rinnnnnn 
No boats 
Brisbane 
Dnnf 
Latitude 
Figure 4.9 
Distribution of prawning effort along 
Queensland coast. Source: QFMA 
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The effort expended along the coast largely reflects the total catch pattem with a greater number 
of vessels operating in areas of high catch (Figure 4.9). The catch per unit effort (CPUE), which 
is assumed reflects prawn abundance, shows a different pattern. The CPUE drops from around 
120kg/boat/day in the northem areas to about 70kg/boat/day off Townsville. Although catch rate 
(CPUE) picks up to the south of Townsville (to over 130kg/boat/day) they again steadily decline 
again to around 70 to 80 kg/boat/day around the Moreton Bay area. 
Currently, prawn vessels are limited to a maximum length of 20m and a maximum engine 
continuous rated power of 300 kilowatts (400 H.P.). The mean vessel size was 13.3m in 1989 
(Glaister et al. 1991), though efficiency has continued to increase. The smaller-sized vessels 
in the fleet generally concentrate in the more sheltered embayments such as Moreton Bay or 
access stocks close to sheltered ports and thus rarely venture far from home. Vessels of 15m 
and larger are better suited to fishing a range of conditions and to conduct diversified fishing 
operations along the length of the coast and many are consequently highly mobile. 
Trawling operations are also seasonally diversified. Depending upon the time of the year, 
trawlers can seasonally target a range of prawn and scallop aggregations, optimising catches. 
Some east coast vessels are also licensed to operate in the Torres Strait fishery (dual endorsed) 
and a lesser number in the Torres Strait and Gulf of Carpentaria fisheries (triple endorsed). In 
1991, 122 east coast licensed trawlers also operated for a part of the year in Torres Strait, whilst 
70 east coast licensed trawlers also operated for part of the year in the Gulf of Carpentaria 
fishery (Elmer, 1992). These latter numbers (GOC) have been recently vastly reduced through 
a compulsory buy-out scheme. 
During the development of the east coast fishery, a combination of habitat destmction and 
overfishing caused the demise of banana prawn stocks adjacent to a number of central coast ports 
(Walker, 1969). Similar impacts are also beginning to be evident for other species. 
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Technological change (satellite positioning) has allowed recent increases in concentrated trawling 
effort close to reef areas (Townsville) for red spot king prawns and more precise targeting of the 
deepwater spawning aggregations (Moreton) for eastem king prawns. Moreover, there has been 
major urban and agriculture development of the coastal fringe in south east Queensland and 
northem and central New South Wales, and an expansion south of the New South Wales eastem 
king prawn fishery since 1983 (Glaister, 1984). Together these factors may account for the 
decline in the catches of king prawns in the multispecies Queensland east coast prawn fishery. 
The implications of such a decline is a cause for concem for both the resource base and viability 
of Queensland prawn fishers. 
Marketing the Catch 
The catch from the east coast prawn trawl fishery may be sold locally, on the interstate domestic 
market or to export markets. Export quality prawns are generally larger and of the species 
favoured in particular countries e.g. tiger prawns to Japan, banana (white) prawns to the United 
States. These may be processed for export on board vessels equipped to Australian export 
standards or in land based establishments equipped to export standards. 
Approximately 85 per cent of the Australian catch is exported (primarily to Japan) although the 
Australian market share in Japan is less than 4 per cent (Glaister, 1990), and declining. The 
principal competitor for the Australian export prawn market has been Asian aquaculture, 
principally Taiwan (Glaister, 1990). Prawns from Queensland east coast grounds north of 
Townsville (mainly king and tiger prawns) are of a size and species suitable for export. 
Queensland east coast prawns also command premium domestic prices in the Melboume and 
Sydney markets with king, tiger, banana and Bay groupings selling well. Generally these are 
frozen uncooked, or cooked and iced. These prawns also hold a significant share of the 
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Queensland market and together with excess export product, are offered for sale locally by 
licensed processors and buyers to consumers and the restaurant trade. 
Traditionally, and particularly the early years of the Gulf prawn fishery, all prawns were deemed 
the target species and all other components of the catch were "by-catch" (commercially valuable) 
or "trash" (commercially worthless). In the early days (1970s) most bycatch was not worth the 
trouble in processing, since limited ice or refrigerated space made the packing of less valuable 
species uneconomic. However, on most vessels, bycatch was seen as part of the crew spoils. 
Bug "tails" (meaty tail portions of shovel-nosed lobsters), scallops, fish fillets, shark tmnks, sea 
snake skins and dried sharks' fins were regularly claimed and marketed by deckhands, becoming 
part of their remuneration. 
On the east coast, the practice has been more conservative, with bug tails, scallops, fish fillets, 
shark tmnks, crabs and most other valuable bycatch marketed along with the prawns as part of 
the vessel catch. Proceeds from the sale of the catch are then split according to prearranged 
shares (vessel, owner, skipper, crew). Specialist bycatch (sea shells, seahorses, sea snakes) are 
still retained by the crew members who find such creatures amongst the catch, but increasing 
concem from fisheries agencies and conservation groups as to the sustainability of such practices 
has meant that, increasingly, shells, seahdrses, pipefishes and sea snakes must be retumed to the 
water unharmed. 
There are approximately 2500 individuals and companies licensed in Queensland to buy 
Queensland-sourced seafood, including prawns (QFMA unpublished data). The principal 
requirements to hold such a licence are to satisfy local hygiene standards and have premises able 
to meet inspection standards. They range from ten medium to large scale processors to (the 
majority) 'comer store' operations distributed throughout the State, but concentrated in coastal 
towns. 
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Distribution of prawns is generally limited to a few medium to large operators (particularly for 
export and interstate domestic markets). There are large numbers of small operators competing 
for a very small share of the domestic (particularly local) market. Smaller prawns, particularly 
those in the Bay grouping may also be packaged uncooked and frozen for recreational angling 
bait. Processing for bait is undertaken by a small number of small processors. 
Relatively few (8 per cent) trawler owners participate in the wider distribution of seafood, 
generally at the wholesale level. Fishers' co-operatives are also of limited importance, with two 
in Brisbane and one each in Gladstone, Yeppoon and Bowen (Elmer 1992). Thus most east 
coast trawler owners have not vertically integrated their businesses to include wholesale and 
retail marketing, and are generally limited to catching operations. 
Aquaculture (pond cultivation of prawns) has impacted the world market for prawns in the last 
two decades. Cultured prawn production in Australia has grown from approximately 30kt in 
1975 to 500kt in 1988 and is expected to exceed 1200kt by 2000 (Glaister, 1990). Conversely, 
world supplies of wild-caught prawns are thought to have plateaued and further new and major 
fishing grounds are unlikely awaiting discovery (Baulch, 1988). Since 75 per cent of world 
aquacultured prawns are grown in south east Asia and the majority exported to attract foreign 
currency, the increasing supply from aqua'culture sources will disproportionately impact existing 
export markets for wild-caught prawns (Glaister, 1990). 
Domestic markets in Sydney and Melboume have started to see imported aquacultured prawns 
from New Caledonia and Taiwan, and from domestic aquaculture farms. Thus the prognosis for 
the wild-capture prawn industry is that prices are liable to remain stable in the short term and 
decline in the medium to long term. For the Queensland east coast fishery, industry restmcturing 
is inevitable. Such restmcturing is likely to mean fewer, more efficient vessels in the catching 
sector, and a greater interest in marketing the catch. 
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Prawn fishers in the 1990s are increasingly taking more interest in the marketing of the catch. 
As most prawn fisheries are fully exploited, catches are unlikely to increase and so fishers must 
value-add their product or niche market. Examples of the former include supplying high quality 
fresh seafood to up-market restaurateurs (through licensed buyers) whilst examples of the latter 
include supplying live broodstock to aquaculturists and live bait prawns to recreational anglers. 
In fishing families in ports such as Tin Can Bay, family participation means that a male-female 
couple function as an economic unit - the man as the artisan - supplying product - the woman 
as the marketer of the product - door to door selling in a small community or supplying buyers 
(pers.obs.). Their relationship thus functions as a relation of production, much as do artisanal 
bakers in France (Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame, 1981). Such co-operation is common in 
smaller, artisanal level fishing families along the Queensland east coast. 
Ownership 
Records of vessel ownership in the east coast fishery are patchy, except for a detailed survey 
from 1980-1983 (Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1984). In this study, a stratified random 
sample of 100 vessels was used, 48 fi"om New South Wales and 52 from Queensland. Much of 
the financial data was thought to be understated and under reporting for taxation reasons was 
suspected. However, the ownership data were not thought to be biased and are presented below. 
Table 4.5 
Percentage ownership of east coast fleet by entity. 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural E^conomics, 1984. 
Entity 
Sole owner 
Husband and wife partnership 
Other family partnership 
Non-family partnership 
Registered private company 
Estate or tmstee company 
Total 
Qld 
23 
49 
17 
4 
5 
2 
100 
NSW 
34 
55 
7 
3 
1 
100 
Total 
28 
51 
13 
4 
3 
1 
100 
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These data suggest a high proportion of owner-operator ownership, particularly those in family 
partnerships (89% in Queensland). An earlier study by Jarzynski (1982) found equivalent 
ownership proportions for vessels located in an area between Cape York and Mackay. 
The question of fleet ownership (numbers of vessels by a particular owner) is also of interest, 
since it too gives guidance on the class of ownership. Data held by the QFMA offer insight as 
to multi-vessel ownership. 
Elmer (1992) provided a detailed analysis of 1991 licensing records for the east coast prawn 
trawl fleet. These data (his table 3.3) indicated that most vessels (82%) are operated as 
independent units whilst a further 13% are owned by operators who own one other vessel. The 
remaining 5% are owned by operators who own more than two but less than six vessels. More 
than half (52%) of vessels were owned by an individual owner whilst a further third (32%) are 
owned in partnership and 15% in limited liability company arrangements. Trawlers were 
skippered predominantly by owner operators (87%) or owners form part of the crew (4%) only 
7% of vessel owners were not legally authorised to participate in fishing operations (neither 
master fishers nor assistant fishers). 
Present day ownership in the east coast pravra trawl is predominantly through family partnerships 
or sole operators, classic petite bourgeoisie. Generally, a single vessel or at the most, two, are 
operated by these partnerships or sole operators. The fleet ownership stmcture is thus primarily 
individual owner-operators (sole owners or partnerships) who are very much individuals and 
middle class in the Marxist sense. 
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Management Policies in Other Australian Prawn Fisheries 
Apart from the long established scoop net prawn fisheries in New South Wales and Queensland, 
significant, commercial exploitation of prawns has been practised in Australia for only the past 
twenty-five years. These prawn fisheries vary from those directed at a single species (South 
Australia) ranging to many (up to 10 in the Gulf of Carpentaria) (Ruello, 1974). During this 
period, from 1970-95, prawn fisheries have developed in isolated pockets throughout much of 
Australia, each of which has independently acquired a set of mles or management policies 
largely dependent upon the local management authority (Bowen and Hancock, 1985). 
At different stages of development, each has adopted some form of limited entry policy. 
Supporting mles have invariably included boat replacement, closed seasons and areas and gear 
restrictions. A common feature of these fisheries has been the eventual recognition of excess 
fishing capacity. All major Australian prawn stocks now appear to be fully or excessively 
exploited (Bowen and Hancock, 1985) and face the problems of restmcturing in order to reduce 
fishing effort. It is useful to briefly review management policies that have developed in these 
fisheries in order to link and contrast such policies in the Queensland context. The following 
summary has relied on discussions with individuals (particularly bureaucrats) as well as the 
excellent summaries of Ruello (1975), Hill and Pashen (1981), Haysom (1985), Bowen and 
Hancock (1985) and McLoughlin et al. (1994). It will include a brief description of managed 
fisheries, agencies, status of fisheries and management policies. 
The origin of management authority for each Australian prawn fishery is a function of the 
Australian constitution and joint and independent management authorities may operate. Where 
a fishery is confined to state territorial or inland waters (within three nautical miles of the high-
water mark) it is managed independently under the appropriate State legislation. Where all or 
part of the stock is in Commonwealth or federal waters (outside 3nm) it is managed jointly 
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between the Commonwealth (Department of Primary Industry) and the State(s) or Territory 
involved (Bowen and Hancock, 1985). 
Individual State management occurs in New South Wales (estuarine, offshore and deepwater 
north of Barrenjoey Point); Queensland (estuarine and offshore); South Australia (Spencer Gulf, 
Gulf St Vincent, Investigator Strait and West Coast); and Westem Australia (Shark Bay, 
Exmouth Gulf, Nickol Bay and the Kimberley). The major fishery outside this group is the 
jointly managed fishery of the Northem Prawn Fishery (NPF) (Slade Point on Cape York, 
Queensland, the Gulf of Carpentaria, Northem Territory and waters to Cape Londonderry in 
Westem Australia) (Figure 4.10) which is managed by the Australian Fisheries Council (federal 
and State fisheries ministers) on advice from the Northem Prawn Fishery Management Advisory 
Committee (NORMAC). NORMAC has five govemment (federal, Queensland, Northem 
Territory, Westem Australia and CSIRO) and seven industry representatives. 
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Figure 4.10 
Distribution of major Australian prawn fisheries 
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The NPF management policies have followed an open entry - limited entry - effort containment 
- effort reduction trajectory. The intent of such policies has been delivered through input 
controls to contain and reduce total fleet fishing capacity to improve economic retums to the 
fishery. A major restmcturing has reduced vessel numbers from 238 (1986) to 125 (1993). This 
involved an industry funded "buy-back" of fishing units as well as a compulsory surrender of 
units if the effort reduction target was not achieved (McLoughlin et al. 1994). 
The NPF is based on two main species groupings - banana and tiger prawns - which have 
different management requirements. Commercial trawling operations commenced in 1965-66 
following exploratory fishing in the Gulf of Carpentaria. The fishery quickly developed and by 
1970, catches by 252 vessels exceeded 7,000t (Bowen and Hancock, 1985). hi 1977 there was 
a freeze on further entry for a 3 year trial period, because of concems of over-capitalisation and 
biological overfishing. The trial allowed development of criteria for eligibility of entry, boat 
replacement, seasonal and area closure and other policies. In 1982 an accelerated program of 
restmcturing was proposed and the following year, a boat replacement policy based on an 
underdeck volume unitisation scheme (the foremnner of the previously described Queensland 
system) and buy-back, was implemented (Bowen and Hancock, 1985). 
These policies have retired effort, but the'stocks are still in trouble with 1992 the lowest banana 
prawn catch ever (2420t) and 1993, the lowest tiger prawn catch since 1976 (McLoughlin et al. 
1994). The economic impact of these declines has been marked by an increase in the unit price 
of prawns, mainly on the Japanese market. Recent deterioration of the Australian dollar 
exchange rate may change this. 
The complexity of the NPF and in particular, the management arrangements (joint 
Commonwealth - States, but with NORMAC overriding other interests) make it a difficult case 
study in understanding management policy development. Difficulty in gaining access to records 
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of discussions and decision-making processes were the reasons that the NPF was not included 
in the comparative study described in Chapter 5. 
The individual state management regimes provide a useful contrast in the development of 
management policies. The case of Queensland has been previously described. 
In New South Wales, the oceanic trawl fisheries developed in the late 1940s (Ruello, 1975). The 
management policy was open entry until the imposition of a freeze in 1982 and limited entry in 
1984. The introduction of limited entry was a reaction to the Queensland action in limiting 
entry. Thus both New South Wales and Queensland had policies of open entry followed by 
recent adoption of limited entry policies. Boat replacement, closures and gear policies also 
apply-
South Australia and Westem Australia both developed prawn fisheries in the late 1960s and both 
immediately adopted (for different reasons) limited entry policies (see Chapter 5). They have 
not developed the same management policies on boat replacement as have New South Wales and 
Queensland, but have on seasonal and area closures. Interestingly, as Bowen and Hancock 
(1985) have observed "...Whether introduced in anticipation or in retrospect, all Australian prawn 
fisheries are now subject to excessive fisliing effort". 
DISCUSSION 
The evolution of the Queensland prawn fishery has followed a pattem that may be common to 
the exploitation of renewable natural resources - initial discovery, market development, 
expansion of exploitation, mechanisation and improved means of exploitation (means of 
production in a Marxist sense), limits to further expansion, specialisation, over capitalisation, and 
over exploitation. Such a trajectory would also seem possible in agriculture (Vanderpool, 1988; 
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Steinmetz and Wright, 1989 and Moran et al. 1993) and possibly the water industry and the 
forestry industry. There is agreement that prawn resources are fully exploited and, in the case 
of banana prawn stocks, over-exploited. 
The Queensland east coast prawn fishery has largely developed following the post World War 
2 availability of the means of harvest and the simultaneous discovery of the availability of 
prawns. The geography of the Queensland coast meant that the extent of the prawn resource is 
considerable and diverse in species and area of fishing grounds. The expansion of the fishery 
has largely followed the population spread from south to north and, in the beginning, has been 
market-limited. Overfishing of banana prawn resources has occurred, largely as a result of their 
schooling behaviour which makes the species vulnerable to targeted fishing. This has been 
exacerbated by the reduction in available banana prawn nursery habitat through flood mitigation 
works and irrigation extractions altering freshwater coastal inputs. 
Fishers have adopted by diversifying to other species and value added by targeting export, rather 
than domestic markets (Glaister, 1990). Relatively few fishers have vertically integrated their 
businesses with most relying on a highly dispersed and small-scale, diversified, domesfic 
markets and a few large exporting companies for export sales. However, there is a pronounced 
owner-operator component to ownership of the Queensland fleet, with sole owner-family 
partnerships of one or two vessels, the majority. Such a pattem is consistent with a petite 
bourgeoisie involvement in the Queensland prawn fishery. That is self employed, owner 
operators with "middle class" views of management. The globalisation of markets has 
increasingly meant that the Queensland prawn fishers are price takers rather than price makers 
because they command only a relatively small proportion of the major export (Japanese) market 
and are also at the mercy of the global economy (Glaister, 1990). 
Such reality, and the diversity of ownership, has increasingly polarised the Queensland prawn 
120 
fishery so that there are fishers that are focussed primarily on export markets and those that 
service domestic demands. Such polarisation has seen fisher behavioural changes including the 
increased mobility of some fishers (travel along coast versus stay at home) and the differential 
targeting of seasonally-abundant species as markets demand. 
It is generally accepted (Garcia and Grainger, 1997) that the worid's fish stocks are at full 
exploitation or are overfished. The paradigm of the inexhaustibility of our oceans' fish stocks 
as espoused by Huxley, has been shown to be flawed. The steady increase in the world's total 
annual catch from two million tons in 1850 to 55 million by the end of the 1960s supported such 
optimism, but the subsequent plateauing of total production in the 1970s and peak in 1987 
signalled that resources were finite. A similar picture has emerged in the Queensland prawn 
fishery. The extent and magnitude of fishing grounds are well understood. Technological 
improvements such as satellite positioning systems, have allowed more precise mapping of 
fishing grounds by fishers, but the grounds are finite, their biological productivity limited (or 
even declining), as available nursery habitat is reduced by urban development, agriculture and 
pollution). 
It is evident that the Queensland prawn resources too are fully exploited and in some cases 
(banana prawns) there are worrying trends'suggesting over-exploitation may have occurred. The 
multispecies nature of Queensland stocks and the robustness (until recently) of the Asian 
economy has masked economic problems. The definition of fishing grounds almost all the way 
along the Queensland coast has meant the isolated coastal leapfrogging through exploration as 
new grounds were discovered, has been replaced by full exploitation of well known grounds. 
Early, inefficient hand scooping has been replaced by modem trawlers, with lucrative export 
markets the catalyst. Eager development has boomed to over-capitalisation. Artisanal fishing 
replaced by petite bourgeoisie and perhaps a further tendency toward capitalisation. An exciting, 
dynamic period. 
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The factors that have contributed to this past twenty-five years of rapid Queensland prawn 
fishery development are marketing, globalisation and management policy failure. The advent 
of domestic markets (aided by transportation infrastmcture) has helped, but the biggest factor has 
been the Japanese market (Glaister, 1990). Economic globalisation (air transport, electronic 
funds transfer, deregulation of the banking sector and the Asian economy) has accelerated this 
trend. 
Capital investment following the Gulf of Carpentaria boom has fuelled the fleet expansion which 
has in tum, resulted in management policy evolution. Mostly, the policy development has lagged 
behind fleet expansion. Comparisons with other prawn fisheries are informative, since many of 
the same policies have simultaneously been applied. The limitation on entry seems to be the 
defining element in each case. 
Note: 
In the final draft of this thesis submitted for examination. Examiner C noted in this section of 
the thesis that: 
"The basis of policies and changes in policies is alluded to but not discussed 
in detail. The account is comprehensive but lacks a "human touch". There is 
almost no account of the social dynamics which must have characterised the 
policy making process. Who were the major players? How did they interact? 
Who was successful? Who fell by the wayside? What alliances were formed? 
All are relevant sociological questions but they received little attention in this 
chapter.". 
The author had this very objective when the work first commenced. It was soon realised that 
this in fact was a major study of its own and could not be adequately covered in the course of 
this study. The point is valid and worthy of research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STANDING WATCH: THE NATURE OF THE PRAWN FISHER 
INTRODUCTION 
Fisheries are a human phenomenon and without human fishing effort the fishery cannot exist. 
Management of fisheries is as much about the management of human behaviours, the fishers, as 
it is about the fish (Hilbom and Walters, 1994). 
Fishing occurs in a very uncertain and unpredictable environment. The sea is a dangerous and 
alien place and is unforgiving of mistakes. Mother Nature is equally unpredictable and in the 
case of species such as prawns, environmental fluctuations can cause marked fluctuations in 
stock abundances (Glaister, 1984). Individual catches can fluctuate as a consequence of the 
activities of other fishers. In addition, product prices, the cost of fuel and the cost of finance 
can all fluctuate independently, or in synergy. 
Fishers work long hours on small vessels in often inclement weather, far from home and family. 
Accepted norms and values for comparable occupations on land, may differ at sea. As a group, 
fishers are often held in low esteem by the non-fishing public. Their incomes may be sporadic 
("feast or famine") and they are faced with an increasingly complex, shrinking world of 
regulation, compromise, competition and interference. Compared with terrestrial occupations, 
Australian fishers have never had a political representative in the state or federal parliament who 
has previously been a commercial fisher (with the exception of the 1998 Queensland elections!). 
So why do they do it? Many authors have referred to the "lifestyle" that fishing epitomises, that 
rather than solely economic gain, a fisher seeks independence, freedom to make choices and the 
challenge of the sea (McGoodwin 1990, Poggie and Gersuny 1974, and Gatewood and McCay 
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1988). Indeed Gatewood and McCay (1988) concluded that fishers derive a "satisfaction" from 
fishing as a way of life. Possibly the more significant factor is that small coastal communities, 
some often remote, offer few altemative sources of employment for the next generation. 
The hazards of working trawl gear at night and in bad weather need to be experienced to be 
appreciated. Fishers accept as the norm, for example, clambering six metres out on the wildly 
pitching trawl arm of a prawn boat (see the frontispiece) in rain and wind in the middle of the 
night to handle tangled trawl boards and trawl wires back into position. A false move or 
unexpected wave perhaps causing mangled limbs or even death. Injury rates in Queensland can 
be as high as 10% per year (the late D.Trama, Queensland research vessel skipper pers.com.). 
Such feats of agility and bravery, considered part of the occupation by fishers, can only be 
marvelled at by non-fishers. 
So are prawn fishers throughout Australia the same? What regional characteristics distinguish 
prawn fishers in, say, Queensland compared with those in other states? In this chapter, I 
examine the nature of the prawn fisher and contrast management regimes in each state with the 
socio-economic characteristics of prawn fishers. Such comparisons allow an examination of 
social stmcture and whether management regimes can shape class relations in this group. 
Queensland prawn fishers have also been subject to specific management change during the 
period of this study. Results of in-depth discussions with Queensland prawn fishers have 
allowed an understanding of their views on these changes. Two major issues - that of the policy 
on boat replacement and the policy on prawn closures - are examined in detail as examples of 
such changes. But first, a recap on the origins of management policies. 
Australian Prawn Fisheries 
We have already seen how the mechanisation of fishing vessels following the Second World War 
allowed the discovery and then development of prawn fisheries in Australia. Small prawn 
trawlers from New South Wales gradually expanded fishing operations northward along the 
Queensland coast. The advent of lucrative export markets soon encouraged other State 
Govemments and fishers to experiment in local waters in the early 1960s with grounds 
discovered in South Australia, Westem Australia and the Gulf of Carpentaria (Kesteven, 1965) 
(Chapter 4). The Federal Govenmient-financed survey of potential east coast grounds (New 
South Wales and Queensland), the Challenge survey accelerated further exploration and was both 
the catalyst for the development of the east coast fishery and this exploration interstate 
(Department of Primary Industry, 1959). 
But the fascinating thing about all of this is the comparatively recent history of prawn fishing 
in Australia. Extensive, commercial prawning has developed fi-om nothing, to a 20,000t fishery, 
worth in excess of $130 million (Kailoa et al. 1993) since the mid 1960s. A further interesting 
fact, which was touched upon in the previous chapter, is that whether in anticipation or 
retrospect, each of these essentially isolated fisheries has evolved similar, yet differentially-
applied management policies. ' 
In the case of New South Wales and Queensland, the essential approach has been (initially) an 
open entry philosophy. In other words, Govemment had intervened in the sense of regulating 
gear, areas and timing for fishing, but the right to fish itself, was open (Haysom, 1985; Glaister, 
1984). Thus a fisher with the relevant technical competence (ability to sail a vessel and 
command fishing equipment), and a fishing licence (minimum charge, minimum technical 
qualifications), in New South Wales and Queensland, could go prawn fishing. The only restraint 
on entering the fishery in either state was individual. Such was also the case (again, initially) 
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in the Gulf of Carpentaria (Ruello, 1975), but not in Westem Australia or South Australia. 
The potential of Shark Bay in Westem Australia as a prawning area generated interest by east 
coast prawn fishers and the mmoured threat of an east coast invasion' caused the Westem 
Australian fishing industry concem. Coincidentally, the owners of a defunct whaling company 
in Shark Bay (closed due to a lack of whales through overfishing) were interested in diversifying 
into prawn fishing. Thus the dual effect of fear of an influx of fX)tential competitors into Shark 
Bay together with a recent experience of the impacts of overfishing, caused the company to urge 
caution on the Govemment in the development of a prawn fishery (Bowen and Hancock 1982). 
Thus the Westem Australian Govemment took the unusual step of limiting entry of further 
vessels into the Shark Bay fishery in 1963. At the time, limited entry management was a novel 
concept, particularly for an undeveloped fishery and Bowen and Hancock (1982) noted that the 
representations of the whaling company were probably a significant factor in its adoption. 
Limited entry was similarly adopted in Westem Australia for the Exmouth Gulf fishery in 1965 
and the Nickol Bay fishery in 1971. 
The South Australian prawn fishery commenced in 1963 with the discovery of commercial 
quantities of westem king prawns (Penaeus latisulcatus) in Spencer Gulf by three South 
Australian and one New South Wales vessel . Other vessels, mainly refitted tuna clippers, were 
reconfigured for trawling and entered the fishery. Following the Westem Australian Govemment 
example, the South Australian Govemment closed all South Australian waters to trawl nets, the 
waters were zoned and permits to trawl were then issued for each zone in 1968 (Olsen, 1975). 
This licence limitation was followed later that year by depth closures of nursery areas. By 
August 1972, 45 permits had been issued and trawlers were working grounds in St Vincent Gulf 
(10 vessels), Spencer Gulf (21) and the west coast (14). 
New grounds were discovered in Commonwealth-managed waters in Investigator Strait in 1973 
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by vessels carrying Commonwealth (Federal) licences. The licensing of additional vessels by 
the Commonwealth govemment caused considerable concem to the South Australian govemment, 
which considered its limited entry regime was threatened. Agreement was reached to cede 
management of the Investigator Strait fishery to the State, under the federal Sea and Submerged 
Lands Act of 1973 (Bowen and Hancock, 1985). 
The Northem Prawn Fishery is said to have originated in 1963 with a joint Federal-Queensland 
survey by I.S.R. Munro which established the presence of banana and brown tiger prawns in the 
south-east Gulf of Carpentaria (Munro 1975). As a result, commercial trawling operations were 
undertaken on a trial basis in 1965-66 and a processing plant established at Kammba in 1967 
(Department of Primary Industry, 1982). Fishing operations expanded rapidly to waters offshore 
from Kammba, Weipa, Groote Eylandt, Momington Island, Thursday Island and Darwin with 
252 vessels landing 6,734 tonnes in 1970 (Walker, 1975). 
The Torres Strait prawn fishery commenced in 1969 following the establishment of onshore 
seafood processing facilities and by 1974 there were five vessels permanently based at Thursday 
Island (Watson and Mellors, 1990). Catches consisted of brown tiger and endeavour prawns. 
Following unilateral declarations of exclusive fishing zones worldwide, Australia entered into 
discussions with Papua and New Guinea and a comprehensive treaty on the maritime borders 
between the two countries was reached in 1978 (Haines, 1986), (Macdonald, 1981 (Fig. 2)). 
The interesting dichotomy that arose during this period then, was that the management regime 
adopted in Westem Australia and South Australia was to immediately limit entry of new fishers 
to the fishery, whilst in New South Wales and Queensland, the decision was to maintain the 
policy of open entry to any commercial fisher (one who held a fishing licence) who wished to 
enter the fishery. 
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With the benefit of hindsight, some authors have retrospectively attributed these early, defining 
decisions in terms of resource sustainability objectives (Olsen, 1975). Others have clearly 
identified the real, political imperative - for example, the Shark Bay example in Westem 
Australia in the early 1960s (Bowen and Hancock, 1982). Whatever the root cause behind each 
of the decisions, history has provided an interesting, potential contrast of the effects that resource 
management decisions have had, both on the resource itself, as well as the fishers. 
The comparison is appropriate, since the magnitude of the prawn resources are similar for the 
states of New South Wales, Westem Australia and South Australia (around 2,000t annual catch) 
whilst Queensland has a significantly higher annual catch (7500t). Fisheries agencies in New 
South Wales and Queensland supported open-entry policies which subsequently reverted to 
limited entry (effectively closed policies). Fisheries agencies in South Australia and Westem 
Australia opted for a limited-sized fleet of fishers and a closed fishery policy. There is thus a 
unique contrast of a high annual prawn catch state with open entry and a moderate prawn catch 
state with open entry fisheries policies, as well as a contrast of moderate annual prawn catch 
states with both open entry and closed fisheries management policies. 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, a number of management policies have been adopted by all 
management agencies - controls on fishing gear, protection for juvenile prawns by closing 
certain areas to fishing and seeking to optimise the value (particularly export value) of the 
product by regulating the timing of fishing through closed seasons. However, the major policy 
intervention is that of regulating access - deciding who and how many can fish. 
Open entry has encouraged a diversity of fishing operations whilst closed fishery policies have 
tended to result in small fleets of very similar vessels (Lipton and Strand, 1989). Open entry 
has encouraged a diversity of opinion on further fishery management options (largely as a 
consequence of larger numbers of fishers) whilst closed fishery policies have tended to focus 
opinion on fishery management options (White, 1989; Die and Watson, 1992). Open entry has 
resulted in a range of sizes of fishing businesses from large, financially successful company 
operations to small, stmggling artisanal fishers, whilst closed fishery policies ensure (guarantee?) 
moderate to highly successful financial retums to participants (Eythorsson, 1996). 
The factors which distinguish the Queensland east coast prawn trawl fishery from other 
Australian and foreign penaeid prawn fisheries include a geographically widely-distributed and 
ageing fleet which includes small, artisanal, localised vessels targeting bait and fresh prawn 
markets; larger, more modem vessels capable of travelling moderate distances targeting fresh 
and frozen domestic and export markets; and finally, large, state-of-the-art trawlers capable of 
remaining at sea for months on end, targeting primarily frozen, export markets in Japan, a classic 
example of economic dualism (Lamson and Hanson, 1984). 
The Queensland Prawn Fisher 
The Queensland fishery expanded northward in the 1960s from Brisbane, essentially by 
leapfrogging small coastal ports that had both the necessary infrastmcture to support trawlers and 
environment to support prawn resources. In other words, the discovery of new localised grounds 
sequentially encouraged a northward fleet movement (Chapter 4). 
Of course the expansion was also significant in that the development of the east coast prawn 
trawl fishery was a useful boost to the economies of local coastal communities. Although 
regional Queensland is heavily reliant on primary (beef, mining, sugar) and tertiary (tourism) 
industries, fishing does have a significance in most coastal ports. In addition to the direct wealth 
generated by prawning itself, local supporting industries (supplies, fuel, rope and nets, ships' 
repairs and a range of others) benefit from servicing the prawn trawl fleet. 
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In addition to vessels, as fishers ventured further and further north, they increasingly settled their 
families in these coastal communities, rather than seasonally commute. This was especially 
apparent during the mid 1970s (Chapter 4). So instead of a cmise "up north", during winter 
months from Moreton Bay, the fishers decided to move their households and relocate their 
fishing operation to a more northem location and this, in tum, opened up new grounds further 
north. Such migration is apparent fi^om the number of Moreton Bay fisher households that 
relocated to Townsville and ports north during the 1970s (Chapter 4). 
The isolation of some of these small ports and the generally hazardous nature of fishing, meant 
that these fishers were strongly independent, self reliant and determined (interview with fisher's 
wife, Lucinda). As they became older and more conservative in their views, many replaced the 
"travelling/opening new fishing grounds" strategy with a more sedentary lifestyle, fishing local 
grounds and not spending more than a few days away from the home port (interview with second 
generation fisher, Yeppoon). 
Again, fishers who owned their vessels outright were more likely to adopt this latter strategy. 
Those who had substantial mortgages/debt levels to service, who had recently bought into the 
fishery or substantially upgraded their vessel, would have been more likely to continue travelling 
in order to maximise catch rates and cash flow (interview with new fisher, Townsville). 
Within close-knit local fishing communities, skill and expertise in fishing is valued and success 
often measured in terms of catch (interview with fleet owner. Tin Can Bay). Competition to be 
the top catching vessel can thus be intense as such success is accorded community recognition 
and peer deference. Innovation (towing triple or quad nets) and technological advances (global 
positioning via satellite) are thus quickly adopted locally as any competitive advantage seen to 
enhance the catching capability of a competitor vessel needs to be reduced. Paradoxically, such 
innovation may, however, take time to reach a particular port, as visiting vessels are seen as 
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"foreign" and not welcomed on local fishing grounds (interview with fleet owner. Tin Can Bay). 
Much as in the Darwinian Galapagos finches (evolution), adoption of innovation by fishers is 
by adaptive radiation rather than instantaneous acceptance! 
Fishers generally have a "hunter-gatherer" ethos rather than one of "nurturing/farming". Given 
that most prawns only have an expected survival of less than a year, such a mindset is 
understandable. The fast growth rates of prawns in the growing season, together with rapid and 
long distance prawn migrations (fishers intuitive knowledge, validated by govemment prawn 
tagging experiments) present an urgency which encourages prawn fishers to harvest prawns as 
effectively and quickly as possible (Glaister, 1984). The dilemma is as to the timing of harvest 
- too soon and the prawns are worth less per kilogram, too late and natural mortality (deaths 
through predation, disease and old age) will have dissipated gains in weight through growth, 
even though individuals will be worth more. The dilemma for the fisher is that individuals know 
that by delaying the time of harvest, the optimum in value can be derived from a given stock 
of prawns. The individual is also aware that other fishers would be prepared to harvest now in 
order to derive a less-than optimum value (prisoners dilemma). The desire to harvest prawns 
quickly, before another fisher does so, is strong with the reasoning being "... because if I don't 
catch 'em, someone else will, (Whitehead, 1998). 
Another complicating factor is that different fishers target different markets which in tum, prefer 
particular sizes and species. Thus large free ranging trawlers equipped with modem on-board 
freezing/packing facilities may wish to capture the lowest grades (pieces per unit weight, ie. 
largest prawns) of brown tiger prawns for export as frozen packs to Japan. Smaller, generally 
local vessels, equipped with limited operating range and only chilled storage capacity or 
mdimentary processing ability may be content with medium grades of a range of species (tigers, 
endeavours, banana and kings) destined for the domestic, fresh prawn market. Finally, the 
smallest class of vessel, essentially local, ovemight or day trips only, may be targeting the 
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smallest, inshore prawns of a range of sp>ecies, for both the domestic human consumption and 
bait markets. 
Such a diversity of purpose can establish a stress between fishers having differing economic 
objectives based upon their market aspirations. The dilemma of early harvest of smaller grades 
of prawns versus later harvest of larger grades of prawns can cause social disharmony and even 
tension within a port. Particular fishers may vow not to harvest prawns of a particular size in 
a particular area because they are sub-optional. A "gentleman's agreement" may be stmck. In 
close-knit, isolated ports (e.g. Yeppoon), such an agreement may ensue. In more open, 
cosmopolitan ports (e.g. Townsville), such an agreement is hard to secure, since one (non-local) 
vessel "breaking ranks" is generally enough to have the whole fleet harvesting the aggregation 
(interview with a commercial fisher, Bundaberg). 
Such a range in final destination for product and differing size and species targets, means that 
a range of optimum, often contradictory, management options may exist. Thus the dilemma of 
whether to catch a larger volume of smaller less valuable prawns or a smaller volume of larger, 
more valuable prawns, may also depend on the relative size and processing capability of vessel, 
the distance to intemational airports and prevailing prices. Such diversity means that the 
management of the fishery (and in particular the management objectives) may be complex with 
potentially mutually-exclusive "desirable" management outcomes. The "benefits" of closure 
regimes may thus approximate a paradox. 
Finally, technological change has meant that the prawn trawlers themselves have become more 
efficient at harvesting, with navigation, position fixing and fish finding advances in electronics, 
improved gear (materials and design) and communications and information technology. Fishers 
can now harvest faster and more efficiently. Where once a "show" of prawns would take weeks 
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to partially harvest, the same aggregation can be captured in days and in all probability, a greater 
proportion of the available aggregation than was previously possible. Communications and 
positioning technology now mean that "secret" aggregations are not privileged information any 
more. Strategies to ensure exclusive harvesting by a few vessels rarely are effective for more 
than several days (interview with a commercial fisher, Caims). 
Fishers readily acknowledge that technological change has its greatest boost at the time when 
vessels are replaced. Fishers constmcting new vessels adopt any affordable iimovations on the 
basis that increased costs can be both amortised to gain taxation advantages as well as offset by 
higher catch rates. Thus although a prawn vessel may be replaced by a new vessel of similar 
dimensions, such improvements inevitably mean that the new vessel is a more effective catching 
unit. When allowances are made for increasing the dimensions (legally or illegally), such 
improvements can be significant. In recognition of this, regulators impose penalties to limit 
incremental efficiency gains - such penalties can include compulsory surrender of a proportion 
of amalgamated catching effort (nets, hull length, propulsion), compulsory surrender of 
entitlements (2:1 licences, amalgamated fishing time) or regulated upgrades (nets, hull length or 
propulsion). Thus the policy regulating vessel replacement in the east coast prawn fishery has 
been a major focus for fishers, researchers and managers following the initial step of deciding 
to limit further entry. 
Thus fishers are more and more aware, as they go about their business of fishing, that their 
world is shrinking. Other users such as recreational anglers, conservationists, tourism operators 
and public opinion are all ranged against the status quo for the Queensland prawn fisher. As 
these pressures build, individual fishers recall with nostalgia, a simpler, less crowded, less 
stressful livelihood. Many of these fishers believe that resources are in danger of over-
exploitation, that the vastly more mobile "gypsy" fleet is ravishing "their" stocks (closure 
policies) and that, increasingly, there are too many boats (vessel replacement policies) (interview 
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with a commercial fisher, Townsville). 
In assessing the success of resource management policies, one can weigh the catching 
performance of a fleet - how much caught in weight and value and whether sustainable catches 
are taken or, put another way, the longevity of the fishery. Rarely do researchers assess success 
of resource management policies in terms of the fishers, the underlying assumption being if the 
value of the product of the fishery - the fish - is maximised, then the management regime must 
have been optimal. But as was seen in Chapter 2, there are many (often unstated or mutually 
exclusive) fishery management objectives. 
AUSTRALIAN PRAWN FISHERS: A COMPARISON 
We have previously seen that management regimes differed markedly in different states during 
the formative, early years of development of Australian prawn fisheries. Whether for 
philosophical or political reasons, fisheries agencies adopted limited entry as a policy at different 
times in their respective prawn fishing industries. The real impact of such a policy change is 
of course fundamental, since it recognises a property right in fishing that is the fish equivalent 
of real property. 
The exclusivity of a property right in fishing is valuable since it is a limited right and the degree 
of exclusivity is a measure of its worth, as is of course, the value of what the right entitles the 
owner to do (for example, the rights to harvest minerals may be very exclusive (de Beers' proven 
diamond field) or not (prospecting) and have a high unit value - diamonds - or not - coal. 
The change from common property of the many to the private property of the few (the allocation 
of the property right) may be the critical catalyst for the rise of capitalism in the fishing industry. 
Ownership of the means of production being overlaid by ownership of processing, access to 
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export markets or merely economics of scale allowing a succession of monopoly. 
Our oldest prawn fisheries, those of New South Wales and Queensland, have developed by 
gradual radiation of fishing effort from an area of initial discovery aided by open entry policies. 
The newer fisheries of South Australia and Westem Australia have developed by directed 
exploratory effort by established fishers diversifying from other fisheries aided by the security 
of limited entry policies. The advantages of being an already established fisher are access to 
processing technology and potential export markets already developed for tuna and rock lobster 
in the USA and Japan. 
Have such differences manifested themselves in the class relations of prawn fishers subjected 
to differing policies? In order to address this question, socio-economic parameters for prawn 
fishers in each of the states were contrasted. 
The 1991 Census did not adequately capture the total population of Australian prawn fishers. For 
example, depending upon the definition of areas, the total of the Queensland population of prawn 
fishers identified was 355, whereas commercial licensing information (QFMA unpublished data) 
suggests at least 900 vessels and over 1200 fishers (skippers and deckhands). Similarly, New 
South Wales had 300 vessels and likely oi'cr 400 fishers whereas the Census only identified 147. 
It is likely that Census data represents approximately one third of the populations of participants 
in the prawn industry. Thus these data were supplemented by other studies, including Jarzinski 
(1982) and Elmer (1992). 
Are Queensland Prawn Fishers Petite Bourgeoisie"! 
There were marked differences between the four states' prawn fisher class stmcture and that of 
the rest of the general Australian public (Australian Bureau of Statistics Yearbook, 1995). There 
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were less wage and salary eamers (workers) among prawn fishers than the rest of the Australian 
workforce. Conversely, there were much higher levels of employees and generally higher levels 
of self-employed prawn fishers than the rest of the Australian population (Table 5.1). 
Contrasts in class stmcture for prawn fishers between the four states were also apparent (Table 
5.1). South Australia and Westem Australia had few employers, much fewer self-employed 
prawn fishers and much greater numbers of wage and salary eamers (workers) than did New 
South Wales and Queensland. Jarzinski (1982) described the percentage of north Queensland 
prawn boats "distribution of crew" (his Table A41) as follows: 
Crew 
No crew 
One crew 
Two crew 
Three crew 
Four crew 
Total 
Average per boat 
6-9m 
100 
-
..-
-
-
100 
0 
9-12m 
— 
100 
-
-
-
100 
1.0 
12-15m 
— 
68 
32 
-
-
100 
1.3 
15m & over 
— 
53 
41 
„ 
6 
100 
1.6 
Total 
9 
70 
19 
-
2 
100 
1.0 
He further examined (his Table A8) the relationship between the skipper and boat owner in the 
north Queensland prawning fleet. He found the majority of skippers were either sole owners 
(34%) or part owners (53%) with only 10% employees. Such data suggest that the "self 
employed" and "employer" categories could both be considered as petite bourgeoisie and 
aggregated since most are owners of production and are self employed or employ one or two 
others to work alongside them (Wright 1997). A further interesting point was the higher 
proportions of self-employed in New South Wales-Queensland compared with South Australia-
Western Australia (Table 5.1), suggesting an ownership aggregation of the numerically smaller 
fleets of the latter two States. This theme is revisited later. 
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Table 5.1 
Percentage employment status of prawn fishers 
compared with the Australian average. 
Source: ABS Yearbook. 
(1) "n" is the number of fishers in each State. Unless otherwise 
stated, state fisher percentages in ail successive tables are 
based on these sample sizes. 
(1) 
Wage 
(Workers) 
Self 
Employed 
Employer 
Total Non 
Wage 
NSW 
(n=147) 
41 
35 
24 
59 
100 
QLD 
(n=355) 
44 
25 
31 
56 
100 
SA 
(n=30) 
67 
10 
23 
53 
100 
WA 
(n=85) 
66 
9 
23 
22 
100 
Aust * 
(n=7.7m) 
84 
10 
5 
15 
99 
A Male Industry 
In August 1991 there were 8.5 million persons in the Australian workforce of which 58% were 
male, while the national gender ratio included only 49.9% males. However, very few females 
were employed in the prawn industry. Queensland had both the highest percentage (7.9%) as 
well as numbers followed by Westem Australia (7.1%), New South Wales (3.3%) and South 
Australia (0). Overall only 6.3% of the workforce listing their occupation in prawn fishing were 
women. 
NSW 3.3 
QLD 7.9 
SA 0 
WA 7.1 
% Female 
Gender differences in Queensland and Westem Australian prawn fleets are most likely due to 
those larger vessels which travel large distances during a particular fishing trip. The duration 
of such trips necessitates a cook being part of the crew complement. Jarzinski (1982) noted that 
in the north Queensland fleet, vessels 9m to 12m had 14% female crew, vessels 12m to 15m 
(16%) and vessels greater than 15m (11%). He also noted that 8% of vessels 12 to 15m and 
11% of vessels over 15m had cooks on board. Considering the fleet overall, 5% had cooks in 
the crew. Most were female. This consistent with the figures above. 
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A Generational Influence : A Young Adult Industry 
Prawn fishing is a young, male adult occupation but there are significant generational differences 
between the prawn fisheries of New South Wales-Queensland and those of South Australia-
Westem Australia, the latter being younger (Table 5.2). When the roles within the occupational 
class are examined, further stmcture can be identified. For example, Jarzinski (1982) described 
the average age and length of experience of prawn vessel skippers and crew according to the size 
of vessel in the north Queensland fleet (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.2 
Percentage age composition of fishers 
comparative percentage age composit 
persons in the workforce. 
15-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
Mean * 
NSW 
(n=147) 
5 
26 
29 
26 
9 
6 
37.0 
QLD 
(n=355) 
7 
26 
27 
24 
11 
3 
35.6 
SA 
(n=30) 
13 
48 
19 
19 
0 
0 
30.4 
5. Total is the 
ion of all 
WA 
(n=85) 
11 
44 
26 
15 
3 
0 
29.9 
TOTAL 
(n=7.7m) 
11 
23 
23 
19 
13 
11 
32.4 
Mean is the mean age of prawn fishers in each state calculated by assuming the percentage age 
composition in each age range occurred at the mid-point of that range ie. 5% of NSW prawn fishers 
were 17 y.o., 26% at 24.5 y.o. etc. 
Career progression as a skipper is generally from commanding smaller to larger vessels, as with 
increasing vessel size, the skipper's responsibility increases (the value of vessel, the complexity 
of operation and the responsibility for the safety and the number of crew all increase) as well 
as the monetary rewards (larger vessels catch more prawns, but also cost more per hour to 
operate). Thus the extent of the north Queensland skippers' experience (both as a fisher and 
years as a skipper) could be viewed as an index of prawning expertise. However, data in Table 
5.2 are superficially at variance with this logic, until one considers the stmcture of the South 
Australia-Westem Australia pravra fleets. In both cases, there are relatively few vessels (and 
%3m 
thus skippers) and the crew age would force the average toward a younger average. The 
converse is tme for New South Wales-Queensland. Finally, data from the north Queensland 
fleet suggest a regular tumover in personnel, based on years spent as skipper and crew on the 
present vessel (Table 5.3). 
Table 53 
Average age and experience (years) of skippers and crew of north Queensland 
prawn vessels (after Jarzinski, 1982). Total is the average over all vessels. 
Age of Skipper 
Skipper as Skipper 
Skipper as fisher 
Skipper on present boat 
Number of crew 
Age of crew 
Experience 
Crew on present boat 
6-9m 
22 
9 
$ 
2 
Q 
^ 
" 
-
9-12m 
36 
10 
8 
5 
1.0 
32 
4 
2 
12-15m 
37 
14 
12 
4 
1.3 
23 
3 
2 
15m & over 
40 
20 
16 
5 
1.6 
28 
4 
2 
Total 
38 
13 
11 
5 
1.0 
29 
4 
2 
Family and Prawn Fishing 
The New South Wales and South Australian prawn fishers belong to household stmctures similar 
to the remaining Australian population (ABS Yearbook, 1995). With the exception of Westem 
Australia, a feature of prawn fisher family types is the high proportion of non-family households 
(group households comprising two or more unrelated people or single person households), which 
are highest in Queensland (Table 5.4). The unusual result for Westem Australia may be a 
product both of the small sample size, and the fact that many Westem Australian fishers are 
single and/or unattached and live on board the vessel for long periods. To a far lesser extent, 
the same is tme for Queensland for the larger class of trawler. 
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Table 5.4 
Percentage of prawn fisher family types 
Family Type 
One parent, without dependents 
Two parents, with dependents 
Two parents, without dependents 
Couple only 
Couple with other related individual 
Non-family households 
Total 
NSW 
(n=147) 
0 
48.9 
9.9 
18.5 
0 
22.7 
100 
QLD 
(n=355) 
0.1 
28.5 
12.7 
13.9 
0.1 
44.7 
100 
SA 
(n=30) 
0 
55.0 
18.5 
15.5 
0 
33.0 
100 
WA 
(n=85) 
3.5 
5.5 
3.5 
3.5 
0 
86.0 
100 
Kinship may, however, be important in the Queensland prawning industry. Jarzinski (1982) 
reported on the relationship of crew to the skipper in the north Queensland fleet (his Table A40) 
and found that although most were not related (63%), a total of 30% were. This included a 
further (7%) unspecified. Comparable data are not available for New South Wales, but family 
participation could be expected to be similar to Queensland, given the parallel evolution of the 
fishery. 
Prawn Fishing: A Technical Skill 
A successful prawn fisher is multi-skilled. The skipper is a qualified Master Mariner Certified 
by maritime authorities and generally also has mechanical engineering qualifications. Some also 
are qualified electricians and refrigeration mechanics. Prawm fisher skippers need to be able to 
use and interpret navigation and electronic equipment (global positioning systems using satellite 
technology, depth sounders, weather faxes and radar), set fishing gear to function effectively, 
process the catch, maintain accurate records and accounts, market the catch, maintain an 
understanding of fisheries management issues, including externalities such as foreign exchange 
rates, fuel prices and interest rates, and still remain up-to-date with technology. 
It is not surprising then, that the occupation requires training in technical skills. Data from the 
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1991 Census showed a strong commitment to technicaWocational training (Table 5.5). The 
Queensland results are consistent with those reported for north Queensland fishers by Jarzinski 
(1982). 
Table 5.5 
Percentage educational qualifications held by prawn 
fishers 
Higher 
Vocational 
None 
Not stated 
Total 
NSW 
(n=147) 
6.6 
32.2 
52.6 
8.6 
100.0 
QLD 
(n=355) 
8.5 
36.9 
42.0 
12.6 
100.0 
SA 
(n=30) 
8.6 
28.6 
45.7 
17.1 
100.0 
WA 
(n=85) 
3.8 
53.8 
31.3 
11.1 
100.0 
AUST 
(n=7.7m) 
27.3 
13.1 
40.2 
19.4 
100.0 
Prawn fishers in Queensland (8.5%) and South Australia (8.6%) had the highest proportion of 
tertiary qualified participants (degree or diploma) but were well below the Australian average 
(27.3%). New South Wales (6.6%) and Westem Australia (3.8%) had less tertiary qualified 
prawn fishers. Once skilled vocational or basic vocational qualifications were included, Westem 
Australia (57.6), Queensland (45.4), New South Wales (38.8) and South Australia (37.2) 
compared favourably with the Australian average (13.1%). It could be argued that tertiary 
qualifications are an inappropriate index of effective education among prawn fishers and that 
vocational training, essential for safe and effective management of a fishing enterprise, more 
realistically reflects essential educational achievement among prawn fishers. These figures when 
considered together with totals of prawn fishers without any qualifications, suggest Westem 
Australia and Queensland prawn fishers are the best educated, followed by South Australia and 
New South Wales (Table 5.5). 
Close similarities exist between the couplets of New South Wales - Queensland and South 
Australia - Westem Australia when "age left school" is compared (Table 5.6). In the case of the 
first pair, more than half of those states' prawn fishers left school by age 15 whereas fewer left 
school by age 15 in South Australia and Western Australia. Similarly, both of these latter states 
had higher retention rates to age 17. 
»K'^4. 
Table 5.6 
Percentage age left school (ALS) by prawn fishers 
l^ tate 
NSW (n=147) 
O L D (n=355) 
SA (n=30) 
WA (n=85) 
AUST(n=7.7m) 
<14 
15 
22 
0 
11 
15 
42 
32 
20 
33 
16 
30 
20 
57 
23 
17 
6 
15 
23 
23 
18 
5 
7 
0 
0 
>19 
0 
1 
0 
4 
N/S 
3 
4 
0 
7 
Mean 
ALS by 
State 
15.2 
14.^ 
16.0 
14.8 
* State 
Percen 
t Non 
comple 
tion 
37.1 
5^.1 
38.6 
36.3 
37.2 
* Percentage aged 15-69, non-fisher and did not complete highest level of secondary school, by state. 
Ethnicity and Prawn Fishing 
The fishing industry has traditionally been a source of initial employment for new migrants in 
some states and several families of European origin have dominated sectors of the Australian 
fishing industry over the past several decades. The Greek and Italian families of Racavolis, 
Kailis, Costi and Puglisi are a few examples. 
The prawn fishing industry differs substantially from the national ethnic mix (Table 5.7). New 
South Wales and Queensland have higher proportions of Australian and Anglo origin than the 
national average, whilst South Australia and Westem Australia are below the national average. 
Interestingly, the ethnicity of the non-Anglo-Australian prawn fishers also varies between the 
couplets. 
New South Wales have minor representation fi:om northern Europe and Asia (predominantly 
Vietnam). Whilst Queensland has fishers originating from the South Pacific and Vietnam, 
Present day prawn fleets in Botany Bay (NSW) and Moreton Bay (Qld) have a high proportion 
(half) of Vietnamese-origin fishers. South Australian and Westem Australian prawn fishers have 
a stronger multicultural representation, particularly Europe (SA) and Oceania (WA). 
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Table 5.7 
Birthplace of prawn fishers (percentage) compared with total 
non-prawn fishers nationally 
Australian 
UK & Ireland 
Total Anglo-Aus 
Oceania (incl NZ) 
North Europe 
South Europe 
West Europe 
Asia 
Total Non-Anglo Aus 
Total 
NSW 
(n=147) 
93 
3 
96 
0 
2 
0 
0 
2 
4.2 
100 
QLD 
(n=355) 
87 
3 
90 
7 
0 
0 
0 
4 
11 
100 
SA 
(n=30) 
73 
9 
82 
9 
9 
0 
0 
0 
18 
100 
WA 
(n=85) 
77 
7 
84 
9 
0 
3 
3 
0 
15 
100 
AUST 
(n=7.7m) 
79.2 
7.2 
86.4 
3.0 
1.1 
2.9 
2.2 
3.4 
12.6 
100 
Although little data are available, the roles within the occupation of prawn fishing can also have 
ethnic diversity. In his study of the north Queensland prawn fishery, Jarzinski (1982) noted 
differences between the "... nationality at birth ..." of prawn skippers (his Table A36) and crew 
(his Table A47). In the case of skippers, 97% were Anglo-Australian, 2% Scandinavian and 
1% Italian. In the case of crew, 83% were Anglo-Australian, 2% Scandinavian, 4% European 
and 12% unspecified or "other". 
Surprisingly, given their cultural attachment to the sea (Cordell and Fitzpatrick, 1987 and 
Cordell, 1990), prawn fishers of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island decent are not strongly 
represented among prawn fishers (Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8 
Aboriginality in Prawning Industry (% Aboriginal or Torres) 
State 
N S W (n=147) 
QLD (n=355) 
SA (n=30) 
W A (n=85) 
State 
Total 
1.2 
2.4 
1.2 
2.6 
A B o r T I 
Fishing 
2 
1 
0 
0 
Non AB or TI 
Fishing 
96 
97 
100 
96 
N/S 
2 
2 
0 
4 
N 
148 
355 
35 
83 
The proportion of pravra fishers with Aboriginal or Torres Strait origins is consistent with their 
population representation in all states except New South Wales (Table 5.8). Other forms of 
fishing, particularly ocean and coastal fishing (net and line) and oyster farming have some 
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participation, though pravra fishing is poorly represented by fishers of Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
origins. 
Working Life on a Prawn Trawler 
It is difficult to assess the hours worked per week in the prawning industry. Adverse weather, 
differences in closed fishing season policies between states and accessibility and proximity of 
fishing grounds would all have a significant bearing on stated working hours. For example many 
prawn vessels may operate on a daily basis from ports in New South Wales, Queensland and 
South Australia. Others may fish for two or three nights before retuming to port. Vessels in 
northem Queensland and Westem Australia, on the other hand, tend to stay at sea for longer 
periods because of the longer distances to fishing grounds. This is reflected in the average hours 
worked compared with state average (Table 5.9). South Australian prawn fishers provide a 
contrast in hours worked because of the highly regulated fishing times resulting from 
management policies (Olsen, 1975). 
Table 5.9 
Average hours worked per week by prawn fishers in each 
state, compared with the national average (all other paid 
work) (figures are expressed as percentage). 
Hours per week 
0-24 
25-34 
35 + 
Not Stated 
Total 
NSW 
(n=147) 
16 
5 
73 
5 
100 
QLD 
(n=355) 
12 
5 
83 
3 
100 
SA 
(n=30) 
47 
0 
44 
9 
100 
WA 
(n=85) 
0 
4 
89 
7 
100 
AUST 
(n=7.7m) 
21.9 
15.6 
64.5 
0 
100 
It is difficult to convey the "typical working day" (or night, depending upon the prawn species 
targeted) onboard a prawn trawler. The day trip (or ovemight trip) on Moreton Bay is not all 
that different from say an agriculture day at work - preparatory work of a routine nature. 
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judgement and strategic skill in planning the fishing strategy, fishing operations, processing, 
retum and clean-up. Short duration trips (two to three days) are an extension of this, but also 
include periods of rest and recreation and the need to be away ft^om home. However, it is the 
long duration trips (weeks to months) that distinguish ship-board life from most terrestrial 
occupations. The daily (or nightly) routine is interspersed with sleep and recreation, but, 
depending upon the fishery, months of fishing in the Gulf of Carpentaria without"... a night off 
..." are not unknovra. So Queensland and Westem Australian vessels of the larger size class, 
licensed to also fish the Northem Prawn Fishery, can have very different working pattems to the 
smaller coastal fishers of New South Wales and South Australia. 
Financial Rewards 
Details of prawn fisher incomes are notoriously difficult to define (see for example. Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, 1984 and Campbell and Haynes, 1990). Reasons for this vary, but 
include avoidance of taxation, complex partnership arrangements and elasticity of demand for 
prawns - they are a very marketable commodity. The BAE (1984) study, for example, 
concluded that their calculated financial data was questionable, since, 
"These depressed income levels do not appear to be consistent with the continued 
expansion in fishing capacity that has occurred in recent years.". 
Nevertheless, more recent changes to management policies (for example eligibility to participate 
being linked to historical levels of vessel catch) have meant that fishers' data has become more 
realistic (Trainor, 1990 and Elmer, 1992). 
Payments in the prawn fishing industry are calculated depending upon ownership of the vessel 
and divided between the vessel (mnning costs), the owner, the skipper and crew. In his study 
of the north Queensland prawn fleet crew payments, Jarzinski (1982) found most (68%) received 
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a percentage of the gross catch, some (6%) received a percentage of the gross catch minus some 
items (e.g. food) whilst others had altemative arrangements (family or other kin relationship). 
Some small artisanal vessels (6 to 9m range) had some wage arrangement, but this was an 
exception. The percentage crew payment ranged between 10 to 16 percent (his Table A39). 
Table 5.10 
Range of gross income earned by individual prawn 
fishers (%) compared with the national average (ABS). 
$,000 
0-12 
13-5 
26-40 
41-70 
> 70 
Not Stated 
Prawner Mean 
NSW 
(n=147) 
21 
47 
23 
5 
3 
0 
23.1 
QLD 
(n=355) 
21 
34 
20 
11 
3 
11 
25.2 
SA 
(n=30) 
8 
19 
36 
28 
8 
0 
38.4 
WA 
(n=85) 
7 
38 
27 
20 
4 
4 
31.3 
AUST 
(n=7.7m) 
7.5 
42.9 
34.0 
15.5 
0 
0 
29.0 
Reported gross annual income (including deductions) for prawn fishers was lowest in New South 
Wales and highest in South Australia (Table 5.10). Except for a skewness in upper incomes. New 
South Wales and Queensland had similar distributions as did South Australia and Westem 
Australia (Table 5.10). This is to be expected given the total catches and numbers of vessels in 
each state. For example New South Wales and South Australia have approximately the same 
total annual catch of 2500 t. The New South Wales catch is taken by 400 vessels whilst the 
South Australian by 38 vessels. 
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Table 5.11 
Range of prawn fisher household incomes 
(%) by State 
0-12 
13-25 
26-40 
41-70 
71-100 
100-150 
> 150 
Not stated 
Mean 
NSW 
(n=147) 
5 
32 
32 
11 
2 
6 
0 
2 
22.8 
QLD 
(n=355) 
65 
22 
25 
50 
7 
2 
1 
6 
19.8 
SA 
(n=30) 
0 
10 
29 
Al 
10 
10 
0 
0 
20.3 
WA 
(n=85) 
4 
25 
17 
33 
13 
0 
0 
0 
23.9 
Household income is difficult to compare given the differences in family type between prawn 
fishers in each state. A similar pattem to that seen in individual incomes is apparent from 
household data (Table 5.11). 
Prawn Fishers and Housing 
Home ownership ("owned or purchasing") categories among prawn fishers is below that of the 
population average in each state (Table 5.12). The age-stmctured composition of prawn fishers 
reflects the fact that prawning is traditionally a young male's occupation. Thus young adult 
male's home ownership rate is likely to be skewed, compared with comparably-aged non-prawn 
fishers, given the prawn fishing occupation is highly mobile. In addition, as prawn fishers leave 
the industry, the needs for permanent housing would be reasserted. South Australian prawn 
fishers have the closest to the state average whilst Westem Australian prawn fishers the furthest 
from the state average. These figures are not surprising when the age, gender and family-type 
profiles are considered. New South Wales has a prawn fleet spread along the coast and a fishery 
supporting a smaller class of vessel that generally return to port each day/night. South Australia 
also has vessels that have comparatively short cmises. Queensland to some extent and Western 
Australia to a large extent, have highly mobile fleets (Table 5.12). Home ovraership may thus 
simply reflect the degree of fleet mobility, with the more sedentary fishers operating from a 
permanent base. Irrespective, the comparison with non-prawn fishers is dramatic (Table 5.13). 
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Table 5.12 
Prawn fisher nature of housing occupancy (% difference) 
compared with state averages and national average (Aust) 
Owned 
Purchasing 
Renting 
Not Stated 
NSW 
(n=147) 
37 
25 
29 
2 
QLD 
(n=355) 
29 
22 
16 
3 
SA 
(n=30) 
36 
33 
8 
8 
WA 
(n=85) 
4 
7 
8 
7 
AUST 
(n=7.7m) 
40.4 
26.7 
26.7 
6.3 
Table 5.13 
Prawn fishers' nature of housing 
occupancy compared with non fishers in 
each state (percentage difference above 
or below state average) 
NSW 
(n=147) 
QLD 
(n=355) 
SA 
(n=30) 
WA 
(n=7.7m) 
Owned 5.6 -12.9 -4.8 -33.0 
Purchasing - 1.1 - 3 . 6 +6.9 -23.4 
Renting +23.5 +12.8 -3.0 + 1.3 
How Important are Prawn Fishers to the Community? 
A comparison of the number of communities dependent upon prawm fishing is illuminating. 
"Dependency" was defined here as an urban settlement with a total population of less than 2,500 
persons and at least 5 fishing vessels resident in the community (Table 5.14). The number of 
vessels, the tonnage and value of the catch by state also highlights the significance of the 
industry to coastal communities. 
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Table 5.14 
Communities dependent to some degree on prawn fishing 
State 
QLD ^ (n=147) 
NSW ^ (n=355) 
SA ^ (n=30) 
WA " (n=85) 
Number 
of 
Vessels 
850 
550 
52 
43 
Tonnes 
Catch 
7450 
1790 
2024 
2059 
$mill 
value ' 
82 
17 
25 
24 
$,000 
per 
vessel 
9^ 
31 
481 
558 
Number of 
Communities 
54 
36 
6 
6 
Major 
Ports ^ 
11 
12 
4 
3 
Percent of 
Australian 
Population 
17.0 
34.1 
8.4 
9.6 
QFMA 1997 Annual Report, L. Williams pers.com. Note, does not include Northern Prawn Fishery 
1995/96 data, "Status of Fisheries Resources 1996/97". Includes estuarine prawn fishery catches 
R. Lewis, pers com., 1996 Annual Report SA Fisheries. 
R. Fletcher, pers com. 1996 Aimual Report WA Fisheries. Note, does not include Northem Prawn Fishery 
Defined as more than 10 vessels resident 
Prawns only, does not include marketed bycatch 
Total percentage of Australian population, 1994 Census 
Prawn fishery may contribute to the local community in a number of ways. First, the 
maintenance and victualling of vessels and repair of fishing gear can have economic multiplying 
effects for local businesses. Second, value-adding of catches through local onshore processing 
(increasingly rare). Third, skipper and crew income is spent locally. Last, local employment 
opportunities that flow from prawn fishing. 
In the cases of New South Wales and Queensland (Table 5.14), large fleets mean that in major 
ports, the economic and social contributions made by prawn fishers are significant. 
Comparatively, however, such impacts may be greater in smaller communities. In New South 
Wales, given the high density of the coastal population (the majority of the State population), 
such economic and social effects may be insignificant when compared to say other primary or 
secondary industries, but in port communities such as fluka, Evans Head and Bmnswick Heads, 
prawn fishing is significant. Similarly, Queensland, with half the population of New South 
Wales and a coastline more than double the length, thp coastal population is more sparsely 
distributed and so small fishing ports would be dependent on the prawn fishing industry. 
149 
The picture is less clear in South Australia and Westem Australia where fleets are smaller and 
more aggregated. The fleets would certainly have the economic and social impacts described 
above, but in fewer communities. 
THE QUEENSLAND PRAWN FISHER 
The fishery management decisions taken in each Australian prawn fishery have contributed to 
the shape of fisher communities and the economic potential of their industry. It is also apparent 
that the resultant social stmcture that has evolved in each state has shaped the fishers' opinions 
on and attitudes to many fishery management issues. Such opinions and attitudes cannot simply 
be explained in terms of the biology of prawns or the economics of prawn fishing, but are 
formed by the way individual prawn fishers perceive the world. The evidence for this statement 
is that premeditated fisher behaviour can be contradictory to known biological information 
("targeting spawning female prawns may cause the stocks to eventually collapse") or economic 
information ("seasonally closing fishing areas will allow larger, more valuable prawns to be 
caught"). In other words, the fisher may realise that his/her own actions are contrary to long-
term sustainability of stocks or sound economic logic, but the fisher will still illegally trawl in 
closed areas for immediate gratification. 
In order to understand the fishers' perspective on policy issues raised in Chapter 4, an analysis 
of Queensland prawn fishers was instigated using information collected during formal meetings 
such as port visits arranged by the management agency or the peak industry organisation, a 
questionnaire survey and interviews, oral histories and personal contact. 
150 
The February 1991 Discussion Paper and Port Visits 
Following the 1979 unilateral decision by Queensland to stop further entry to the Queensland 
east coast prawn fishery, the Commonwealth, Queensland and New South Wales management 
agencies established a joint Task Force with the aim of resolving management policies and 
jurisdiction (particularly cross border access) issues in the fishery. The Task Force reported in 
1982 and although New South Wales also froze further entry, and reached broad agreement on 
the cross-border access question, management policies were largely ignored (Glaister, 1984). 
An East Coast Prawn Fishery Task Force was established in May 1984 to "... develop a 
management scheme for this fishery." (ECPTTF, 1984). With bureaucrats and fishers from New 
South Wales and Queensland, chaired by a Commonwealth bureaucrat. The final report (ECTTF, 
1984) recommended a single (New South Wales and Queensland) fishery, managed as a limited 
entry fishery on method (i.e. trawling rather than prawn trawl) and vessel units (quantifying 
vessel effort) and a boat replacement policy. 
The report recommendations were condemned by industry and were largely ignored until the 
deterioration in the financial position of many prawn fishers as a result of the combined interest 
rate hike and fuel crisis of the late 1980s. On 7 December 1988, in order to put a brake on 
effort increases the Queensland Fish Management Authority, with approval of the Minister, 
agreed to the imposition of a further freeze on replacement, upgrading or modification of east 
coast prawn trawlers whilst a new boat replacement policy was developed in consultation with 
industry. 
In order to progress policy development, a further joint Working Group of industry and 
bureaucrats was established. A Discussion Paper from the Working Group was circulated to 
industry during 1989 and had a hostile reception from prawn fishers, particularly on 
recommendations regarding boat replacement, although the majority supported a continuation of 
the freeze. The policy vacuum continued and in late 1990 the management agency established 
a new Working Group in order to "... Recommend long-term policy for the containment of effort 
and capacity in the fishery." (Elmer, et al. 1990). 
The recommendations of the Committee were widely circulated as a discussion paper and direct 
input was sought from the fishers in a coast-wide series of seventeen port meetings during 
January-Febmary 1991. The meetings were organised by the fishers' peak body, the QCFO, and 
attended by Committee members and local fishers. 
Meetings were held at the seventeen locations chosen by the fishers' peak body, the QCFO. 
These included all major and minor prawn fishing ports and attendances varied from three fishers 
(Port Douglas) to thirty-five (Caims). In total, 310 east coast prawn fishers attended port 
meetings. The format of meetings was the same - the QCFO chaired all the meetings and the 
discussion paper was painstakingly reviewed, line by line. Questions were encouraged, full 
explanations provided and each meeting lasted from 2 to 4 hours. 
The recommendations contained in the paper included: 
Right to continue fishing to be based on fishery participation (history of fishing 
evidenced by annual individual prawn catches). This was a mechanism to eject recent 
entrants from the fishery. 
A boat replacement policy. This was a mechanism to force fishers replacing/upgrading 
a vessel to forfeit an equivalent licence (the same number of boat units) to that of the 
number of boat units of the replacement vessel - that is a compulsory buy-out of units. 
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. Management of the Moreton Bay area. This was a mechanism to define Moreton Bay 
as a separate fishery and to prevent those fishers allowed this exclusivity from fishing 
anywhere other than Moreton Bay. 
With the exception of the Boat Replacement Policy (BRP), all recommendations were 
unanimously rejected. Twelve of the seventeen ports and approximately the same proportion of 
fishers (65%) supported the 2:1 BRP. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the discussion paper was too confrontational as seen from the point 
of view of the prawn fisher. Insufficient attention was paid to selling the concepts, with 
"radical" options presented as faits accomplis. 
As a fisher from Bundaberg responded: 
"My summary of the Discussion Paper is that it is a very divisive paper in that 
it seeks to advantage one group against another. Also, most fishermen are of the 
opinion that better consultation should have taken place before it was released as 
the majority of its recommendations are not acceptable to fishermen." 
The outcome of the Febmary Discussion Paper and meetings was the total rejection of all 
recommendations other than the BRP (by industry) and, subsequently, non-support (by the 
QFMA Board). 
The October 1991 Situation Analysis and Questionnaire 
The QFMA Board considered the Review and Port visits had been a failure and directed a 
reconstituted Committee to ascertain from fishers if they understood the current state of the 
i* a. Prawn vessels rafted up for Port Meeting near Horn Island, Torres Strait. 
^ b. On board prawn vessel 
off Horn Island, Torres Strait. 
Pictured (L to R) 
J Glaister (author, QDPI) 
R Green (vessel owner, 
convenor of meeting) 
A Hansen (QCFO) 
PLATE 4 
Northern Port Meeting 
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fishery together with possible altemative suggestions from them, as to management policies. The 
Discussion Paper was redrafted and relabelled as a Situation Paper. It was initially developed 
as a draft management plan, but the Board considered this would be too provocative to prawn 
fishers and so this (essentially) management plan document was relabelled a "Situation Paper". 
It outlined the status quo, including the existing boat replacement policy (2:1), existing closure 
regime and effort limitations (gear, vessel dimensions), as well as some future management 
policy options. The author was an employee of the Govemment (QDPI and subsequently 
QFMA) and knovra to be as such, by the fishers. 
The total attendance at the second series of port meetings was 278, approximately 30% of the 
endorsed Queensland prawn fishers. Attendance ranged from 49 at Mooloolaba to 7 at Virginia, 
with some ports unusually high, given previous such meetings. Vessels fishing remote grounds 
were a particular challenge. For vessels licensed to also fish the Torres Strait and Gulf of 
Carpentaria fisheries, access to meetings for these fishers was difficult. With the assistance of 
Mr R. Green, a number of fishers agreed to congregate at Hom Island in the Torres Strait. The 
Island is serviced by a light aircraft from Caims, and thus, with the assistance of the fishers, a 
meeting was held on board the fuel barge off Hom Island (Plate 2). In general, however, the 
level of attendance at port meetings was poor, given the seriousness of the topic. 
General reaction to the meetings was positive and attendees expressed an appreciation in being 
able to better understand the current situation on the east coast. The main concem appeared to 
be the economic viability of the fishery. Fishers at most ports were concemed that the size of 
the fishing ground had increased as a result of the introduction of GPS systems (satellite plotters) 
but they still considered the individual catch rates were declining. Basically they were working 
harder to maintain the status quo. Prices were down past what they were several years earlier. 
Most agreed that market prices received for prawns eighteen months to two years earlier were 
unrealistically high and unsustainable and that a market adjustment had occurred. However, they 
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now felt they had gone the other way too far and that they were unlikely to come back up 
significantly. In other words, market prices, they felt, would not recover. 
Thus, there had been several ineffectual attempts by the management agency to craft 
management policies that would address the issues of existing vessel replacement, of potential 
fleet effort increases through increased fishing by currently undemtilised vessels (latent effort) 
and of subverting prawm fishing seasonal closure regimes by concentrated fishing at the opening 
of the season. On vessel replacement, the management concem was that replacement vessels 
would be more effective in catching prawns so that the aggregate fleet fishing effort would 
increase. In other words, effectively "additional vessels" would be joining the existing fleet. 
On latent effort, the management concem was that existing under-utilised or part-time vessels 
could be purchased by a new owner who would fish the vessel to its full potential. Again, this 
would in effect increase the fishing effort capability of the fleet. 
So the management agency had implemented a limited entry policy that had failed, and in fact, 
had allowed the fleet to nearly double in size. The practical effects of this were that many of 
these vessels had entered the fishery on a speculative basis and not effectively worked. This so-
called "latent effort" in the fleet was like a sword of Damocles to managers, in that any success 
in improving the viability of the fishery through management policies would encourage the 
"latent" vessels into greater participation in the fishery. So that any system of restmcturing the 
fleet, of necessity needed to first deal with the sector of the fleet that could be readily activated 
as "new" vessels. So all these policy areas were connected and the dilemma was simply too 
many vessels. The dire financial times (fuel crisis, interest rates, prawn prices) merely 
exacerbated the situation. Management policies were needed and the prawn fishers wanted 
change, but change that would not impact them personally. 
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Fishers' Attitudes to Change 
What was apparent from the first series of Port meetings was that group dynamics would prevent 
individual attitudes and views being heard. In discussions with individual prawn fishers, a 
common comment was that individual prawn fishers were loath to contradict the port 
spokesperson/expert or that their view would be criticised by fellow prawn fishers once they 
were away from the meeting. For these reasons and to gain a more thorough understanding if 
fishers' views, the management questionnaire was circulated at the end of each meeting. 
At the beginning of January 1992, a total of 226 responses (23.7% of the fleet of 954) to the 
management questionnaire had been received. These had been collected after each port meeting 
(215) or subsequently mailed in by QCFO Branch Secretaries (11). A summary of attendances 
and responses is given in Table 5.15. 
Table 5.15 
Sequence ports visited, attendance (numbers) and 
questionnaire response (numbers) during 1991 Review 
Port 
York Island 
Portland R. 
Port Douglas 
Caims 
Iimisfail 
Lucinda 
Townsville 
Ayr 
Bowen 
Mackay 
Yeppoon 
Gladstone 
Bundaberg 
Urangan 
Tin Can Bay 
Mooloolaba 
Virginia 
Colmslie 
Southport 
Totals 
Sequence 
14 
13 
12 
11 
10 
9 
' 8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
16 
17 
19 
18 
15 
-
Attendance 
21 
13 
7 
20 
14 
6 
11 
6 
19 
10 
13 
7 
26 
7 
16 
49 
7 
10 
16 
m 
Response 
22 * 
11 
4 
13 
16 * 
6 
8 
6 
11 
8 
8 
12 * 
17 
7 
15 
37 
7 
7 
11 
226 
Ports showing higher response rates than attendances are from flshers 
unable to attend meetings who subsequently completed a mailed in 
questionnaire. 
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A number of fishers (estimated at 8% of port participants) did not complete the questionnaire. 
A few individuals (less than 5) chose not to because of concems as to the use such information 
could be put. Most others were unable to complete the questionnaire through illiteracy (discrete, 
personal discussion). 
Management Policy Options 
Fishers were asked whether management of the East Coast should be concemed with the 
following choices (percent response in brackets): 
fl) looking after the resource and letting fishers fend for themselves (40.3%); 
Fishers who supported this policy choice were opting for policies only concemed 
with the biological wellbeing of prawn stocks and took no consideration of the 
socio-economic wellbeing of fishers. Thus seasonal closure policies would be 
designed only to maximise prawn sizes, not individual profit. 
(ii) maximising the profitability of fishers even if this means increased intervention (27.0%); 
Fishers who this policy' choice were opting for policies of govemment 
intervention in areas like boat replacement (allow maximum efficiency) seasonal 
closures (opening and closing fishing seasons to maximise the size of prawns 
caught) and similar policies that would generally favour the larger operators. In 
other words, govemment intervention on behalf of larger operators and at the 
expense of artisanal fishers. 
(iii) ensuring the present fleet stmcture remains unchanged (23.9%); 
Fishers who supported this policy choice were opting for policies of status quo 
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and were concemed at the impact of larger vessels and, in particular, the 
increased mobility of these larger vessels. So in the case of boat replacement, 
they did not want govemment to relax the mles to let more fishers upgrade to 
larger boats, they did not want seasonal closures imposed that simply benefited 
the mobile, larger vessels at the expense of small, local artisanal vessels and that 
restmcturing the fleet would be detrimental in the long term. 
(iv) did not answer this question (8.8%). 
Fishers who opted for this policy choice were tom between the other three 
choices. They may have been intending to replace their vessel, recently entered 
the fishery, be in financial difficulties or just uncertain of the future. 
The percentages are the response rates from all fishers who completed a questionnaire. In other 
words, 40.3% of the fishers (91 out of the 226) consider that management should be mainly 
concemed with "Looking after the resource and letting fishers fend for themselves". Fishers 
agreeing with this objective were saying that management should not intervene in business 
decision-making but should only worry about the health of the resource. These fishers were 
supporting deregulation so that as far as possible, individuals could make informed decisions and 
wear the consequences. These respondents were generally larger operators with little or no debt. 
A further 27% (61) fishers considered that intervention for other than resource health was 
warranted if profitability was to be maximised. Thus fishers who agreed with this objective were 
also agreeing to intervention if those remaining were more viable. These fishers were supporting 
further govemment intervention to allow fleet restmcturing that would increase their individual 
profitability. They were concemed at the number of vessels and reduced individual catch rates. 
These respondents would include recent entrants with higher overheads (bank overdrafts). 
Finally, 23.9% (54) fishers considered that the present fleet mix (small boats to large boats) is 
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about right and that restmcturing and other forms of intervention are not warranted. These 
fishers were worried about boat replacement and what impact restmcturing would have. These 
respondents considered government intervention could tip the balance towards large operators 
and see them lose out. 
The diversity exhibited in response to these policy choices was used to aggregate respondents 
and to consider their views on subsequent questions. 
Problems Facing the Fishery 
Ordered responses to the question of what is the major problem facing the fishery in order of 
first choice (most important) to third choice were as follows: 
Problem 
(i) Prices received for product 
(ii) Costs in operating a trawler 
(iii) Reduced catch rates 
(iv) Too many boats (competition) 
(v) Interest rates (general economy) 
(vi) Other (specify) 
First Second Third 
1 
4 
-J 
3 
5 
5 
% 
»-
s 
4 
5 
fi: 
3 
1 
4 
,J 
5 
i 
Thus, in considering all of the first choice responses, respondents considered (in order) prices, 
catch rates, number of boats, costs and interest rates. For all second choice responses, 
respondents considered costs, prices/catch rates, number of boats and interest rates. Finally, for 
all third choices, respondents considered costs, prices, number of boats, catch rates and interest 
rates, in order of importance. 
Overall, the problems identified in the questionnaire were, first, the prices fishers received for 
their catch. Embedded in this statement were concems as to the export market (demand, 
exchange rates and such) and the domestic market (demand, competition from 
imports/aquaculture and such). The second problem, that of costs, included fuel, boat 
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replacement, crew costs and the total costs : prawn price ratio. The third problem identified 
fishery management policies. The concems of too many boats, the latent effort problem and 
generally too few prawns and too many boats. The fourth problem, the general economic 
outlook, would have been particularly worrisome for fishers carrying debt or about to restmcture 
their own operation. 
Prawn prices were the major concem. The export-based Australian prawn catch accounts for 
80% of the total catch, with the main export market being Japan. Even though the Japanese 
market is so important to Australia, our exports only represent a tiny fraction (4%) of that 
market, so we are price takers rather than price makers (Glaister, 1990). At the time of this 
questionnaire, the Japanese market was very uncertain. 
The second and third primary problems were concemed with perceived lower catch rates and the 
related problem of too many boats. Thus the primary concems of fishers were to do with prices 
they received for their catch and their own share of the catch. 
Looking at secondary problems, operating costs and again, prices and catch rates ranked most 
highly. 
The responses to the first question on management policies were used to aggregate respondents 
by policy option and then each policy option group's answers to the major problems were 
considered. No surprisingly, supporters of the policy option of looking after the resource and 
no govemment intervention were concemed about reduced catch rates, costs and prices; those 
wishing to maximise profitability were concemed about too many vessels reduced catch rates and 
operating costs and those promoting status quo policies considered costs and prawn prices to be 
the main problems confronting the industry. 
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Economic Viability 
The wording of the question on economic viability was slightly ambiguous since it asked 
respondents "are you economically viable now," and did not add "if you are not now, will you 
be in twelve months?". The certain/uncertain choice confounded the independence of the 
questions and also caused some confusion, since if fishers were uncertain of whether they were 
economically viable now, they had the choice of scoring one of the other options, including that 
they would never become viable (choice (v) not at all). 
Economically viable? 
(i) Now 
(ii) Twelve months 
(iii) Two Years 
(iv) Three years 
(v) Not at all 
% Certain % Uncertain Unknown 
39 
19 
11 
12 
6 
16 
15 
20 
20 
16 
6 
14 
15 
17 
— 
A total of only 39% (88) of fishers were sure they were economically viable now. However, 
a further 42% thought that they would become economically viable within three years. Thus 
81% of respondents were certain that they were, or would eventually be, economically viable. 
Only 6% thought that they never would become viable. Thus there seemed to be an individual 
optimism by prawn fishers regarding the long term future for their own activities, and a 
pessimism for the overall fishery. 
When responses were considered by aggregation of management policies, fishers supporting 
minimum intervention (resource protection only) and those supporting status quo (main existing 
fleet stmcture) were the most optimistic (viable now or would be within twelve months) whilst 
those advocating govemment intervention to maximise profits were less optimistic (may become 
viable within three years or not at all). 
161 
In discussions with prawn fishers, their economic horizons are quite limited, with cash flow to 
support debts very important. Thus forward projection for two or three years is a very long time 
for an individual needing to make the next monthly loan payment. 
Stabilisation Scheme 
Queensland prawn fishers have a jaundiced view of industry-funded buy-back schemes because 
of the example of the cost and duration of the Gulf of Carpentaria buy-back of fishing 
entitlements. Fishers are so wary of such schemes that rather than govemment-imposed 
restmcturing, they prefer to think of industry initiatives such as removing latent effort (under-
utilised boats) to create a more stable and secure future. Thus in discussions with the QCFO, 
the concept of a "stabilisation" scheme was bom. Such a scheme would "retire" latent effort so 
as to guarantee non-active vessels could suddenly join the fleet, thus the fleet would "stabilise" 
at a known size. Hence, support for the concept was examined by the survey. 
In considering the question of whether a "stabilisation" scheme (buy out of entitlements) is 
warranted, there were significantly more that favoured the idea (57% or 129) compared with 
those that did not (40% or 91) with 3% not answering this question (Table 5.16). However, 
when the answers to Question 1 (manageYnent options), were also considered, for those fishers 
who opted for looking after the resource (minimum control) and maintaining the present fleet 
stmcture, fishers were almost exactly divided on support for stabilisation with as many favouring 
the idea of such a scheme as those that opposed it. The fishers who favoured the option of 
intervention to maximise profitability strongly supported (46 to 14) a stabilisation scheme. A 
similar pattem emerged with the following question on whether fishers would be willing to 
contribute to such a scheme, with the exception that most of that group of fishers who favoured 
the maintenance of existing fleet stmcture were not prepared to fund such a scheme. 
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Table 5.16 
Questionnaire responses (numbers of fishers) by Port for supporting the stabilisation 
scheme ("support"), the willingness for individuals to pay for the stabilisation scheme 
("will pay") and support for the zoning of the east coast (zoning). An asterisk 
indicates support, two asterisks stron: 
Port 
York Island 
Portland R. 
Port Douglas 
Caims 
Innisfail 
Lucinda 
Townsville 
Ayr 
Bowen 
Mackay 
Yeppoon 
Gladstone 
Bundaberg 
Urangan 
Tin Can Bay 
Mooloolaba 
Virginia 
Colmslie 
Southport 
Total (numbers) 
Percentage Support 
Support 
11 
4 
1 
* a 
? 
1 
4 
2 
** 11 
4 
* 5 
** 10 
f 
• * -J 
* 10 
* * ')C 
2 
0 
* 8 
129 
57 
g support 
Will Pay 
9 
4 
1 
6 
7 
3 
* 5 
1 
** 10 
3 
S 
** 9 
S 
** 7 
* 10 
** 25 
3 
0 
* 9 
120 
53 
Zoning 
* 14 
5 
2 
* 7 
1 
3 
* 5 
* 5 
* 6 
3 
4 
i 
$ 
# • 
2 
16 
4 
1 
4-
104 
46 
Total Responses 
22 
11 
4 
13 
16 
6 
8 
6 
11 
8 
8 
12 
17 
7 
15 
37 
7 
7 
U 
226 
100 
Prawn fishers' consecutive responses to Question 1, Question 5 (stabilisation scheme) and 
Question 6 (who pays) were examined for interactions. Numbers in parenthesis are numbers of 
prawn fishers. 
(a) Option "Looking after the Resource" (86) 
Of these, 45 favoured scheme, 39 did not; 
Of the 45, 38 would be willing to contribute, 5 would not; 
Of the 39, 3 would be willing to contribute, 36 would not. 
A total of 86 prawn fishers the majority of respondents favoured the first management 
policy option of "looking after the resource and letting fishers fend for themselves" and 
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they were nearly evenly divided on whether a stabilisation scheme was needed or not. 
So even though these respondents wanted to minimise govemment intervention, most 
supported restmcturing of the fleet by removal of latent effort, and were largely willing 
to pay for such a scheme. 
(b) Option "Maximise Profitability even if Intervention" (54) 
Of these, 40 favoured scheme, 13 did not; 
Of the 40, 39 would contribute, 1 would not; 
Of the 13, 3 would contribute, 10 would not. 
A total of 54 prawn fishers favoured the second management policy option of 
"maximising the profitability of fishers even if this means increased intervention" and 
were strongly in favour of a stabilisation scheme. This group favoured restructuring and 
were prepared to pay for such a scheme. 
(c) Option "Maintain Fleet Stmcture" (48) 
Of these, 23 favoured scheme, 25 did not; 
Of the 23, 18 would be willing to contribute, 5 would not; 
Of the 25, 1 would be willing to contribute, 24 would not. 
A total of 48 prawn fishers favoured the third policy option of "ensuring the present fleet 
stmcture remains unchanged", or status quo and a surprising number (23 out of the 48) 
of these respondents also favoured the stabilisation scheme (removing latent effort) and 
were willing to pay for such a scheme. So even fishers wishing to preserve the status 
quo, a high proportion supported the need for removing latent effort, though perhaps not 
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restmcturing. 
(d) Summary 
There were 208 trawl fishers' responses 
57% (118) favoured the scheme, 40% (84) did not; 
54% (113) would contribute, 43% (90) would not. 
Overall, there was support for both having a stabilisation scheme and for it to be funded 
by the fishers themselves. There was no apparent geographical bias (Table 5.16) with 
support apparent at some of the larger ports (Caims) but not at others (Townsville). 
Strongest support was in smaller ports such as Bowen, Gladstone and Urangan where 
there was concem that local latent effort could be activated. An interpretation could be 
that it was a local issue dependent on the local number of under-utilised vessels that 
could be activated, the local impact of fishing by non-local vessels and individual 
economic circumstances. 
Single Fishery versus Zoning 
Fishers were asked whether the East Cost Trawl Fishery should (one answer only): 
(a) be managed as a single complex fishery with access for all fishers who hold an east coast 
licence (present arrangement) (51.8%); 
(b) be zoned so as to restrict access to only fishers endorsed for that one zone (12.8%); 
(c) be zoned but allow some mechanism for access to more than one zone (33.2%). 
The percentage support for each option is in parenthesis. The question of zoning is a complex 
one. Historically, a Queensland prawn fishing licence entitled the licensee to fish anywhere in 
Queensland waters. The discovery and subsequent restriction on entry to the Gulf of Carpentaria 
and then Torres Strait prawning grounds and the maximum size limitation on vessels in Moreton 
Bay (14m) meant that Queensland fishers felt they had "lost" access to significant areas already. 
The establishment of the Great Barrier Reef Marine park and zoning of some of these waters 
(scientific study zone - the "green zone" - and localised closure of important coral areas) had 
added to fishers' concems. 
However, the mid to late 1980s attempt at seasonal closures on the east coast had resulted in 
targeted, aggregated fishing ("pulse fishing" - discussed later) and caused a rethink on the utility 
of zoning. The overriding consideration, however, is the multispecies nature of the east coast 
prawn fishery - that because of the geographical extent of the coastline that different species 
mature and grow at different rates and times, so that prawns are at optimum size for harvest at 
different times in different areas. The dilemma is that immature prawns can be protected from 
harvest, but that once the grounds are opened, sequential harvesting strategies can see large 
number of vessels fish a particular locality at the same time (pulse fishing) and then move on 
to the next aggregation. 
This dilemma explains the almost even split between no zoning, managed as a single unit 
(51.8%) and zoned with access to one zone (12.8%) or zoned with access to mutlizones (33.2%) 
- a total of 46% supporting some form of zoning. 
FACTORS AFFECTING PRAWN FISHERS' ATTITUDES 
Individual discussions and consultation with prawn fisher groups allowed an understanding of 
some of the factors underlying prawn fisher attitudes to change of management policies. 
PLATES 
Gulf Trawler 
Large class steel hull Gulf of Carpentaria 
vessel of the type run by company operation 
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Apparent contradictions in attitudes (as seen from questionnaire results) could be explained 
rationally by individuals and yet when an industry-wide consensus explanation was attempted, 
the complexity of issues confounded simple explanations. 
Fishers were scathing in their condemnation of management in "allowing" new vessels to 
continue entering the fishery after the 1979 "freeze" and yet at least half of them were part of 
that process! The process of changing the common property of all into the private property of 
Queensland prawn fishers guaranteed an exclusive share of the means of production and potential 
for a capitalist, vertical integration of an industry. The size of that share was important in 
attitude formation. Individual attitudes also varied depending upon whether they owned their 
vessel (or vessels) outright or whether they were mortgaged to a bank; whether they were 
licensed only for the east coast or also able to fish Torres Strait and the Gulf of Carpentaria; 
whether they were an original or recent entrant and whether their trawler was old or recently 
built small or large. Factors such as these are useful in understanding where an individual prawn 
fisher lies on the Bourgeoisie - Petite Bourgeoisie continuum (Plate 5). 
Attitudes to boat replacement policies can similarly be understood. Prawn fishers with state-of-
the-art larger vessels are likely to support tough replacement policies since it is likely to be 
decades before they are going to need tb consider replacement. In the meantime, each new 
vessel represents an incremental increase in competition for catch share. Fishers are also aware 
of another kind of incrementalism - that of technological adoption. Boat replacement is also 
contentious since, as the size of vessel increases linearly, its catching ability generally increases 
exponentially. Larger vessels are thus viewed as having a disproportionately greater impact. 
Many fishers believed that encouraging the introduction of larger vessels through the 
Commonwealth Government's Shipbuilding Subsidy (Chapter 5), the QFMA 2:1 replacement 
policy and the demand for larger vessels with the change from essentially local fishing to a 
strategy of greater mobility, have all combined to fundamentally alter the stmcture of the fleet. 
PLATE 6 
East Coast Trawler 
Smaller class wooden hull East Coast 
prawn vessel of the type run by owner 
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"The past vessel replacement policy of two for one of the Authority (QFMA) 
allowed a massive increase in effort. The Authority allowed two small older 
vessels with a next to nil catching capability to be replaced by one, new, up-to-
date trawler that has up to ten times the catching capability of the small vessels 
replaced." 
Interview with Fisher, Yeppoon, 9.1.91 
Similarly, the age of vessels in the east coast prawn fishery has had a direct bearing on 
individual attitudes to effort reduction. Fishers owning older (and generally smaller) vessels 
have different attitudes to those owning/purchasing new (and larger) vessels. The former view 
the latter as the fundamental reason for effort blow-out in the fishery (Plate 6). 
"At present the 2 for one boat replacement policy has merit, but proviso should 
be introduced for a smaller operator with an older boat to be allowed to replace 
it with an equivalent vessel. Otherwise twenty years down the track, I can see 
a lot of bread and butter operators, who are the backbone of the industry risking 
their lives in very old and unsafe vessels." 
Interview with Fisher, Bundaberg, 11.2.91 
Attitudes to closure policies can also be influenced by individual circumstances. Extent of 
indebtedness for example would mean prawn fishers that have unencumbered ownership do not 
have monthly repayments to service and can thus be selective about periods of work. Seasonal 
closures can be budgeted for, whereas prawn fishers with debt commitments need to continue 
fishing to maintain a cash flow. Closure regimes would thus not be favoured by prawn fishers 
with debts to service. 
Fishers content to only fish local grounds are also' unlikely to favour closures because of 
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concems that, as soon as the local closure is removed, vessels from neighbouring ports will 
quickly aggregate to take advantage of the unfished area (this is called pulse fishing). 
"What is the point of me sitting on my arse to let the prawns grow and then 
watch some bastard from Brisbane who has fished all year steam up for the 
opening? Pulse fishing means that closures are bullshit." 
Interview with Fisher, Townsville 1988 
Fishers with licences also endorsed to fish in the Torres Strait and/or the Gulf of Carpentaria 
(dual or triple endorsed) were generally highly supportive of closures, especially if opening times 
differed between the three areas. This has usually been the case since closures in the three areas 
are designed to protect different species at different latitudes. The reason they are supportive 
is that differing opening times allow sequential targeting of unfished aggregations, thus 
optimising fishing effectiveness. 
The size of vessel influenced individual views on both closures and effort reduction. 
"The small operator is the worst affected by these restrictions. When a closure 
is lifted, if the weather is bad, the' operator with a 30 to 40 foot trawler is forced 
to remain in port, whereas the large trawlers can work all weather." 
Interview with Fisher, Bundaberg, 11.2.91 
There was a strongly geographic polarisation on the benefits of zoning (Table 5.16) with 
northem branches strongly in favour and southem branches strongly against the concept of 
zoning. A likely explanation would be twofold - support from Caims north would be from 
larger operators attempting to stop smaller operators from Brisbane targeting "their" juvenile 
(non-export) prawns, whilst support from Townsville to Bowen would be to remove the "pulse" 
fishing effect (see later). 
Prawn fishers attitudes to closures were not always so polarised. Prawn fishers recalled that in 
the late 1960s to early 1970s, a northem "voluntary" closure existed from December through to 
March (Caims fishers, 1991). In those days small scale fishers voluntarily stopped fishing during 
this period and retumed to their home ports and families. The reduction in fishing in the Gulf 
was thus considered a "social closure" even though catch rates were low, prawns were small and 
less valuable and fishing was less lucrative, the closure was to allow fishers to spend time with 
families at Christmas, avoid the cyclone season and complete annual vessel maintenance. As 
the numbers of vessels increased and new entrants were faced with servicing large overdrafts, 
these fishers began to work longer hours, the mobility of the fleet increased and "gentlemen's 
agreements" (voluntary closures) were replaced by govemment interventions. 
As the number and complexity of these closure arrangements increased in the Gulf of 
Carpentaria, fishing times were reduced and competition between fishers increased. This was 
particularly so on the east coast where fishers endorsed to fish (those with multiple licences) in 
different fisheries such as the Gulf of Carpentaria, Torres Strait and the Queensland east coast 
chose to fish the east coast. Such multi-endorsed fishers could move from one fishery to 
another as the seasonal closures were imjjosed in a particular fishery. This behaviour initiated 
debate over the value of such closures and placed increasing pressure on east coast managers to 
choose the timing of such closures on other than biological grounds. This debate continues. 
Discussion with fishers also suggested regional values. Fishers from urban ports (Brisbane, 
Caims, Townsville) tended to have different values to those from small, regional ports (Yeppoon, 
Lucinda, Innisfail). For example, local depletion of prawn stocks adjacent to closure areas as 
a result of pulse fishing was a much more important issue for small, local, coastal fishers than 
urban-based, more mobile fishers. The lack of altemative employment opportunities in the 
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former ports was mentioned by many regional prawn fishers. Some labouring jobs (local 
councils) or farm-related employment (sugar cane, cattle) were cited but these were very limited. 
Thus the lack of alternatives ensured that local fishers were protective of "their" prawn resource 
and resented "foreign" (ie. non-locally based) fishers. 
DISCUSSION 
This work allowed a comparison nationally, of prawn fishers' class position, evidenced from 
examination of prawn fishers' social characteristics across differing management regimes. In 
other words, the links between class position and policy. It also provided an insight as to how 
one group of prawn fishers, those from Queensland, viewed policy development. In particular, 
when presented with policy options, which values were paramount. 
Prawn Fishers' Characteristics and Policy 
The lack of clear representation of prawn fishers in the 1991 Census was puzzling. During port 
visits described in Chapter 3, fishers were asked whether they had participated in the National 
Census and what occupation they had identified if they did. Similarly, members of the QCFO 
Trawl Committee and delegates to State Council were also queried. Surprisingly, many 
suggested that often prawn fishers would not wish to be so identified because "prawn fisher" was 
not a respected or admired profession. 
"Fishing is not exactly top of the pops with the general public and most blokes wouldn't 
want it known that they were prawn fishermen. That's why most of them tick the Ships 
Pilots and Deck Officers box.". 
A Hansen, Chair Trawl Committee, 
October 1991. 
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Interestingly, the ASCO ranks the fishing occupation below that of farm labourer on the Census 
form, even though high levels of skills are required to be a successful fisher. 
The employment status of prawn fishers showed marked differences between Westem Australia -
South Australia (WASA) and Queensland - New South Wales (QUNS). Most QUNS fishers 
were non-wage (self employed or employers) whilst most WASA fishers were wage eamers. 
This suggests vessel ownership was higher in QUNS and, together with comparative numbers 
of vessels data, indicates both New South Wales and Queensland have high numbers of owner-
operators, whilst the fleets in South Australia and Westem Australia are operated by non-owners. 
A consequence of early govemment intervention through the imposition of limited entry has been 
that the original entrants have enjoyed a windfall gain in those two jurisdictions. For example, 
the fleet of South Australia takes the same total catch as the fleet of New South Wales, which 
has an order of magnitude greater number of boats. Thus the South Australian fishery is pro 
rata, more lucrative. The exclusiveness of ownership and cash flow potential meant that the 
rights to fish in Westem Australia and South Australia quickly became valuable. The capital 
cost of entering the fishery (purchases of vessel and restricted licences) meant that only wealthy 
investors or existing participants could afford to buy into the fishery. In both cases, an employee 
skipper would be necessary to operate the vessel. In New South Wales and Queensland, until 
the late 1970s/early 1980s a new licence could be purchased for a modest sum and a fisher could 
commence fishing. This possibly accounts for employment status differences. 
There were marked differences in the age distributions of fishers in the two regimes and this 
probably reflects the ownership differences outlined above. The median and mean ages of 
fishers in New South Wales and Queensland were about ten years older than their counterparts 
in Westem Australia and South Australia. One explanation is that prawn fishing in WASA, 
compared with QUNS, is very lucrative and, as a skipper on wages would generally be paid on 
a percentage of the catch, fishers prepared to work hard in WASA could generate high incomes 
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in a short period. Such a "nest egg" could have allowed the purchase of a vessel in an open 
fishery such as New South Wales or Queensland prior to the introduction of limited entry in 
those states, or to set-up in a business outside fishing. Either way, a steady tumover of skippers 
would keep the average age lower in WASA than, say, would be the case for owner-operators 
unable to afford to employ skippers in QUNS. 
The commercial fishing industry world-wide is overwhelmingly male (McGoodwin, 1990), and 
the Australian prawn fishing industry is no exception. Although women were represented in the 
census survey data, they were only a small fraction of the catching sector workforce. The 
Queensland and Westem Australian fleets had women represented in crews, but an explanation 
was that representation was more to do with division of labour. Queensland and Westem 
Australian prawn vessels often travel long distances and prawning grounds are remote from 
population centres. Thus these vessels are equipped to spend long periods at sea and employ 
additional crew as cooks, whereas New South Wales and South Australian vessels rarely work 
more than two to three days without retuming to port. However, as Thompson et al. (1983) has 
noted, while "... fishing is commonly thought of as a man's trade", it has been an occupation 
particularly dependent on the work of women. Marchak et al. (1987) described the fishing and 
fish-processing industries of British Columbia and the division of labour (technical and social) 
which occurs. They found that women^ typically find themselves in jobs that are routine, 
monotonous, stationary and seasonal and generally in processing and on shore. Where women 
do engage in fish production (catching), it is usually artisanal (shellfish gathering) and local 
(Murdoch and Provost, 1975). 
Onshore processing was a significant employer of females at the start of the prawn fisheries in 
the Gulf (Kammba, Groote Eylandt) and Queensland (Brisbane, Townsville) when most boats 
were "wet" and relied on brine and ice for chilling the catch. In those days, boats would queue 
to unload prawns into shore-based processing facilities. With the advent of refrigeration, on 
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board "snap freezing" capabilities and market demand for packaging by species and size, shore-
based processing was rapidly replaced by on-board processing and the shore facilities closed. 
Some on-shore processing of scallops continues in Westem Australia and Queensland, but there 
is little on-shore processing of prawns. 
Family type comparisons again reveal that New South Wales and South Australian fishers have 
the highest and second highest rates of "two parent plus dependent" family types, consistent with 
a lifestyle of short duration fishing trips from ports in these states. Rates are lower in 
Queensland and non-existent in Westem Australia. Interestingly, in the family types described 
for NSW prawn fishers, single parents were not present, versus 5% for the Australian 
population. A likely reason is that prawn fishing is a male occupation and the majority of sole 
parents are female. The high incidence of non-family categories in Queensland and Westem 
Australia could also be attributed to time spent at sea (distance from grounds). 
The level of educational attainment in Westem Australia was significantly higher than for other 
states and may be a product of the comparatively larger size and technical complexity (fish 
finding aids, navigation) of the Westem Australian fleet. The need to remain for long periods 
at sea and to travel long distances, may require a greater level of training to successfully operate. 
The level of education is also mirrored in age - left-school data, with Western Australian fishers 
staying at school for comparatively longer than their interstate colleagues. Again, given the 
differences in size of the population between the states, and the comparatively more regionally 
dispersed nature of the New South Wales coastal population, it is perhaps to be expected that 
employment opportunities would be less in regional New South Wales than urban Westem 
Australia. The more marginal/artisanal fishery in New South Wales has a stronger generational 
focus with second and third generation prawners (and some older, having switched to prawning 
in the 1960s) common around the central coast ports (for example, Maryborough, Bundaberg -
interview with fisher, 1991). 
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The birthplace of most Australian prawn fishers is overwhelmingly Australian but of the 
proportion of non-Australian origin. New South Wales has the least and South Australia the 
greatest proportions. Leaving aside those prawners originating from the UK and Ireland, some 
degree of ethnicity is apparent in state prawn fisher distributions. New South Wales and 
Queensland have a small percentage of representatives originating in Asia and Oceania whilst 
South Australia and Westem Australia have (non-British) European (South Australia) and 
Oceania and (non-British) European (Westem Australia) origin fishers. Aboriginality is not 
strongly represented among prawn fishers and is consistent with proportions found in the non-
fisher state populations. Some explanation can be found in the carrying on of fishing traditions 
by early migrants from their birthplace (Italy, Greece, South East Asia). Others possibly result 
from systems of kinship where migrant family members assisted each other in securing capital 
to enter the fishery. The latter has been particularly apparent in recent years with the newly 
arrived Vietnamese fishers in Botany Bay (New South Wales) and Moreton Bay (Queensland) 
(boat registration/transfer records, QFMA/NSWF). Family groups purchase a prawn vessel, act 
as crew and pool resources in order to purchase further vessels. Vietnamese fishers today own 
approximately 30 % of Moreton and Botany Bay vessels in each area (interviews with state 
bureaucrats, New South Wales and Queensland, 1994). Similar waves of migrant fishers are also 
apparent from historical records (Table 5.17). In New South Wales, notable prawn fishing 
ethnicity waves have included Chinese, Italian/Greek and Vietnamese fishers. 
Decisions on management regimes have directly impacted on hours worked in each of the state 
prawn fisheries. Policy decisions on closure regimes determine seasonality of fishing activity. 
Social factors (wishing to be at home with family at Christmas, weekends) can also influence 
decision makers. So closures can be for biological (optimise prawn reproduction) economic 
(optimise value of prawns at harvest) or social reasons. This is discussed at greater length later. 
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Table 5.17 
Birthplace (numbers) of total fishers in the Moreton district in 1901, 1911 and 1917. 
"Britain" includes "Australia and England" prior to 1914. Source: Queensland 
Marine Department (1840-1917). 
Birthplace 
Britain 
England 
Australia 
Germany 
Italy 
Greece 
China 
Scandinavia 
Russia 
India 
USA 
Aboriginal 
1901 
112 
— 
— 
15 
10 
26 
3 
-
— 
-
-
1911 
198 
— 
— 
16 
13 
7 
4 
-
2 
-
3 
1917 
-
86 
345 
6 
12 
-
5 
2 
-
2 
-
In the case of South Australia, the prawn harvesting season has shifted from November-
December to March-April, in order to protect spawning female prawns, with the season 
consequently only lasting 60 days (R. Lewis, pers.com.). Thus the smaller fleet (by an order of 
magnitude) of South Australia is able to harvest in 60 days the same catch as the New South 
Wales fleet takes in 270 days. 
The income eamed by individual prawn fishers was similar to the Australian average individual 
income (in the case of South Australia and Westem Australia) and below the Australian average 
for New South Wales (lowest) and Queensland. When the household income was considered, 
the importance of the non-prawning income to prawn fishers total household income was found 
to be significant, particularly in New South Wales and Queensland. Discussions with groups of 
fishers and their wives in New South Wales revealed that prawn fishers' wives often work part-
time in semi-skilled jobs (sales assistants, supermarket checkers) and full-time in skilled jobs 
(word processing). As well as seasonally in other, non-prawn fishing (meshing and trapping). 
Queensland prawn fishers' wives appear more involved in shore-based management of the family 
business - "keeping the books", marketing product and maintaining vessel records. They were 
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also involved in a variety of part and full-time work (personal observation, discussions during 
port visits). 
The nature of housing occupancy statistics suggest that prawn fishers lag well behind the rest 
of the Australian population in settled housing (owned or purchasing) and are in front in 
temporary housing (rented) (Table 5.13). This is not surprising given the age stmcture of the 
fishers (except for NSW), the population in each state and the nature of the occupation. 
However, state differences are still apparent with South Australia being closest to the state norm 
and Westem Australia the furthest. The anomaly in Westem Australia (low 
ownership/purchasing but only just above average renting) can be explained by the fact that 
many fishers live on-board the larger praWn vessels unlike most other states. High rental levels 
in New South Wales reflect the marginal artisanal level of retum most fishers enjoy whilst those 
in Queensland, the highly migratory nature of the fleet. 
An outcome of govemment policy decisions can be to benefit or disadvantage sectors of the 
community. Philosophical and political influences tend to play a significant role in policy 
development, but quite often many of the effects of policy cannot be predicted. Generally policy 
makers, and the public that is impacted by policy, are not in a position to revisit decisions nor 
evaluate policy impacts. In this instances, there are four State jurisdictions each managing a 
prawn fishery. The development of the fisheries has been recent and largely in isolation. 
Uniquely, there has been two states (Westem Australia and Queensland), sparsely populated, 
endowed with valuable, productive prawn resources of markedly different value that have opted 
for opposite policy prescriptions. At about the same time, two other states, more densely 
populated, endowed with more moderate prawn resources but of approximately equivalent value 
that have also opted for opposite policy prescriptions (Table 5.18). 
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Table 5.18 
Prawn Fishers and Policy 
Variable 
Initial Management Policy 
Employment ^ 
Female '' 
Age^ 
Non-traditional Family *" 
Educational ' 
Birthplace " 
Hours Worked ^ 
Income '" 
Housing " 
NSW 
Open' 
1.4 
3 
37 
11 
39 
96 
73 
23 
- 7 
QLD 
Open 
1.3 
8 
36 
44 
45 
90 
83 
25 
- 17 
SA 
Closed" 
0.5 
0 
30 
55 
37 
82 
44 
38 
+ 2.1 
WA 
Closed 
0.5 
7 
30 
86 
57 
84 
89 
31 
- 5 6 
Open is open entry to all fishers 
^ Qosed is limited to initial participants 
' Ratio of non-wage (self-employed and employer) to wage (worker) labour. The Australian 
mean is 0.18 indicating a low proportion of non-wage labour 
* Percentage of prawn workforce female 
' Mean age (years) of prawn fishers 
* Percentage non-family households 
^ Percentage Higher or Vocational Educated 
' Percentage Anglo-Australian birth 
Percentage working more than 35hr week. Australian mean is 65 percent of working 
population 
Mean in thousands of dollars gross 
" Percentage owned/purchasing below state mean 
Thus New South Wales and Queensland allowed free entry by fishers into the prawn fisheries 
of those States from discovery to the late 1970s/early 1980s, approximately twenty years. South 
Australia and Westem Australia on the other hand chose to implement limited entry policies and 
basically restricted entry to the fisheries to the original participants. 
Have such policy decisions impacted the fishers? Although the history of Australian prawn 
fisheries is recent, there are fundamental differences in the characteristics of prawn fishers from 
each jurisdiction. The starkest contrast is in the employment status of fishers. New South Wales 
and Queensland prawn fleets have a high proportion of self employed or small employer fishers, 
the petite bourgeoisie. Fishers in these States have a history of owner-operators, fishers who 
own and operate their own vessels and may employ one or two others (Glaister and McDonall, 
1983), but work alongside them as co-workers. They thus own the means of production but 
work themselves,and unlike the capitalist or large company operation, essentially work for 
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themselves. Westem Australian and South Australian prawn fleets have a higher representation 
of wage labour. Here owners of the means of production hire skippers to work vessels on their 
behalf. Owners may be individuals (who may own several vessels) or companies (large or 
small) who own multiple vessels. 
The economics of fishing in each of the areas was initially similar as grounds were discovered 
and fishing experience was accumulated. However, as entry continued in QUNS and halted in 
WASA, the economic differential increased. A measure of this was the value that the property 
rights (licences) accmed - $35,000 for a South Australian prawn licence compared with $10 for 
a New South Wales prawn licence, in 1975 (Wallace-Carter, 1987; NSW Annual Report, 1977) 
or the per vessel value of the catch (Table 5.14). The accumulation of capital was thus both in 
the property right as well as the cash flow as the value of prawns continued to increase. Fishers 
in the limited entry fisheries were able to either aggregate ownership by purchasing additional 
licences or conversely to retire and hire wage labour to operate the vessel. The incentive to 
capitalise in Queensland or New South Wales was less since the fisheries were less lucrative and 
property rights poorly defined (anyone could enter until 1985). 
A further consequence of increasing capitalism in WASA and strengthening of the petite 
bourgeoisie in QUNS was the use of wage labour (and the lucrative wages able to be paid) and 
the comparatively high tumover of wages skippers versus owner-operators as evidenced by the 
differences in mean age of fishers (Table 5.18). 
However, some of the fisher characteristics differences can be explained in terms of physical 
characteristics of the fisheries (remoteness of fishing grounds, duration of voyages). In such 
cases the couplets of Westem Australia/Queensland and New South Wales/South Australia 
(remote, longer duration compared with localised, shorter duration) can also "explain" the 
characteristics of fishers. The percent non-family households, technical training, hours worked 
179 
and non-ownership of housing are all higher for fishers working remote fishing grounds and are 
away fishing for longer periods. 
The early allocation of property rights through the policy of limited entry can be linked to the 
accumulation of capital and significant class differences in fishers compared with those subject 
to policies of open entry. The closed policies of Western Australia and South Australia have 
encouraged a more capitalist fishery with an employed (wage earning) workforce of younger, 
more skilled/educated, more culturally diverse fishers eaming higher incomes than their 
counterparts in New South Wales and Queensland. In these states, by contrast, the fishery has 
been more artisanal with a workforce which has been self-employed (or an employer) of older, 
less skilled/educated, less culturally diverse fishers, eaming lesser incomes, a tme petite 
bourgeoisie. But such privileged access afforded by closed fishery policies was initially 
instituted largely as a result of effective lobbying of govemments by determined, powerful, 
vested interests (see previous sections). In both Westem Australia and South Australia, well-
established, successful fishing companies and fishing families respectively, were granted the bulk 
of the rights (interview with prawn fisher, Caims). The sheer weight of numbers of fishers that 
entered the fisheries in the other two states (New South Wales and Queensland) precluded the 
accretion of similar exclusive rights. Rather than buying up available, tradeable rights, using 
resultant high cash flows from prawning as occurred in Westem Australia (and the Gulf of 
Carpentaria) and to a lesser extent in South Australia, many fishers in New South Wales and 
Queensland started their careers as deckhands, saved to buy a small vessel and then upgraded 
to a larger vessel as they accumulated sufficient funds (interview with prawn fisher, Caims). 
In fisheries, as with other sectors of modern economies, economic growth has been characterised 
by the accumulation of capital. It seems likely that a major effect of govemment intervention 
by limiting entry in Westem Australia and South Australia, has been that such capitalism has 
occurred at a much faster rate and to a far greater degree than in prawn fisheries with open entry 
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policies. There certainly appears to be evidence for a divergence between capitalist-producer 
fishers in the limited entry regimes of Westem Australia/South Australia and the more artisanal 
or petite bourgeoisie fishers of New South Wales/Queensland. 
That govemment policy can have such impact and also shape the characteristics of prawn fisher 
groups is not surprising since the allocation of exclusive rights to resources by govemments has 
always engendered debate (see West, 1982). Unlike other natural resources, however, aquatic 
living resources were considered common property - that is, owned by no one until they were 
captured. Decisions in Westem Australia and South Australia were thus the first policy decisions 
in the area of the allocation of common property fisheries resources in Australia. 
Queensland Prawn Fishers and Policy 
It is first important to realise that although 278 people attended the meetings, numbers at each 
port (Table 5.15) varied widely, with some ports showing a high proportional attendance for the 
number of fishers in the port (say Mooloolaba) and others, a low attendance (say Townsville or 
Caims). Reasons for this variation, offered by fishers, ranged from lack of interest in the issues 
to lack of faith in what could be achieved. Whatever the reason, care is needed in interpreting 
the results of the survey. One interpretation of attendance, for example, was that most of the 
people who attended were financially stressed and wanted rapid change (or conversely, those that 
did not attend were happy with the status quo and did not want change). 
There were obvious, long-standing concems about the number of boats in the fleet. All the 
fishers had witnessed the failure of the 1979 "freeze on entry" that resulted in a near doubling 
of the fleet. Although initially fuelled by speculators, most of those people had on-sold and the 
present owner-operators were genuine fishers. Nevertheless, the horse had well and tmly bolted 
and there was a fleet well in excess of optimum (Elmer, 1992). 
181 
The failure of the Febmary 1991 Discussion Paper to identify any solutions and the lack of 
industry agreement on the October 1991 Situation Analysis meant that the fishers could also not 
define any possible policy direction. The questionnaire survey did define some prawn fishers' 
attitudes and together with interviews and discussion, allowed some understanding of the 
complexity of agendas. Certainly self-interest was much in evidence with larger operators or 
operators wanting to increase their fishing power advocating deregulation of fishers as long as 
prawn sustainability was ensured. Recent entrants (with financial burdens) were in favour of 
govemment intervention to protect their assets. Still others wanted no deregulation and no 
further intervention, just to be left alone. 
Those contradictions aside, what conclusions can be drawn? Fishers who attended the port 
meetings were almost evenly divided as to how the fishery should be managed and what were 
the major problems facing the fishery. Given the range in the size classes of vessels in the fleet, 
the variety of prawns and markets they target, and their individual financial positions, this is not 
surprising. The prawn fishing industry makes a direct, significant economic contribution to cities 
and towns along the east coast of Queensland with industry employment and support industries 
also contributing. The majority of fishers rejected increased intervention aimed at only 
maximum profitability. Prawn prices, reduced catch rates and operating costs were identified 
as the major problem areas. 
It is important to note that these fishers' responses are time specific, with low prices and high 
costs operating at the time of the survey. It is likely that attitudes could differ when conditions 
were more favourable. Conversely, fishers faced with difficulties would be more willing to 
consider management policy altematives. The combination of prawn prices, catch rates and 
operating costs are largely beyond the control of fishers or bureaucrats. Examining the "free 
form" question 9 ("What are the causes of your current problems?") and allowing for fishers' 
sense of humour with some answers, the focus of concem was again poor product prices (21% 
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of all respondents) and low catch rates (21%) followed by too high operating costs (17%). Thus 
nearly 59% of respondents were concemed about factors essentially extemal to the management 
process - though it could be argued that poor catch rates can be a result of poor management. 
The Japanese mean annual market price for Australian prawns from 1979-89 varied from a low 
of 1,210 Yen/kg (1989) to a high of 2,301 Yen/kg (1982) (Glaister, 1990), with a steady decline 
from 1982 as a result of the recession and increasing inroads from aquacultured prawns. 
Similarly, catch rate fluctuations are largely attributable to environmental changes (rainfall in 
particular) and are similarly unpredictable (Glaister, 1978b). Operating costs (fuel in particular) 
are linked to the global economic system and also cannot be constrained easily. Globalisation 
is thus an integral part of the prawn fisher's life. 
Fishers were divided on the issue of whether a restmcturing scheme was warranted. However, 
the majority of fishers who attended the meetings supported the further investigation of a "low 
cost stabilisation scheme". As described earlier, fishers were adverse to "buy-back" schemes, 
given the experience of the Gulf of Carpentaria scheme, but they recognised the need to retire 
latent effort. Many petite bourgeoisie prawn fishers could see the major impediment to the 
better definition of property rights in the Queensland prawn fishery being subverted by the 
potential for latent effort to suddenly become active. Thus any improvement in the economic 
performance of the fishery was likely to encourage activation of latent effort. 
Fishers were evenly divided on the issue of zoning versus management as a single fishery, but 
the responses suggest the issue also needs further industry discussion. When responses to the 
three questions (stabilisation scheme warrants further consideration, willingness to pay for such 
a scheme and should the east coast be zoned or not) are considered on a port by port basis 
(Table 5.16) no clear pattems emerged on the first two, but the northem ports favoured zoning 
compared with more southem ports. 
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It is only after these issues are extracted do the issues attributable to management decisions 
figure in fishers' concems. In order of significance, these are too many vessels (14%), closures 
and their consequences (pulse fishing, protection of small prawns, mobility of vessels) (11%), 
the effects of the domestic economy - finance difficulty, interest rates, recession (8%) and 
competition from imports (6%). Of these, it could be argued that only the first two (numbers 
and replacement of vessels and closures and their consequences) could be directly attributable 
to management policy failures. 
It was apparent from the questionnaire, interviews and discussion that fishers as individuals, 
looked upon exisdng management policies in the light of their own current economic 
circumstances and their own mode of operation. Thus a small artisanal producer who only fishes 
Moreton Bay and owns the vessel, has a different view than a fisher with a larger vessel who 
seasonally fishes from Brisbane to Townsville and has a mortgage to service. They both differ 
in their views again from a fisher who owns outright two vessels that only fish Far North 
Queensland (Caims north) and perhaps are also endorsed for the Torres Strait. 
Discussions with fishers conceming the small versus big producer also revealed an interesting 
political dilemma - that of the relation of small producers (typified by the prawn fisher) to the 
modem capitalist state versus the "power bloc"; in other words, the politically dominant mral 
and conservative classes under the hegemony of monopoly capital. In Suffolk in the United 
Kingdom for example, although 65% of small farmers consistently voted conservative and 42% 
were party members, few harboured any illusions regarding the Conservative administration, and 
many expressed the view ".... we'd be better off under Labor" (even though this was expressed 
with meful regret!) (Newby et al. 1981). 
In interviews with Queensland prawn fishers, most (estimated 75%) appeared to be committed 
conservatives with a generalised disgust and mistmst of organised labour (union power) being 
184 
the most frequently cited reason for their conservatism. However, such casual observation would 
need to be tested by a properly conducted survey of fishers' political beliefs. Such attitudes are 
consistent with Westem et a/.(1991) investigation of class and politics (their Table 14.1) where 
they found employers and the petite bourgeoisie held predominantly conservative views. 
Interestingly, prawn fishers appeared to distinguish strongly between State (fishery management 
policy) and Federal (export enhancement, food standards, social policy - unemployment issues) 
with most support being for a conservative federal govemment. Interestingly, the election of the 
Howard conservative govemment has seen the rapid retreat from the Keating Labor 
Govemment's commitment to the Asian region - the major market for export prawns. Such a 
policy shift has impacted upon these markets, although it must be said the collapse of the Tiger 
economies of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have assisted as well. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SORTING THE CATCH: ORGANISATIONAL ECOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
Ecology is the scientific study of the interactions that determine the territorial distribution and 
abundance of organisms (Marshall, 1994). The word derives from the Greek oikos and logos 
meaning literally, "... the character of the house" (Turner, 1987). Charles Darwin's theory of 
evolution inspired the development of the discipline of ecology. The theory postulates that 
evolution (the origination of species from earlier forms, not by special creation) is driven by 
reproduction and inheritance on the one hand and by natural selection on the other. Natural 
selection eliminates the species least able to survive the stmggle for existence, because they are 
unable to adopt to changing environments, or Other species competing with them for limited 
territory. 
Unfettered competition is limited, however, since species are also interdependent, adapted to each 
other and to the natural environment. Certain species are dominant and others subservient, but 
the equilibrium or balance may be upset with the emergence of newly dominant species. Thus 
the continuum of evolutionary development may have periods of invasion, domination and 
succession. 
Modem natural resource management systems can also be thought of in terms of the interplay 
of natural resources (including Mother Nature), profit-seeking resource industries, organisations 
and diverse publics (Bolman and Deal 1997). The concepts of exploitation, protection, 
conservation and development are central to the relationship between society and natural 
resources. As the systems are products of this relationship, they reflect those cultural elements 
(institutions, norms and values) that guide human practices. This concept has been well explored 
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in the business literature (Moore, 1993). 
The importance of organisations and their interactions in resource management is often 
overlooked. Gale and Miller (1985) identified three features of bureaucracies - stmctural, 
knowledge bases and jurisdiction - in comparing bureaucratic systems for forestry and fisheries 
management in the USA. They contended that resource management is " ... increasingly a 
question of social policy, involving the negotiated integration of political and scientific 
decisions," and they concluded that the complex policy process should be studied and debated. 
If policy is an output of organisations, then the various organisational interactions (the 
"organisational ecology") which shape, interpret, administer, influence and change such policy, 
is a critical component of understanding the policy's impact upon society. Understanding such 
organisational arrangements are thus germane to the present study. 
The interactions within and between organisations and the interconnections between the practical 
policy issues and political action give insight into how such organisations function (Holm, 1995). 
There is an extensive literature on bureaucracy and the theory of bureaucratic behaviour in both 
political science and economics (McCay, 1981; Schwert, 1981; Jentoft 1989; and Vestergaard, 
1994). Other workers have identified relationships between agencies and regulated industry (eg 
Peltzman, 1976; Loomis, 1993). Rarely have such studies investigated fisheries cases, unless 
they have been those of traditional or artisanal industries. Such behaviours would seem 
important in the understanding of the development of resource decision-making. This chapter 
examines the stmctures and shared responsibilities of the major fisheries organisations in 
Queensland, and their interactions. 
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THE STRUCTURE OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION 
Legislative Arrangements 
Fisheries resources under Queensland jurisdiction have been managed by the Minister for 
Primary Industries through two principal pieces of legislation - the Fisheries Act 1976-1989 and 
the Fishing Industry Organisation and Marketing Act 1982-1990. More recently, the 
Queensland Fisheries Act 1994 has been enacted. 
The Fisheries Act 1976-1989 was administered by the Division of Fisheries, Department of 
Primary Industries (QDPI). The two principal objectives of the Act were: 
, to promote the good order, management, development and welfare of the fishing 
industry; and 
» to provide for the protection, conservation and management of the fisheries 
resources of the State, through the legislative responsibilities and functions 
provided in the Act. 
The Fishing Industry Organisation and Marketing Act 1982-1990 constituted the Queensland 
Fish Management Authority (QFMA) which was established in December 1982. The three 
principal objectives of the Act were: 
to provide for the management and control of the supply and marketing of fish; 
to provide for the management of fisheries resources; and 
to promote the good order, management and development of the fishing industry 
throughout the State. 
1 » 
Both of the Principal Acts have been superseded by the Queensland Fisheries Act 1994 which 
replaced the QFMA with the Queensland Fisheries Management Authority. The main changes 
other than the title were that the goveming Board of the new QFMA was "expertise" based^ 
rather than representatively based, and that consultation was mandated through Management 
Advisory Committees (MACs) and Zonal Advisory Committees (QACs). The MACs are 
fishery-based (eg. the Prawn Trawl Management Advisory Committee) whilst the ZACs ate 
community-based (eg. the Townsville ZAQ. 
Organisational Structure and Responsibilities 
The Minister is advised by the QFMA in principal areas of management and licensing for both 
the commercial and recreational fisheries, and advised in the principal areas of research, habitat 
management, enforcement and extension by the Division of Fisheries within the Department of 
Primary Industries. The QDPl's responsibility is predominantly the conservation of fish and fish 
habitats (management, research, compliance) whilst that of the QFMA is predominantly 
sustainable management of exploitation and marketing (management, licensing). There is thus 
a degree of overlap in responsibility in some key management and compliance areas (eg. 
aquaculture). 
« Queensland Department of Primary Industries 
Under the direction of the Minister for Primary Industries, a number of Queensland's marine and 
freshwater fisheries are managed through The Division of Fisheries, Department of Primary 
Industries. This Division consists of two Branches - the Fisheries Branch and the Queensland 
Boating and Fisheries Patrol - which are responsible for administering the Queensland Fisheries 
Act, and in the case of the latter Branch, surveillance and enforcement of prohibitions under the 
Fishing Industry Organisation and Marketing Act. 
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The Fisheries Branch is responsible for maintaining freshwater and marine resources and the 
protection of fish habitat through research and the provision of technical advice to the QFMA, 
the Govemment and the fishing industry. The Branch provides management and research 
assistance to complement fisheries management policies implemented by the QFMA, manages 
a number of minor commercial and recreational fisheries and provides extension and educational 
material to the community. 
The Queensland Boating and Fisheries Patrol is essentially the regulatory and enforcement arm 
in the fisheries and marine area. In addition to enforcing the provisions of Fisheries legislation, 
the Patrol is responsible for enforcement and extension activities under a very wide range of 
other State and Commonwealth legislation in the areas of marine and boating safety, fisheries 
management, pollution monitoring and control. 
Queensland Fisheries Management Authority 
The Authority comprised ten members as its "board of directors" appointed for a three year term. 
Membership consisted of a Chair and Deputy Chair, who are Govemment appointees, and four 
representatives of the commercial catching sector, one seafood processor, one wholesaler, one 
recreational fisher and a representative of local government. The QFMA is supported by an 
executive and an administrative staff responsible for licensing, management and policy 
implementation for the major commercial and recreational fisheries of the State. There is further 
industry involvement through specialist committees which meet regularly with senior QFMA 
staff. The new QFMA has an expertise based Board and was effectively established in March 
1995, and changes since this date are outside the scope of the present study. 
The QFMA is self-funded primarily through licensing and other fees derived from the catching 
and marketing sectors of the Queensland commercial fishing industry. It is a relatively 
190 
autonomous body although directly responsible to (able to be overridden by) the Queensland 
Minister for Primary Industries. In essence, it conducts the day-to-day management of fisheries 
in Queensland, with the determination of legislative and policy issues being the prerogative of 
Govemment, acting upon recommendations of the Authority. 
The QFMA is also a significant source of funds for fisheries management oriented research, 
undertaken by the Department of Primary Industries (more than 10% of QFMA annual income) 
in providing technical advice required in developing and implementing fisheries management 
strategies. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY ADMINISTRATION 
Early History 
In 1957, proposals were first raised favouring a statutory. Statewide organisation of commercial 
fishers. At that time the Queensland Professional Fishermen's League (QPFL) represented most 
fishers. Leading figures of the QPFL considered that a statutory organisation with industry-wide 
coverage would engender unity, minimise duplication and costs and represent a stronger lobbying 
potential. During 1965, a range of proposals were presented to the State Govemment but were 
rejected since there were doubts as to the representativeness of the proponents. By late 1970 the 
majority of the many fishers' representative bodies had agreed to support the concept of a single 
council. 
A petition calling for the establishment of the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation 
(QCFO) was presented to the State Govemment in 1972 and resulted in the creation of a 
provisional Council under the auspices of the Council of Agriculture. 
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Mr B. Holt, Chair of the Redlands Branch and Deputy Chair of the State Council retrospectively 
summarised fishers' feelings on the origins of the QCFO first State Conference as follows: 
"Well, under the original concept everybody knows that there was too many organisations 
and the Govemment decided to form one organisation. So then a provisional Council 
was set up and at this provisional Council, under the auspices of Jack Jones, the secretary 
of the Council of Agriculture, which handled some eighteen Primary Producer 
organisations, which are set-up on a very similar set-up to the regulations that we have 
formed now. So, after talking with him and probably because he has handled this matter 
similarly, and all the other organisations have been set-up similarly to this, he thought 
that this set-up would be the best to adopt, and, as we hadn't . . . the members on the 
provisional Council hadn't . . . gone into any depth, probably at looking at the stmcture 
of setting up the organisation, other than that, those regulations and that format was 
adopted. Probably it was just impressed on us mainly from the Govemment, because it 
seemed the regular standard for the other organisations and that is probably the basis of 
why the pyramid stmcture was accepted by the organisation originally. It wasn't 
probably accepted, it was just pushed on us by Govemment and probably it we could 
have had a look at ourselves beforehand we might have adopted a different stmcture in 
mnning the organisation." 
B. Holt, 3/6/77, State Conference Minutes 
On 12 January, 1974, the 1974 Regulations allowing for the formation of the Queensland 
Commercial Fishermen's Organisation's Local Branches, District Councils and State Councils 
were gazetted. The Regulations established a pyramid-like administrative stmcture. At the base 
were twenty-six branches covering the entire Queensland coastal region from the Northem 
Territory border to the New South Wales border. Each Branch consisted of all master 
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(competency certificated) fishers in the Branch area, the elected Chair, Deputy Chair, Secretary 
and one representative to District Council. 
The next level were five District Councils each of which covered several Branches as follows: 
Branch 1 to and including Branch 5 - District Council 1 
Branch 6 to and including Branch 10 - District Council 2 
Branch 11 to and including Branch 16 - District Council 3 
Branch 17 to and including Branch 21 - District Council 4 
Branch 22 to and including Branch 26 - District Council 5 
Each of the District Councils elected two representatives to the final tier of administration, the 
State Council, making a total of ten Councillors. It was considered that representation at Branch, 
District and State Council levels would allow fishers the opportunity to participate in decision 
making and policy development for the industry. 
However, the stmcture was seen as unwieldy and remote from fishers' needs and that issues of 
importance to Branches were being lost at District Council and not carried forward to State 
Council, resulting in frTJStration at the Branch level. 
This culminated in the convening of a State Conference on 3 June 1977 to which all Branches 
were invited to send a delegate, effectively by-passing the State Council. This was a significant 
meeting as it defined the future shape of the QCFO. One of the Convenors, Mr Trevor Settree 
of Port Douglas summed up the feeling of the meeting thus: 
"We are talking about the fishing industry as a whole. We have our own policies in each 
of our Branches but I think the whole operation (of a more effective stmcture) will come 
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under discussion in the recommending of a constitution." 
T. Settree, 3/6/77, State Conference Minutes 
Mr Denis O'Connell of the Southport Branch chaired the meeting and had discussed the matter 
in detail with one of the convenors, P. Conaty (Redlands). Conaty proposed a full-time chair, 
a 26 member State Conference to meet once per year with the agenda circulated to members 
in the Newsletter before the meeting. He suggested that this form would work since it was 
based on the political model (Conaty was campaign manager for a local conservative Member 
of Parliament at the time). 
O'Connell: "Well, this is how political parties operate don't they? They have conferences each 
year and they appoint executives and then the policy is set from the rank and file of Branches. 
Is that the same thing you're thinking of?" 
Conaty: "Yes, but the chair must be a fisherman and must be full-time." 
3/6/77, State Conference Minutes 
The Conference also discussed how rank dnd file fishers could vote to influence the organisation, 
through proportional representation (based on the numbers of master fishers) or through equal 
value Branch votes (irrespective of the numbers of master fishers in a particular Branch). 
O'Connell: "You can do it two ways. You can do it by the way the Senate is done in 
Australia whereas the smaller (population) States still get the same representation as the 
populated States, or you can do it the reverse. You can have representation by membership in 
areas (proportional). There's one extreme to the other." 
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"Well, do you want the chair elected by ballot from all fishers in Queensland from the 
Branches, or from your (this) Conference or from your executive through your Conference. 
That's the three ways you can do it." 3/6/77, State Conference Minutes 
These proposals were put to the 1 July 1977 meeting of State Council and it was agreed that 
members be circulated through the Newsletter with the intention of a State referendum on the 
proposals. The proposal was narrowly passed at the third Conference on 29 September 1979. 
The issue was subsequently put to the Queensland Govemment by the Maritime Services 
Minister, the Honourable Max Hooper and on April 15, 1980, the State Cabinet agreed that 
QCFO Council should be increased from 10 to 26 members. 
The inaugural 26 member Council met on 29 September 1980 and Dale Bryan was elected Chair 
with Mai Vanderheiden Deputy. At a subsequent Special State Council meeting (6/8/81) the 
Management Committee stmcture was adopted with State "method" committees for all major 
fisheries (Gillnet, Finfish, Crab, Beam Trawl and Prawn (Otter) Trawl). The Annual General 
Meeting of 21/10/81 endorsed the concept with the terms of reference for the State Prawn (Otter) 
Trawl Committee to be drafted by Jim Storey. 
On the 1 December, 1982, the Queensland Fish Management Authority was formed with David 
Mitchell, Director of the Division of Dairying and Fisheries, QDPI, Chair and Dr Graham 
Alexander, Director General of QDPI as Deputy. Dale Bryan, President of the QCFO was the 
only fishers-producer representative on the Board. 
At the AGM of 5 November 1982, Council considered possible bankruptcy proceedings against 
the President, Dale Bryan, and resolved that in the event of bankruptcy being proven that Bryan 
would be appointed as a paid employee of the Organisation and that the Deputy Chair would 
automatically become the Chair. 
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In the mid to late 1980s, a number of policy issues were debated within QCFO and the 26 
member State Council which caused acrimony along the coast. Such issues included boat 
replacement, seasonal closures and the concept of zoning the coast into distinct and discrete 
fishing areas. Largely as a result of the "Senate-system" (voting power based on area rather 
than numbers of fishers), a schism between Northem Branches and Southem Branches 
developed. These issues are described in greater detail later, but suffice it to say, the schism 
prompted a call for "area management" which was basically that regional issues should be 
decided upon by regional Branches affected, not the entire State Council. In other words, a 
retum to the "District" stmcture of the old pyramid hierarchy. "Area Management" continued 
to be hotly debated during 1987/88 under the presidency of Peter Conaty, fuelled by the 
"Gerrymander" (manipulate boundaries of constituency unfairly so as to secure disproportionate 
influence at election) provided under the Branch system. Although numbers of total fishers per 
branch are approximately evenly distributed, the number of prawn fishers per Branch (as indexed 
by vessel ownership by port) are skewed. For example, the area north of Caims has 14% of the 
QCFO membership (including non-trawlers), 24% of prawn vessel ownership and 31% of the 
prawn vessel fishing days. The Brisbane Branches have 26% of membership, 33% of vessel 
ownership and 17% of vessel fishing days. 
Organisational Structure and Responsibilities 
From the earliest attempts at statewide organisation through the Queensland Professional 
Fishermen's League, many breakaway special interest groups have emerged, stmggled and died 
for lack of widespread support. Such experience is also common to other westem fishing 
countries such as New Zealand, the United States and Canada (see Macdonald, 1979; Keamey, 
1989 and McCay, 1989). They too have experienced how difficult it is to maintain a large 
constituency given the plurability of interests and divergent views on the merits of association 
and/or unionisation. 
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The Queensland commercial fishers include a diversity of fisheries, methods of fishing and areas 
of representation. The prawn trawl grouping represent the most economically powerful and 
influential grouping within the organisation and dominate the policy formulation arena. In 
examining how the current organisation functions, it is necessary to understand the stmcture and 
responsibilities. 
Appointment to the State Council (except for the position of President) is determined by 
nomination and election of each State Council Branch Delegate by a majority of votes at the 
relevant Local Branch Annual General Meeting. The position of President is determined by 
nomination from the membership and election by a majority of votes of the State Council. The 
term of office for President is three years. 
The Management Committee consists of the President, Senior Vice-President and Vice-
Presidents. The Senior Vice-President and the Vice-Presidents are elected from amongst the 
members of the State Council at the State Council Annual General Meeting each year. The State 
Council's policy is to elect a Vice-President from each of the QCFO's four regions. These 
regions (and memberships at 1994) are: 
Area 1 Kammba to Innisfail (Branches 1-5) (587) 
Area 2 Lucinda to Mackay (Branches 6-10) (476) 
Area 3 Yeppoon to Tin Can Bay (Branches 11-17) (695) 
Area 4 Tewantin to Gold Coast (Branches 18-26) (934) 
The QCFO consists of and represents 2,692 members who are Queensland Master Fishers 
(certified). Commercial Vessel Owners and Torres Strait Master Fishers, in 26 Local 
Branches. Areas for local branches and membership are listed in Table 6.3. The Organisation 
is funded entirely by compulsory financial contributions from its members as provided for in 
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Section 30f Subsection 10 of the Act. The annual members' levy (currently $407) is determined 
by the State Council and is subject to approval by the Minister for Primary Industries. It is 
collected via the State licensing system by the Queensland Fisheries Management Authority and 
reimbursed to the QCFO. 
The functions of the State Council are to: 
« Discuss all matters bought before the State Council by commercial fisher's local 
branches, the Management Committee and other committees of the State Council 
or referred to the State Council by the Minister; 
• Adjudicate in respect of any disputes between commercial fisher's local branches 
or between any committees of the State Council; 
« Formulate policy for the Organisation and to monitor such policy in the areas of 
administration, structure, financial affairs and planning; 
« Promote efficiency and prosperity of commercial fishers; 
• Promote the requirements and problems of the Queensland fishing industry to the 
Minister, the QFMA, the QDPI and other relevant bodies; 
• Seek affiliation with other State and national bodies; and 
• Comply with all lawful instructions and Directions of the Minister issued under 
the Act. 
The State Council meets every six months. 
Local branches provide a focus for local fishers to meet and discuss issues of interest locally. 
Their elected representative to the State Council - the Branch delegate - takes direction from 
the Branch and represents the Branch view at the State Council. In some instances, some Branch 
delegates may push their personal views, which may be at odds with the Branch view, and this 
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may cause difficuUies. In between State Council meetings, the Management Committee performs 
the day-to-day functions of the State Council. 
The State Council may also establish Specialist Committees to advise it in its policy-making role 
and to provide a vehicle by which members and branches can consider specific Statewide, 
regional and local issues. The State Council established four State Fishery (method-based) 
Committees in 1987 to consider matters relevant to each particular fishery and to make 
recommendations to State Council. These are the State Trawl Committee, State Net 
Committee, State Line Committee and State Crab Committee. Each Committee consists of 
a delegate from each Local Branch, so each committee has 26 members and meets at least once 
per year. 
The State Council established a regional committee stmcture in 1989 reminiscent of the pre-
QCFO "District Committees". Under the system, Regional Fishery Committees were 
established to ensure fishers had adequate input into the management of the fishery in their 
particular region. The regions (described earlier) embrace up to five local Branches and 
recommendations from a particular region may be progressed directly to Govemment (by-
passing State Council), provided they meet a set of guidelines designed to avoid a proposal from 
one region unnecessarily impacting a fishery in other regions (Statewide impacts for example). 
Each of the four regions has its own Trawl, Net, Line and Crab Committees. 
The State Council also established an Environment Committee in 1987 which consists of the 
Chairs of each of four Regional Environment Committees. Other specialist committees include 
the Survey Committee (ensure industry input into vessel survey standards and manning 
requirements) and the Public-Relations Sub-Committee (of the Management Committee). 
The focal programs of the QCFO include resource access, environment, fishery management. 
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fishery legislation, research, public relations, training and industry administration. 
Prawn Fishers and the QCFO 
The nature of commercial prawn trawl fishing is that of individuals, working in an often hostile 
environment, making decisions on a daily basis that may have life or death consequences. Such 
people, have, by necessity, become highly self-reliant, able to make decisions and are extremely 
independent. It is not surprising, given the type of "training" and the general attitudes and values 
of "hunter-gatherers", that the fishing industry is often perceived as unmly, undisciplined and 
lacking an industry-wide perspective in areas such as resource management. 
The east coast prawn trawl fishery has historically been managed as a single fishery (with the 
exception of Moreton Bay which has been limited to those vessels less than 14m since 1968) 
allowing access to all Queensland east coast waters for Queensland - licensed fishers. This fact 
has been strongly supported by industry when any suggestions have been made to "zone" 
(partition) the coast. Such a view has mitigated against locally-derived decisions for local 
problems, with a Statewide perspective invariably adopted by the QCFO. 
Such inflexibility has led to complaints of an industry hierarchy that is insensitive to real, local 
issues. Such concems led to the 1989 re-establishment of the previous "pyramid" stmcture 
originally also rejected as insensitive to local needs by industry at the birth of the QCFO in 
1980. Thus the dichotomy the Organisation is constantly confronting in the prawn trawl fishery 
is that of local, regional issues that are incompatible with the "Queensland waters for Queensland 
fishers" view. An example of this previously discussed is that of seasonal closures. 
In general, prawn fishers have little patience for ". . . bookwork, bullshit and bureaucrats" 
(Interview with prawn fisher 1991) and are reluctant to participate in local branch or committee 
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meetings unless motivated by personal concems (threat of management policies that impact their 
own operation, for example). Representation of constituent concems can then devolve to a few 
interested individuals with the time (retired fishers) and determination to participate. Thus the 
same key people, generally with a long involvement in the industry, are office-bearers at the 
local branch, regional committee and State Council level. Invariably, this encourages a certain 
conservatism and resistance to change. It also results in industry politics being predictable given 
the same individuals participating in the same debates each time policies are discussed. 
Discussion of issues can thus have a tortuous history. An issue raised by a member at a local 
branch meeting can generate considerable debate, perhaps persisting over several meetings. If 
it is essentially a regional issue (rare with trawl issues because of the reasons described earlier), 
it would be referred to the regional trawl committee and then to all branches as well as being 
published in the "Queensland Fisherman" (Industry Joumal) for comment from members within 
30 days. It is then referred to the QCFO Management Committee and thence to the QFMA. 
At any stage if there is concem that it may impact other regions, it is automatically referred to 
the State trawl committee. 
In the case of an issue raised at a local Branch that has Statewide implications, it is referred to 
all branches for consideration and then referred to the State trawl committee. Advice can then 
also be sought from particular regional trawl committees. The State trawl committee 
recommendation is then retumed to all branches for ratification with a decision then taken at 
State Council. This is then forwarded to the QFMA. 
Since State Council only meets twice per year and the branch, regional and committee 
consultations can also cascade into many months of negotiation and consultation, such decision 
making has an inbuilt inertia and results in a conservative view on any change. Thus industry 
initiatives are generally incremental and major change rarely industry-driven. The nature of 
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fishing mitigates against unnecessary risk taking. Exhaustive industry consultation is thus 
viewed not only as desirable, but also necessary. 
THE STRUCTURE OF MARKETING ADMINISTRATION 
The Fish Supply Management Act, 1972 
The Fish Supply Management Act 1972-1976 (and its predecessors) was the core of the 
marketing of seafood in Queensland up to 1982. The key elements of the Act were: 
(a) the establishment of a statutory board in 1972 (Queensland Fish Board) for the purposes 
of marketing the catch. The composition of Board membership was representative of 
industry sectors but members were appointed rather than elected; 
(b) the Board had powers of compulsory acquisition of the catch in defined areas of the State 
(all major fishing ports were within such areas); 
(c) the Board was obliged to operate a type of 'buyer of last resort' facility; 
(d) the Board had a role to play in price and market stabilisation; 
(e) the Board licensed all fish buyers; 
15 the Board was funded from industry sources by way of margins on trading activities. 
The Board was responsible for \ . . the management and control of the supply and marketing of 
fish through the State' and to ensure that 'adequate supplies of fish are available ... to meet all 
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reasonable demands ...' 
Under the legislation, areas known as Fish Supply Districts were able to be established 
throughout the State. All fish landed within one of these Districts were required to be delivered 
to the nearest Board depot or market where it was sold on behalf of fishers. Sale by other 
method was illegal. 
Fish Supply Districts were established to cover virtually all of coastal Queensland where fish was 
landed in commercial quantities. The Board operated in excess of 20 markets at its height with 
Branches located at major fishing ports from the Gold Coast to Weipa. Where the Board did 
not have its own facility, agents were appointed. 
The only exception, in law, to these marketing arrangements was where the Board issued a 
permit of exemption, which was normally restricted to very isolated areas of the State. While 
the Act clearly allowed the Board to operate either by direct retailing or auction, up until the 
1980s the vast majority of fish was sold by auction. Auctions were held at most markets five 
or six days per week. Only buyers (both retailers and secondary wholesalers) who were licensed 
by the Board could bid and fish had to be offered in the order in which it was received. 
The Operation of the Queensland Fish Board 
Apart from its obvious statutory responsibilities outlined briefly above, the Board had an 
involvement in a wide range of industry matters which placed it in a position of considerable 
influence particularly in the period from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. The auction and 
consignment facility remained the most important element of the Board's operation throughout 
the State. In Brisbane, the auction was the most important source of fresh product for the city 
but the consignment facility gained the Board notoriety. 
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The Board also played other industry-oriented roles including: 
| t ) provision of infrastmcture and facilities for fishers by way of wharves, moorings and 
storage; 
(b) the operation of price stabilisation plans, particularly for the mullet and mackerel 
fisheries; 
(c) a loan guarantee facility for fishers; 
(d) the operation of a Service Department providing fishing gear and other supplies for 
fishers and marketers; 
(e) promotional activity. 
While in legislative terms, the Board was clearly empowered to undertake all of these functions 
and holding an industry monopoly obviously was in the best position to do so, the facts of law 
and operations of the industry in practice led to may of these functions not being totally 
compatible. For instance, like other boards, the Queensland Fish Board was supposed to both 
market the catch and enforce the marketing requirements. It thus was forced to police the clients 
it dealt with and at the same time, maintain a commercial relationship. Due to the fact that other 
outlets/sources of supply were available, such a system was unlikely to succeed. 
The Decline of the QFB in the 1970s 
An analysis of the industry and the operations of the Board during the 1970s, supports the 
contention that economic and commercial factors led to a decline in the dominance of the Board 
and this decline would probably have occurred regardless of the application of the Statute. The 
only difference may have been that the decline would have been more gradual thereby allowing 
the Board to adjust or redirect its efforts and perhaps even diversify. 
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The combination of factors meant that seafood products were able to easily bypass the 
established legal marketing system causing an environment suited to economic "free riders". 
"Free riders" can best be defined as those persons in the market place who directly benefit from 
an action of a competitor or other operators in the market but do not pay for that benefit. For 
example, as a statutory marketer, the Queensland Fish Board was required to accept all of the 
catch. Hence overheads, capital equipment and operating costs including labour costs were 
factored into the Board's pricing stmcture. However, this was not the case of 'illegal' 
competitors who had the luxury of being able to privately sell (illegally) high valued produce 
in the knowledge that the remainder of the product, usually of lesser quality, had to be accepted 
by the Board. For a general treatment of this phenomenon, see Stigler, 1974. 
Against this background, the Board's profitability began to fluctuate widely and from 1977-78 
its position became extremely unpredictable. This situation coincided with declines in access 
to the high value products such as prawns, chronic problems with under-utilised capital 
equipment and relatively high gearing of debt. 
However, perhaps the most significant factor remained that the Boards, of necessity, was 
operating some 26 branches throughout the State as well numerous agency operations. The 
administrative costs involved in this venture were considerable. Moreover, the branches were 
not performance dependent, with wages being paid regardless of intake. The necessity for the 
Board to be service oriented was a significant draw back to its competitive position and many 
instances exist where the lack of flexibility in the Board's operation led to lost sales. 
The Lapidge Report, 1980 
In March 1980, the Queensland Government established a committee to '... enquire into matters 
relating to fish marketing and the future of operations of the Fish Board,' under the chair of Mr 
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D P Lapidge, QDPI. The Committee was to recommend steps to reverse the unprofitable trend 
of Board operations, suggest appropriate strategies and structures for marketing, examine the 
necessity of the Board's current operational involvements and to examine altemative stmctures. 
The Lapidge Committee identified weaknesses associated with legislative, financial and 
management constraints and how such constraints affected the supply, quality and price aspects 
of the Board's buying and selling policies. They recommended that the Fish Board be retained 
but with significant restmcturing including administration to be through the Queensland 
Department of Primary Industries, the composition of the Board to be changed, withdrawal from 
the processing sphere and an education program for fishers be instituted. 
The Fishing Industry Organisation and Marketing Act, 1982 
The primary reason for the original introduction of the Fishing Industry Organisation and 
Marketing Act was to legislate the major recommendations of the Lapidge Report and to 
restmcture the Queensland Fish Board as a "fishers board" with sufficient powers to compete 
under the market conditions of 1980 and beyond. The Act was also aimed at removing the 
function of regulating the marketplace from the Board. The main findings of Lapidge were that 
whilst the QFB had operated an orderly inarketing system designed to handle high volumes of 
low value product (mullet), the demand for high value lower volume prawns was so high and 
lucrative, that the orderly marketing of prawns rapidly became "disorderly". Black marketing 
avoiding the official marketing channels) became rife and was the root cause of the eventual 
failure of the QFB. 
The formation of a Fishing Industry Advisory Committee (a recommendation of Lapidge) was 
the catalyst for the development of the QFMA and the basic licensing arrangements for the 
industry. The Act was far more than a piece of legislation dealing with marketing of seafood 
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and the establishment of the Queensland Commercial Fishers' Organisation. The formation of 
the QFMA became the focal point of the legislation with the new body to be responsible not 
only for marketing but for management of fisheries resources with extremely wide powers 
relating to virtually every sector of the industry. 
Apart from reconstituting both the Queensland Fish Board and the Queensland Commercial 
Fishermen's Organisation, the Fishing Industry Organisation and Marketing Act made a 
significant departure from traditional Australian fisheries management practice by establishing 
an industry representative organisation with major responsibility for management and 
organisation of the industry, the QFMA. 
The Fishing Industry Organisation and Marketing Act was substantially amended in 1984 to 
provide the Authority with all necessary powers to manage Queensland's fisheries and this matter 
quickly became the most important function of the QFMA. 
A combination of factors such as the decline in the role of the Queensland Fish Board in the 
marketplace, the upsurge in the number of private traders and unwillingness of the marketing 
sector to support and fund a highly regulated marketing sector, has meant a gradual diminution 
in the activities of the QFMA in the marketing area. 
In essence, the Fishing Industry Organisation and Marketing Act allowed industry a greater say 
in the mnning of the industry. In retum, industry now pays a greater proportion of the cost. 
While the Act itself does not demand the introduction of a 'user pays' arrangement for the 
industry in providing industry with a greater say in its own management, the legislation implies 
that the industry will pay for that privilege. Since 1984/85, the Queensland Fish Management 
Authority has been totally funded by industry via various licence fees and charges imposed on 
both the commercial catching sector and marketing sector of the industry. Currently, about 80 
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percent of Authority costs are home by commercial fishers with the remainder being derived 
from marketers. Industry participants now directly influence the direction of industry 
management policies. However, Govemment still has ultimate responsibility for policy 
determination. 
ORGANISATIONAL INTERACTIONS 
The two govemment organisations (QDPI, QFMA) and the industry peak body (QCFO) are the 
major influences for fisheries policy development in Queensland. As has been seen, the 
marketing sector has been largely privatised and is rarely part of the policy debate. Within 
govemment (QDPI, QFMA) there is a blurring of responsibilities between the two major 
agencies, with replication of functions and duplication of structures. Such uncertainty has 
generated a competitive environment with both agencies providing advice to the Minister of the 
day. 
Such a climate between the two agencies is surprising given the close associations between them. 
For example, several of the most senior bureaucrats within QFMA are former, or seconded, 
QDPI officers. Four out of the five QFMA Chairs (Mitchell, Bygott, Densley and Miller) were 
seconded from the QDPI senior bureaucracy. However, a consistent view expressed during 
interviews with current and former QFMA staff was that the QFMA was unlike govemment 
service. As one interviewee put it: 
"There is a lot more freedom (in the QFMA). It's not like being in the Public 
Service, it's more like private enterprise. If you need to buy something, you go 
out and buy it - no forms in triplicate and all that nonsense." 
Interview, Febmary 1991 
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Competitive tension was also apparent during interviews with current and past employees of both 
agencies. Equivalent managers in QDPI were viewed by their peers in the QFMA as; "out of 
touch", "career public servants with no feel for the industry" and "nine-to-five, typical public 
servants". The QFMA staffers on the other hand, were viewed by their QDPI peers as: 
"Captives of industry", and "know-it-alls who don't have to do any of the hard 
yards, just agree (with the QCFO)". 
Interview, Febmary 1991 
Given these tensions, it was also surprising that with all the formal and informal linkages and 
interactions between the agencies, powerful individual relationships often triumphed over difficult 
organisational relationships. This was particularly evident both between QDPI researchers and 
QFMA managers, and the QBFP. 
In the case of researchers and managers, the relationship is possibly analogous to the "purchaser-
provider model" currently popular with organisational theorists (Zucker, 1988). The QFMA 
regularly contract QDPI researchers to carry out management instigated research projects (eg. 
"Efficacy of Closure Regimes") and co-operating officers establish a certain supportive rapport. 
In the case of the QBFP (Compliance), patrol officers view themselves as outside, and 
independent of both agencies. Again, it is analogous to the purchaser-provider model with the 
"service provider" (QBFP) maintaining a good rapport with a major client (the "service 
purchaser"). 
Another source of strong feeling between officers in both agencies was that of funding. As with 
all govemment agencies since the 1987 recession, scarcity of funding and tight budgets have 
impacted upon morale. In the case of QDPI, the election of the Goss Labor Govemment in 1989 
saw a pronounced redirection of funding from the conservative, agrarian needs of the former 
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govermnent (agriculture, mral development) to the liberal, urban needs of the incoming 
govemment (education, health, social justice). This re-allocation impacted upon the QDPI 
budget severely ($100m of a $500m budget - QDPI officer, interview). The QFMA, on the 
other hand, were largely immune due to their budget being directly tied to fees and licences from 
commercial fishers. 
The retum of a conservative state govemment to power in Queensland in 1996 (albeit subject 
to the support of an independent) has seen a reversal of this situation with a boost to the QDPI 
budget ($45m). Increases in commercial licence fees have not matched inflation, however, and 
senior QFMA management are concemed at the agency's ability to deliver sound advice. In the 
Annual Report, 1997, the then Chair wrote: 
"In my opinion the organisation lacks the financial resources to effectively 
progress the changes required for it to achieve its role as set out in the 
Queensland Fisheries Act 1994 in a time frame the community is likely to find 
acceptable. The available budget of approximately $5m (almost entirely derived 
from levies and fees) is clearly inadequate to deliver the major changes required 
to deliver sustainable fisheries management.". 
(Pg 2, Annual Report 1997) 
Relations between govermnent and the fishing industry peak body, the QCFO, have been 
similarly strained. The principal outcome of the review of fish marketing (the Lapidge Report) 
was the recommendation to establish the QFMA (with a constellation of interest groups) to 
manage Queensland fisheries. Representation by the QCFO on the Board via the President and 
a Vice President ensured a built-in inertia for difficult, resource management decision-making. 
Concems by fishers that the QCFO and QFMA were becoming indistinguishable resulted in the 
QCFO members successfully moving to prohibit the President also being a QFMA Board 
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member. The further restmcturing of the Board from representatively-based to expertise-based 
with the enactment of the Queensland Fisheries Act 1994 has further weakened the QCFO 
influence in the QFMA (though this has recently (1998) been reversed). 
Such an evolution, whilst healthy in delivering impartiality to Board decisions has had a cost in 
the escalation of the politicisation of fisheries management decision-making in Queensland. The 
QCFO routinely bypass the QFMA and make direct political representations to the Minister. 
Such politicisation has not occurred through the rank and file, but primarily through the industry 
leadership, since co-ordinated political activism is not a traditional mode of expression for 
fishers. The tortuous consultation mechanisms and committee stmctures mean that real-time 
input by the members is nearly impossible and most day-to-day decision-making is by the 
President and occasionally. Management Committee. Numerically and financially, prawn fishers 
are the highest profile and most significant power bloc in the QCFO. Decision-making on 
issues affecting prawn fishers, thus appear to have assumed greater significance for the 
leadership than for other fisheries issues. In particular, the workings of the Trawl Committee 
are of considerable importance to the leadership. 
Personalities appear to play an important role in the leadership interactions between the three 
agencies, with the QFMA and QCFO seemingly closer than either is with the QDPI. This may 
be a factor of the comparative stability of QFMA/QCFO leadership (Table 6.1). The frequency 
of leadership change in the QDPI has created morale problems and loss of corporate memory. 
The last three incumbents have come from managerial, agricultural backgrounds, and were not 
versed in the technicalities of fisheries management. 
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Table 6.1 
Frequency of Leadership Change by organisation in 
Queensland. "Incumbents" (number) "Duration" 
Oongest serving incumbent in years) "Mean Duration" 
(mean length of service in years) Source: Official 
records and personal observation. 
• • 
Organisation 
State Minister 
QDPI 
QFMA 
QCFO 
Incumbents 
7 
11 
5 
5 
Duration 
7* 
4** 
g*** 
£.**** 
Mean 
Duration 
3.5 
1.5 
3.0 
4.0 
* Hon E Casey (first non-conservative Minister after 30 years continuous 
Conservative Governments) 
** N Haysom (most senior flsberies bureaucrat in QDPI) 
*•* D Mitchell (original chair of new QFMA) 
**** T Loveday (present incumbent and most influential) 
Board members of the QFMA were initially appointed to represent particular sector interests. 
Thus the first and second QFMA Boards included QDPI, QCFO, Queensland Fish Board, Fish 
Merchant Wholesalers, Fish Processors and the Fish Primary Producers Co-operatives 
Association. The third Board included Local Govemments and recreational fishers' 
representatives. These representatively-based Boards thus also brought individual values to the 
discussions of effort reduction and closures. For example, a policy of seasonal prawn fishing 
closures dnectly impacts product throughput for prawn marketers. 
QDPI interests included maximising the levels of fisheries research and managing fisheries by 
biological science, since their officers are the principal research providers and their charter 
includes a commitment to ecological sustainability. Current and former officials were also well 
aware of the political imperative and agreed that decision-making included compromise through 
negotiation to consensus. QCFO interests included maintaining status quo. Reductions in effort 
could translate to loss of QCFO members, imposition of closures disadvantage local QCFO 
Branches and changes to current mles would disadvantage someone. The Queensland Fish 
Board, Wholesalers' and Processors' interests were all concemed with a guaranteed supply of 
prawns and were thus reluctant to impose lengthy or widespread closure regimes. Niche markets 
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(fresh bait, small prawns versus export quality, large prawns) could also create mutually 
exclusive objectives (economic dualism) during Board deliberations. The dynamics of QFMA 
meetings could thus be dramatic. Such tension eventually resulted in the QCFO President being 
forced to relinquish Board membership by the QCFO rank and file because of perceived conflict 
of interest in 1984. 
"The FMA is an extra bloody cost for another mob of public servants to think up 
more proposals to make it harder for the "average" fisherman to make a living." 
"The present set up that exists with the only catching sector representative, the 
Chairman of the QCFO, entwines the QFMA with the QCFO to such an extent 
that many people see one as an extension of the other." 
"Each organisation is an independent entity and should be seen as such. The 
QFMA is an overall decision-making body, the QCFO is supposed to represent 
the catching sector of the industry." 
Fisher representative, 19.6.84 QFMA Meeting. 
The "conflicts of interest" concems and'lack of success in management also resulted in the 
representatively-based QFMA Board evolving to an expertise-based one through legislative 
amendment in 1995. The success of this change is yet to be proven. 
ORGANISATIONS AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
In previous Chapters, the development of prawn fisheries generally, and in Queensland in 
particular, has focussed on the fishers. However, the policies that shape such development, 
whether explicitly stated or hidden, are the product of negotiation or confrontation between 
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organisations and individuals. Management theory and practice often assume that fishery policy 
decisions are made based on exact knowledge of the fishery system and science. Unfortunately, 
as was alluded to in the introductory Chapters, such traditional approaches of fishery science and 
management ignore a major aspect of fishery systems - that of uncertainty (Sissenwine, 1984). 
In addition to the uncertainty occurring in natural populations (distribution, recmitment, food 
supply, environmental fluctuations), the uncertainty due to human behaviours can be equally 
unpredictable (Hilbom and Walters, 1992). 
Prawn fisher attitudes and characteristics have already been described, particularly those for 
Queensland, but what about interactions between the fishery organisations, how do they affect 
policy development? Earlier Chapters of this thesis have identified areas that define the 
management challenge for the Queensland east coast prawn fishery. 
The fishery commenced as an open entry fishery until a policy change in 1979 (officially), but 
as has been described, further new vessels continued to enter the fishery up until 1985, when 
loopholes were closed and the fishery became limited entry. The policy of open entry for the 
first twenty years of the fishery helped shape the class position of fishers (Chapter 5), but also 
created a pool of effort (the pravvm fleet) in excess of that required to take the annual catch. The 
fleet included a diversity of vessel classes ][artisanal to industrial) and a proportion under-utilised 
- the so-called "latent effort". Concems that such under-utilised effort could be activated, 
influenced demands from fishers for policies to reduce effort. 
Notable features of the Queensland east coast prawn fishery includes the wide geographical 
spread of fishing grounds from Cape York to the Queensland/New South Wales border and the 
diversity of prawn species. Together such attributes mean that prawn species are at different 
stages of maturity at different times of the year. Thus the timing of seasonal fishing closures, 
designed to maximise growth or protect spawning female prawns, needs to differ for different 
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species (biological periodicity differs) and different geographical locations (seasonal timing 
differs with latitude). Such differences dictate sequential seasonal fishing closures. Sequential 
fishing closures benefit distant fishers willing to travel (since they can target areas that are open 
to fishing following seasonal closures) and disadvantage local fishers not willing to travel (since 
they rely on local fishing grounds that are limited). The debate over whether such seasonal 
closures provide real benefits is hotly debated between those fishers, generally the larger 
operators, who travel and those fishers, generally the smaller operators who only fish locally. 
Thus policy prescriptions on effort reduction and closures provide an insight into organisational 
interactions. 
Effort Reduction 
All Australian prawn fisheries are now subject to restricted entry. As Bowen and Hancock 
(1985) observed, whether restricted entry was introduced in anticipation or in retrospect, all 
Australian prawn fisheries are also now considered subject to excessive effort. This situation 
is due to a combination of upgrading through technology adoption or inadequate boat 
replacement policies. The contradiction of the need for controlling boat replacement yet 
allowing flexibility for fishers to choose their individual vessel configuration - the need for 
containing real effort versus the necessity of allowing boat replacement - together mean there 
is a constant erosion of limits on effort. Whether unitisation based on physical vessel 
dimensions and engine power or proportional share of effort determined by catch history is the 
mechanism applied, expansion in fishing effort has continued in spite of restricted entry policies, 
prompting some economist observers to advocate replacing such input controls with output 
controls such as quota systems (Anderson, 1987). 
Several remedies have been considered. There is widespread agreement that imposing 
inefficiencies on vessels is not the most desirable method of constraining effort. However, with 
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the exception of the Northem Prawn Fishery, most fisheries have gear restrictions (total net 
headrope length, number of nets, mesh size and sweep length). In many of the smaller fisheries, 
participants have supported imposing a "twin gear only" restraint in order to place an upper 
ceiling on effort. This measure is invariably supported by owners of smaller vessels and is 
equally strongly opposed by larger vessel owners and company fleet operators. 
The other remedy now being considered is various forms of buy-back schemes. These have 
been successfully applied in the Northem Prawn fishery (NPF) and most recently in Westem 
Australia. Both these schemes have been financed by levies on remaining participants since they 
are the direct beneficiaries of such reductions. A common feature of both these fisheries are the 
relatively small fleet sizes. A buy-back scheme has been evaluated on the Queensland east coast 
by industry and government, but the comparative fleet size (941) means that the cost would be 
prohibitive in order to have a significant impact. The expectation of speculative gain also means 
that as the fleet reduces the marginal cost of removing additional units must increase, since the 
individual share of the catch increases. 
This choice of removing vessels is a more difficult one than imposing inefficiencies to try to 
stem the fleet increase in effort posed by adoption and technological advances, and has generally 
been the choice taken in managing fisherfes by control of inputs. The QFMA cannot be said to 
have been successful in containing effort in the east coast fishery. As early as 1979, the rapid 
increase in vessel numbers was seen as a cause for concem for, as Hill and Pashen (1981) 
observed: 
".... part of the present problem of the east coast prawning fleet is an inability to 
land sufficient product ... management should aim at reducing the number of 
vessels." 
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Fishers were, and still are well aware of the problem and have continued to lobby for some 
constraint. 
"I have worked an average of 140 sea working days in 1987-1989 to average a 
$200,000 gross income, hi 1990 I worked 186 days to average $200,000 gross 
income. In 1990 the extra days at sea reduced my net profit by 15%. It's like 
a dog chasing its tail." 
Interview with a Fisher, Mackay, 2.12.91 
All attempts to seriously address the issue of excess effort in the east coast fishery have been 
unsuccessful with most emphasis placed on vessel replacement schemes (purchase two, surrender 
one), buy-out of surplus vessels and compulsory retirement of vessels failing to achieve a given 
level of production (performance criteria). The latter option of compulsory retirement on the 
basis of non-performance was rejected outright by fishers during the Febmary 1991 Port 
meetings (Chapter 5) whilst the other two options have had a longer history, previously described 
in Chapter 4. 
An aspect of the Queensland east coast fleet has been the gradual migration of vessels 
northwards (Table 6.2). Caims and Townsville have seen a doubling of effort (both in 
percentage and numbers) whilst the proportion of vessels in the Brisbane (Moreton Bay) and 
Southport fleets has reduced. This phenomenon has two factors - permanent relocation of 
vessels to northem ports and introduction of new, replacement vessels. Some fishers in the 
Moreton Bay - Southport area traditionally relocate their operations to northem ports for winter. 
The fishing is marginally easier (working conditions better, prawn abundances higher), but most 
also treat it as a "busman's holiday" and take the family with them (interview, Brisbane fisher, 
1992). Some fishers with larger vessels who had traditionally migrated north for winter 
eventually decided to permanently relocate north, in the mid-1970s. One reason for this was 
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the decline in king prawn catches off the south east. The other factor in vessel location occurred 
at the time of the replacement of vessels. Fishers wishing to replace their vessel with a larger 
vessel (to upgrade) in the late 1970s/early 1980s were obliged to surrender an additional licence 
(the 2:1 licence upgrade provision) in an attempt by managers to slow effort increases in the 
fleet. The effect of this provision was that fishers wishing to upgrade, would purchase a licence 
held in abeyance (not being used), or altematively, the licence off a small (generally under-
utilised) vessel, thus removing a small vessel. In either case, the new, replacement, larger vessel 
would be located out of the port with the most lucrative catch rates, the northem ports, in order 
to service the substantial overdrafts borrowed to build the new vessel. 
Thus the 1970s-1980s witnessed both a northerly movement of effort and an overall increase 
in effort, through the amalgamation of some smaller vessels into fewer larger vessels. The 
trawling efficiency of these larger vessels was greater than the combined efficiency of the vessels 
they replaced (interviews with fishers, State Trawl Committee and agency managers), thus the 
nett efficiency of the fleet increased. 
Table 6.2 
Percentage distribution of prawn trawlers by homt 
1967-1990 
Port 
Thursday Is 
Caims 
Townsville 
Mackay 
Bowen 
Rockhampton 
Gladstone 
Bundaberg 
Maryborough 
Mooloolaba 
Brisbane 
Southport 
Total percentage 
Total numbers 
67 
0 
I 
4 
1 
I 
4 
1 
m 
3 
14 
50 
10 
lOO 
325 
70 
2 
1 
f 
1 
1 
3 
1 
f 
5 
IS 
40 
8 
100 
487 
Year 
75 80 
1 0 
13 28 
7 10 
3 3 
3 2 
i 5 
1 2 
i 5 
4 6 
7 10 
31 22 
16 7 
1 0 0 lOO 
593 1251 
; port 
85 
1 
m 
11 
4 
JM 
4 
M. 
6 
f 
10 
25 
5 
lOO 
997 
90 
0 
24 
12 
3 
2 
3 
3 
7 
5 
12 
25 
5 
lOO 
918 
Source of Data: Unpublished records held at Fisheries Administration Section, QDPI, prepared by 
O McCosker (1967-1980) and licensing records held at QFMA (1980-1990). Total 
numbers are the total numbers of boats 
218 
The politics of effort reduction are enmeshed in the distribution of effort geographically, the 
multispecies nature of the fishery and the attitudes of the fishers. 
It is important to appreciate that although the fleet has reduced in numbers since the mid 1980s 
(Figure 4.1), the total trawler-days fished has increased (Table 4.3), meaning real effort has 
increased. The Queensland fleet rapidly increased from the mid-1970s until the early 1980s. 
The nett increase was over double the fleet of 1975 (Figure 4.5). There is no doubt that many 
of these vessels were speculative investments by non-fishers looking to capital gains, but 
nevertheless the potential capacity of the east coast fleet was huge. 
This surge in fleet size in the late 1970s was driven by the development of lucrative new 
grounds for particularly Tiger Prawns (Caims northward) and Red Spot King prawns 
(Townsville). The ecology of Red Spot King prawns is such that they aggregate near reef areas 
and the adoption of satellite positioning technology meant that prawn vessels so equipped have 
been able to exploit these newer grounds. Thus newer, larger vessels, able to travel and work 
rougher weather and trawl near reef areas (Red Spot King Prawns) and seagrasses (Brown Tiger 
Prawns) gradually replaced the older, smaller vessels only able to work local traditional grounds. 
The multispecies nature of the Queenslarid east coast fishery has already been discussed. One 
aspect of this prawn species distribution is that Brown Tiger prawns and to a lesser extent. Red 
Spot King prawns are primarily exported (Glaister, 1990) whilst Eastem King and Bay prawns 
(Figure 4.8) are primarily directed towards the domestic market. Thus larger, newer capitalist 
vessels targeting the lucrative premium export market are operating from northem ports whilst 
smaller, older more artisanal vessels targeting the less lucrative domestic markets (human 
consumption, bait) are operating from southem ports. 
Thus, ports adjacent to the more recently-discovered areas have evolved larger more modem and 
mobile vessels whilst those ports adjacent to the traditional grounds have become the repositories 
for the older vessels. Thus the fleets of Caims and Townsville represent the former whilst those 
of Bundaberg and Moreton Bay the latter. There is also an inertia to change among the older, 
small scale artisanal prawn fishers in the more traditional ports. Like other artisanal fishers, 
these fishers value a lifestyle as much as the economic gains derived from prawn fishing 
(McGoodwin, 1992) and their level of effort is more subsistence than economic rationalist. Thus 
in fishing ports such as Caims, Townsville and Mooloolaba, port and berthing charges, product 
handling charges and other costs are higher as a consequence of modem marina facilities, cold 
storage and handling facilities and modem port facilities. Fishing ports such as Bundaberg, 
Scarborough and Brisbane River on the other hand are generally older, less modem with less up 
to date facilities and with marginal artisanal fishers. Fishers based at these latter ports exploit 
known, finite, limited stocks. Unless unusual environmental conditions occur, fishers can predict 
the likely productivity of an area (weight of prawns available to be caught in a season). The 
competitive urge to deploy more effective effort (adoption of technology; newer, more modem 
vessels or large nets) is not as strong as in those ports adjacent to newer, less well known 
grounds. 
A buy-back of excess effort in the east coast fishery has often been seen as a solution to the 
issue of excess effort. During port meetings with prawn fishers in October 1991, the majority 
of fishers who attended the meetings supported the investigation into a "long term low cost 
stabilisation scheme" (buy-back). In Febmary 1991, the QCFO Trawl Committee strongly 
endorsed in principle such a scheme. In April 1992, a paper outlining a draft scheme was 
circulated to all fishers in the industry magazine "TTie Queensland Fisherman". The scheme was 
essentially to be funded on a dollar-for-dollar by Govemment and an industry levy based 
proportionately on boat capacity, to purchase licences only (not vessels), and to be jointly 
managed by industry and govemment. The scheme would allow a fisher wishing to sell, to 
tender a buy-out price to a joint industry-govermnent committee, which would meet once per 
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year. The committee would then purchase the best mix of businesses as the annual levy and 
govemment contribution funding would allow, and then the scheme would lapse until the 
following year. This approach would prevent the scheme setting the market price and inflating 
values, since there was no obligation for the committee to commit any of the funds unless the 
fishing business was worth it. 
The proposal enjoyed widespread rank and file support but was rejected at the May 1992 QCFO 
State (Council meeting. Delegates from the southem branches (the highest proportion of artisanal 
fishers) considered that such a scheme would unfairly impact the smaller scale operators, since 
it would be cheaper to buy-out many small operators rather than a few larger operators. It 
would thus quickly remove small scale operators, leaving the larger operators who "... were the 
ones doing the real damage ..." (interview with fisher, Scarborough, 1992). Delegates instead 
voted to conduct a census of trawl operators and to convey these comments to the Trawl 
Committee for their further consideration. During the debate, the Brisbane (Moreton Bay) 
delegate wished it recorded that "Branch 22 (Brisbane) members are totally against any 
fisherman-funded buy-back scheme". In other words, any stmctural adjustment program (buy-
back) should be funded by govemment, since they reasoned, govemment inaction had created 
the problem in the first place. This was not new, since a resolution carried 18 to 5 at the AGM 
of the 11 October 1983 was that a: 
"Buy-back Scheme as presented in the paper be adopted to commence January 
1985". 
was also never acted upon. The politics of the then QCFO State Council, particularly the 
personalities of individual delegates, saw to that. Both the Chair (P. Conaty) and deputy (D. 
Bryan) were strongly against a buy-back. 
Interestingly, a QCFO policy proposal on 31.8.83 drafted by a Co-ordinating Committee, which 
included P. Conaty and M. Vanderheiden in its membership, unanimously moved: 
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"Because of the many diverse fishing operations that go to make up the 
Queensland fishing industry, it is considered that there is an urgent need for a 
total industry management plan as opposed to the present piecemeal apparatus and 
species entitlement systems being placed on industry by govemment. The Co-
ordinating Committee agreed in principle that (such) a management plan should 
include (among other measures) a total east coast fisheries zone, a new vessel 
replacement policy to contain effort and a voluntary buy-back scheme to reduce 
effort." 
QCFO Policy Proposal 31.8.83, Co-ordinating Cbmmittee 
Report (P. Conaty, M. Vanderheiden members). 
Conaty was a small scale prawn fisher from Moreton Bay and was also an experienced political 
operative. It is interesting that many, similarly contentious, proposals have often been raised at 
the QCFO meetings over the years, in the expectation that such proposals will fail. Any 
discussion of effort reduction for example naturally translates to also a reduction in membership 
(and revenue) for the organisation. So from the organisation's position, such proposals would 
generally be rejected (interview with fisher, Southport 1992). 
Again, interestingly, Vanderheiden voted against the plan at a subsequent meeting (12.3.84) 
because of his own Branch (Yeppoon) concems (12 March 1984). These were essentially the 
concems that a buy-back would unfairly impact small scale fishers and alter the make-up of the 
fleet (small scale versus larger vessels). 
CLOSURES 
Dichotomies are also apparent in fishers' attitudes to management which appear closely related 
to their lifestyles and self interest. Fishers with the larger, better equipped, vessels require higher 
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cash flows, and hence catch rates, to remain economically viable. They need to fish more 
regularly and on more valuable prawn aggregations than do fishers with smaller, more 
economical (less fuel, crew payments, etc) vessels. They are also usually targeting export 
markets (larger prawns). These fishers are thus more mobile, able to deplete local aggregations 
quickly, and are of the opinion that minimal restrictions to their continued economic viability 
are desirable. They support punitive boat replacement policies as desirable, seasonal and area 
closures and buy-back schemes. 
The smaller scale, older vessel fishers on the other hand are more conservative and believe that 
without the "rape and pillage" fleet of "foreign" (ie from other ports) vessels, local aggregations 
of prawns could sustain local vessels for weeks rather than days. They support more lenient boat 
replacement policies (like for like, not upgrading), do not support closures (since upon opening, 
such measures encourage a "gold msh" or pulse fishing by the "foreign", highly mobile fleet) 
and do not support buy-back schemes, since these cater to greedy fishers who have 
overcapitalised. 
"I work, on average, 160-170 nights a year mostly in range of home port and 
have no ambition to become a nomad just to avoid elimination from 
elsewhere." Interview with Fisher, Lucinda, 4.2.91. 
"As I understand it, if your vessel is lost and you want to replace it, you have to 
either buy an existing vessel, or buy an additional licence to build a "new" vessel. 
It would be hard enough losing a boat without being kicked while you are down. 
Also, if you have to buy an existing boat instead we will end up with what we 
had years ago before this boom, a fleet of old wom-out boats." 
Interview with Fisher, Victoria Point, 3.1.91. Brisbane 
"Commercial fishing is a business like any other and any overcapitalisation or 
223 
over commitment is not an industry problem but an individual one stemming from 
bad business decisions, and should not be subsidised financially or otherwise by 
others in the industry." 
Interview with Fisher, Lucinda, 4.2.91 (far north Qld). 
A major difficulty with closures and their application in management of the east coast has been 
the multispecies nature of the resource. Their impact other than protecting immature prawns, 
is to alter fishers' behaviour and the dynamics of the fishing fleet. Fishers willing to travel can 
minimise the impact of a closure regime on their individual business, by continuing to fish 
outside the closure area. Fishers unwilling or unable to travel (those with smaller, older vessels 
for example) must endure a period of non-fishing in the prawn trawl fishery, or pursue other 
types of fishing. This then is a cause of much of the resentment regarding closures. Those 
local, small scale fishers, unwilling or unable to travel, that have a closure imposed on local 
grounds say, have to endure an enforced period of non-fishing, whilst those other local fishers 
with larger vessels and able to travel, move to other prawning grounds and continue to fish 
during the closure period. Upon the closure being lifted, once the prawns are an acceptable size, 
the local area is suddenly inundated with the large (local and from other ports) vessels that have 
fished elsewhere during the closure and now share in the benefits of the closure. These include 
aggregations of large prawns that have not been subject to fishing for some time, so that good 
catches are anticipated. A "gold msh" thus ensues. Such resentment generated the "9y2 
month/12 month licence" proposal. A special State Council meeting of the QCFO was convened 
on 25 July 1986 to discuss the concept. 
Briefly, individual fishers would nominate whether they would opt for a 9y2 month licence 
(observe the closure, tie up the boat and not fish during the closure) or a 12 month licence 
(continue to fish the rest of the coast during the closure period). For those opting for the 12 
month licence, they would be barred from fishing in the closed area once it was opened for 
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fishing for a further two and a half months. The QFMA had difficulties with the practicalities 
of how such a scheme could operate - for example, how a vessel could be bought or sold during 
the interim, whether possession of nets or product would be an offence for fishers who opted for 
the 9Vi month licence and how such a scheme could be enforced. 
The QCFO was split on so called "area management" (9Vi/12 month concept) since it was 
viewed by many as a first step to zoning the east coast fishery. Branches 1 to 10, 19 and 23 
(Kammba to Mackay, Mooloolaba and Wynnum) supported the concept and Branches 11 to 17, 
20, 21, 22, 24 and 25 (Yeppoon to Tin Can Bay, most of the metropolitan Brisbane Branches) 
were against it. Tewantin and Golf Coast abstained. Such a polarisation of opinion on this issue 
on a north-south basis, reflects the new/old, large/small traveller/localised composition of the 
east coast fishery and more especially, the petite bourgeoisie-capitalist divide. 
OUTCOMES OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Even though the issues of the continuing increase in fishing effort (numbers of larger vessels, 
technological efficiency increases, the finite nature of recognised fishing grounds) and the effects 
of closures have been recognised as significant challenges since at least 1979 (Hill and Pashen, 
1981), management action to limit or rediice effort and to dampen "pulse" fishing effort has still 
not eventuated. The increase in effort has continued through technological creep, fishing effort 
(number of trawler days fished - Table 4.3) continues to increase and alarmingly, the catch per 
trawler day (a measure of prawn abundance) is declining (Table 4.3). The total effort now in 
the fishery is far greater than is currently needed to take the existing catch. It is unlikely that 
any new grounds remain undiscovered, thus, unless increasing prices match increasing costs, the 
economic performance for each fisher is likely to deteriorate. 
Since 1991, the QFMA has made a number of attempts to address the issue of excess effort in 
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the east coast prawn fishery. The Discussion Paper (Febmary 1991) was followed by the 
Situation Analysis (October 1991) and subsequently the Framework for Management (1992). 
All these documents advocated the status quo or were rejected by industry (Febmary 1991). The 
status quo was again codified in a second draft management plan in 1993-94. In 1994-95, a 
new Management Advisory Committee was established and it has now circulated a new 
Discussion Paper together with management options to be then produced as a draft management 
plan. 
The closure regime was originally introduced to a section of the north coast in order to protect 
sub adult brown tiger prawns from being prematurely caught. This was to cater for an export 
market then demanding a larger class of prawns. With the area now also producing other prawn 
species and with the export demands less stringent, the rationale for the closure regime has 
changed. The localised impacts of closures - primarily when seasonal closures are relaxed and 
a "pulse" of usually non-local vessels from distant ports descends upon the previously closed 
area - need examination. A further concem is that of the fishers who do not comply with the 
closure and deliberately cheat. Is the "pain" of temporarily or seasonally shutting and area to 
fishing activity rewarded by the "gain" of greater catches or more valuable product? Computer 
simulation (Die and Watson, 1992) evaluation of the dissipation of closure benefits as a result 
of non-compliance (cheating) showed that the effects of cheating are substantial and quickly 
erode the benefits from imposing the closure. They showed that the imposition of a closure 
could be more beneficial to those fishers who did not comply with the regulation (cheats), thus, 
increasing potential conflicts between cheats and non-cheats. 
In a policy sense, the management of the east coast prawn fishery is in a time warp. Nothing 
essentially has changed since 1986. The basic problem seems to be attempting to manage a suite 
of geographically widely-distributed multispecies, multimethod fisheries, servicing a range of 
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markets, as a single complex entity. Mutually-exclusive management options which, regionally 
make sense, cannot be translated across the entity. Natural ecological species distributions (eco 
tones) could be defined which would allow the definition of separate fisheries, which would be 
amenable to co-management. That is, have the existing level of consultation focussed 
regionally. The difficulty of course is residual property rights, historical mobility and resistance 
to change by participants. 
In interviewing fishers, managers and other players in this industry, it is apparent that 
management issues are not simple nor trivial. The social stmcture of prawn fisher communities 
in, say, Scarborough or Yeppoon are fundamentally different to those in Townsville or Caims. 
The fishers have different values, opinion, needs and agendas. 
In its most simple form, the fishery could be conceptualised as a number of separate but 
symbiotic markets within a political and social framework. In other words, there could be a 
coexistence of marginal artisanal subsistence prawn fishing as well as catching larger prawns for 
domestic and intemational markets. An extension of this model is that of neo-classical 
economic theory of labour market segmentation. Basically this recognises that labour is not an 
homogenised commodity, that workers differ in their tastes and preferences for leisure rather than 
work and for monetary rather than non-nionetary rewards and that they differ in human capital 
(education and training, work skills and experience). 
Nevertheless, in examining management issues of immediate concem to fishers such as closures 
to fishing, a number of variables emerged. Local agendas (the "Not in my backyard" syndrome) 
were very much to the fore when local impacts (pulse fishing) occurred. Closed areas allowed 
prawn aggregations to occur and anticipated higher catch rates attracted greater than normal 
fishing effort on those aggregations when the closures were eased (the "pulse" effect). Fishers 
could thus see the benefits of closures dissipated by incursions of "foreign" (non-local) vessels 
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and the local depletion of stocks. 
Fishers' fishing behaviours could also adopt to maximise opportunities presented by closure 
regimes. Purchasing fishing rights (endorsements) in fisheries with different seasonal closure 
regimes (Gulf, Torres Strait and East Coast) has enabled those fishers to sequentially fish prawn 
aggregations as closures are opened. Thus fishers with only a single endorsement complain that 
multi-endorsed fishers hit the high catch rate periods in each fishery by judicious planning of 
fishing trips. 
Of longer term concem to many fishers is the increase in effort through technology creep - in 
other words the increasing efficiency of the fleet resulting from the adoption of technological 
advances (satellite positioning systems, fishing gear, propulsion). This was widely viewed as 
insidious, since it was gradual, not highly visible, incremental and compulsive. Even though 
efficiency increases are recognised by the fishers, managers and scientists, the lack of clear 
policy direction has resulted in paralysis. 
Lifestyle and economic incentives have also caused a significant northwards migration of fishers 
and their families. Small, marginal fishing units, replaced by larger vessels and concomitant 
financial liabilities (bank loans), has generated a need for greater cash flows. As northem 
grounds in the mid 1970s expanded, the exodus of vessels from southem ports accelerated. The 
fleet composition (15% larger, increased efficiency) and levels of debt (increased borrowings) 
have changed dramatically in the past twenty years. We have seen in this chapter how prawn 
fisher vessel ownership pattems vary between the Australian prawn fisheries. In Queensland, 
the trend towards larger vessels has caused an increase in the amount of speculative capital 
investment (speculators versus ovmer operators), but more significantly, higher levels of debt in 
the northem ports of Tov^msville and Caims. it is unlikely that further unfished Queensland 
prawning grounds remain to be discovered. Thus unless prices continue to rapidly increase. 
228 
which seems unlikely given the increasing levels of aquaculture production, limits to the fishery 
have been reached. 
The 2:1 boat replacement policy will continue to be challenged as the fleet continues to age. 
Fishers wish to replace aging vessels with modem vessels for safety and insurance purposes 
(most insurance brokers will not insure vessels over 20 years old or, if they will, the premiums 
are prohibitive). They also wish to increase their individual share of the catch by adopting new 
technology and fishing with greater efficiency. Given the now limited and finite nature of the 
prawn resources, effort needs to reduce if fishers are not to become financially unviable through 
incrementalism, in effect, participating in a zero sum game. 
In any fishery managed through constraining inputs such as numbers of vessels, amount of gear 
or time spent fishing, advances in technology which allow effective effort to increase through 
improved efficiency, will always be difficult to regulate. In the case of the east coast prawn 
trawl fishery, such a paradox has long been recognised by all players. 
"State Council generally supports the freeze on building otter trawl vessels to be 
placed in the Queensland prawn fishing industry but considers some workable 
replacement scheme must be introduced for the up-grading of existing vessels and 
to allow genuine future master fishermen to obtain a vessel to work in the prawn 
fishery." 18th meeting. State Council, 5.12.79, Res. 18.7.3. 
"To provide for the control of effort in the trawl fishery in Queensland waters 
throughout the State by the limitation of vessels operating in this fishery in area, 
numbers and physical dimensions. 
QFMA Corporate Plan, 25.11.82 
Industry in particular has seen the problem of increasing effort in a fully exploited fishery, but 
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has been unable to address it. 
"Forget the fisherman trying to manage the fishery, forget the QCFO. They have 
proved without a doubt they cannot manage themselves time for the QFMA to 
introduce its own policies." 
Anonymous, Southport, 28.9.91. 
"Management: day late, dollar short." 
Anonymous, Southport, 28.9.91. 
A Committee of fishers (QCFO), managers (QFMA) and scientists (QDPI) formed to address 
the problem (east coast management working group) in 1985 could also offer only a restatement 
of the status quo. 
"It was resolved: that a primary objective of management must be to allocate 
a de facto property right (entitlement) for all primary fishing vessels in 
Queensland, while maintaining the right of the fisherman to be involved in and 
to work in as many fisheries as he chooses." 
: "that management must permit every fisherman to continue all of his present 
bona fide fishing activities, but that it must preclude speculation in entitlements." 
I "That there must be a change of emphasis from the management of fishing 
activities of people (master fishermen) to the intimate management of apparatus; 
to allow a relaxation of criteria applying to holding a master fisherman's licence -
without allowing any blow-out in numbers or effort in the short term." 
QCFO East Coast Management Working Group 
4.2.85. 
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Why the paralysis in policy development? What is the problem and why cannot a solution 
emerge? We have already seen that the problem(s) is first a multispecies target - so that 
measures designed to optimise the catch of a particular species may have suboptimal effects on 
the catch of another. Second, that such measures can alter fisher behaviour - closures cause 
pulse fishing. Third, that management policies allowed a rapid increase in the size of the fleet 
in the early 1980s that still exists. Fourth, that policies have allowed upgrades (small vessels 
tumed into larger vessels without penalty). Fifth, that there are two extremes of classes of prawn 
fisher - artisanal and capitalist/exporter - with the trend towards capitalisation. The solution 
is not clear, but it does require decisions to limit and reduce effort in the fishery. Obviously 
such a solution requires agreement with the major players. It is appropriate, therefore, to now 
look at the fishery managers and the fishers themselves. 
The Managers 
"The (QFMA) Authority cannot be all things to all men, therefore, in certain areas 
decisions which support the majority must be taken which in effect means 
someone else may be disadvantaged. I am certain that the Authority will be 
subject to individual and group pressure and even political pressure from time to 
time. So long as our decisions are soundly based and effectively researched, we 
should be able to withstand any criticism." 
D Mitchell, First meeting QFMA 7.12.82, QFMA Minutes. 
Such was the Chafr's mtroduction to the Board of the first QFMA meeting. What he was 
alluding to was that with such a diverse Board, that it would be unlikely that hard decisions 
would be unanimous. From its inception in 1982 through to 1994, the QFMA Board was 
representatively-based, with the fishing industry dominant (catchers, processors, wholesalers and 
marketers). With such interest groups also making policy, it is not surprising status quo 
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maintained. In other words, the catching sector (fishers) would not volunteer to reduce their own 
numbers, processors also would not willingly see the numbers of fishers reduced, since they 
would have fewer sources of prawns for their facilities, wholesalers would be of the same view 
as the processors and marketers ditto. In 1994, the representatively-based Board was replaced 
by an expertise-based Board. It was recognised that a representatively-based Board had 
difficulties in making hard decisions because members of the Board were facing conflicts of 
interest, for the reasons mentioned above. It was thought by govenmient that an expertise-based 
Board would be independent and not driven by such conflicts of interest. The new Board 
immediately established Management Advisory Committees (MAC^) with all user groups 
represented on these bodies, with the responsibility of producing management plans. 
The QFMA is still responsible to the Minister who also takes policy advice from the QDPI. The 
juxtaposition of the QFMA and QDPI has meant that the Minister can get conflicting advice. 
The involvement of the QDPI in fisheries management is an anachronism of the 1970-1985 
period, actively assisted by the then QCFO, who wished to get a "good" minister by linking 
fisheries and agriculture. 
"Discussion took place on the matter of lobbying for a separate Minister for 
Fisheries. Mr R Siebenhausen (a'delegate from Branch 20) stated that it would 
be disadvantageous for the Organisation to press for a separate Minister at this 
stage. It was suggested that this matter should be left in abeyance as it was a 
priority aim of the Organisation to transfer (responsibility for fisheries) to QDPI 
and if this was achieved then Mr Vic Sullivan would then be Minister in charge 
of Fisheries. It was agreed that rather than press for a separate Minister for 
Fisheries at this stage it would be better to wait and see what will happen in the 
near future." 
Extraordinary Conference QCFO, 19.6.80. 
232 
The formation of a management authority was followed by the Govemment establishing a 
parallel fisheries management branch within QDPI, the beginnings of the dichotomy in fisheries 
management in Queensland. 
"The new (Fisheries Management) Branch will assist fishermen and the Fish 
Management Authority (QFMA) in determining and monitoring fish resources, 
examining the economics of various fish management practices and be involved 
in collection and analysis of fisheries data." 
Minister Tumer, announcing the setting up of the FMB, 
QDPI at State Council, 26.7.84. 
In practice, the setting up of a parallel source of Ministerial management advice ensured 
duplication and "turf wars", with much confusion as to roles and responsibilities between the 
two. The QFMA had the close connection to the industry through the consultation process and 
Board stmcture, whilst the QDPI group had the research backing of its scientific group and was 
less "captured" than the QFMA staff. 
Another major change was in the leadership of the QFMA. Up until 1994, the Chair was filled 
by QDPI bureaucrats. In 1995, this cusfom changed, with the new Chair not a former QDPI 
staffer, but appointed from the Minister's Office. This effectively broke the umbilical cord to 
the QDPI, (though since re-established in 1995). 
The influence of the QDPI has been strong, with management techniques commonly applied in 
agriculture (quotas) being transferred to fisheries. For example, the impetus for unitisation of 
the fishing fleet was prompted by the QDPI experience with hen quotas in attempting to 
restmcture the egg production industry (11th Meeting, QFMA, 8 December 1983). 
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"I could probably sum up the National Party's present approach to the fishing 
industry by referring to the way in which the industry is being administered. It 
is tied up in with the Division of Dairying in the Department of Primary 
Industries. That is typical of the thinking of the cow-cocky Govemment in 
Queensland." 
Mr E Casey (ALP Mackay) FI & MA Amendment Bill 
Second Reading Speech, 8.3.84. 
Such influence is not surprising, given thirty years of unintermpted conservative govemment in 
Queensland, and its strong, mral, political base. The fishing industry (itself strongly 
conservative), could also see political advantages in a close connection with an important mral 
portfolio such as Primary Industry. In discussions with managers, the overwhelming sense is that 
of the political - that management policy could not advocate radical departure from the status 
quo. It is ironic that managers and fishers can agree that control and reduction of effort is the 
central issue and also that there are no easy answers. Any policy that reduces effort in the 
fishery will cause pain. The conflict of interests among Board members and the QDPI culture 
of mral extension service and assistance to the mral sector ensured that no radical change 
occurred. Thus a strong culture of status quo was maintained. 
The Fishers 
The QCFO, the formal organisation of commercial fishers, has had a tumultuous history with 
periodic shifts from regionally-based to locally-based (Branch) stmctures. With membership 
fees compulsorily collected (in conjunction with fishing licences) by the QFMA on behalf of the 
QCFO, the Organisation has a guaranteed funding base. 
"Similar representations have been made to back bench MPs and I know the issue 
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is to be raised at a meeting of the joint Govemment parties next month wherein 
submissions will be made that in future years, membership of the QCFO should 
be on a voluntary basis only." 
Minister Hooper, addressing reconvened 4th Annual Conference 
QCFO, 26.2.80, on issue of compulsory levy QCFO. 
The QCFO is a very effective lobbyist for Queensland commercial fishing interests but an 
ineffective body to progress management policy change. It is effective because it has a strong 
regionally-based, hierarchal stmcture and compulsory membership (collected by the QFMA, by 
legislation). Thus like all strong Trade Unions, has a collective power in negotiations. Also, 
like Trade Unions or other agrarian association, the hierarchal stmcture ensures decision making 
is slow and rarely other than unanimous. Policy formulation can thus be a tortuous affair and 
usually incremental in progress. 
Branch membership, as with any Association or Trade Union, is central to the strength of the 
QCFO. Each Branch elects delegates to State Council (the decision-making body) and the 
fishery committees, (including the State Trawl Committee), the bodies where industry policy 
options are developed. In the case of prawn trawl, each of the 26 Branches thus has a voice at 
State Council and the Trawl Committee., In 1994, 22 of the 26 Branch chairs and 23 of the 26 
State Councillors were prawn fishers or retired prawn fishers (Aimual Report QCFO State 
Council, 1994). Thus, prawn fishers are the major power bloc within the QCFO. 
The Branch stmcture is both its strength and its weakness. Branch boundaries were originally 
established on the basis of approximately equal numbers of fishers (not just prawn fishers), but 
migration of fishers (particularly northward) has caused marked changes in demographics (Table 
6.3). Marked differences in the size of Branches means that small Branches can have a 
disproportionate influence on QCFO. ' 
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Table 63 
Branch Membership of the QCFO (all fishers) i n 1994. 
Percentage is the percentage of Queensland members in that 
port Source: QCFO Annual Report. 
Port 
Kammba 
Weipa/Thursday Is. 
Port Douglas 
Caims 
Innisfail 
Lucinda 
Townsville 
Burdekin 
Bowen 
Mackay 
Yeppoon 
Rockhampton 
Gladstone 
Bundaberg 
Urangan 
Maryborough 
Tin Can Bay 
Tewantin 
Mooloolaba 
Scarborough * 
Sandgate * 
Brisbane * 
Wynnum * 
Redlands * 
Jumpinpin 
Gold Coast 
Total Membership 
* Denotes metropoli 
Branch 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
an Brisbane E 
Membership 
117 
18 
68 
289 
95 
48 
154 
33 
74 
167 
85 
49 
134 
212 
97 
50 
68 
51 
194 
214 
53 
115 
50 
72 
36 
149 
2639 
branches 
Percentage 
1994 
4 4 
0.7 
2.6 
11.0 
3.6 
1.8 
5.8 
1.3 
2.8 
6.3 
3.2 
1.9 
5.1 
8.0 
3.7 
1.9 
2.6 
1.9 
7 4 
8.1 
2.0 
4 4 
1.9 
2.7 
14 
5.6 
100 
1 
"The northem branches have brought all this trouble (pulse of effort) on 
themselves by continually calling for zones since many southem fishermen have 
since gone north to establish prior rights (a history of participation in anticipation 
of zoning)." 
Branch 14 (Bundaberg) State Council 23.4.86 Minutes. 
"We favour zoning because we are outnumbered in State Council, we cannot get 
anything through to benefit us." 
Interview with Fisher, Lucinda (6), AGM 11.10.83. 
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"... the QCFO's representative stmcture, it is almost impossible to achieve 
management laws that are relevant to local areas. There are seven Northem 
branches from Bowen to Port Douglas, that have had all their management plans 
gerrymandered by 17 Southem branches." 
Interview with Fisher, Townsville, 3.4.91. 
"That State Council support Port Douglas Branch resolution to change the State 
Council policy on zoning." (ie. current policy states no zoning other than 
Moreton Bay). 
State council, 19 June 1985 
For: 1,3,6,7,8,9,11,12 Branches 
Against: 2,4,5,10,13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 
20,21,22,23,24,25,26 Branches 
This was an interesting vote, given results of port meetings in 1991 (Table 5.16). The QCFO 
has a long-held aversion to "... further subdivision of the Queensland east coast..." (State Trawl 
Committee minutes, 5 April 1991). The Branch councillors supporting a change to the policy 
(ie. to allow the zoning of the coast were roughly divided (although not totally) on a northem 
versus southem Branches basis. This outcome was not exactly repeated at the October 1991 
series of port meetings, where the rank and file expressed individual views. Thus it can be that 
councillors may sometimes push an agenda that is at odds with their Branch view. Members of 
course have the ability to change their councillors at the time of the next Branch election or by 
other democratic means. Such variability is apparent comparing this vote of councillors with 
rank and file wishes expressed at the 1991 port meetings (Table 5.16, Caims vote - Branch 4). 
A problem with the Branch stmcture and the diverse representation of numbers of prawn fishers 
along the coast, is that delegates (councillors) can vote as a bloc (see for example the zoning 
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question above), on issues of limited or no impact to their own particular regional area, thus 
fishers from areas that are impacted, feel that political opportunism and not sound policy, may 
be directing the agenda. 
The effect of this disproportionate influence has been that fishers fishing separate stocks of 
separate species geographically remote from proposed closures are able to veto policy proposals 
of an immediate importance regionally. Additionally, because Branch delegates to State Council 
are invariably re-elected if they desire the job (most fishers are not prepared to invest the time 
in representational duties), the same personalities persist around the State Council table. For 
example, many State Council Branch delegates have held continuous office since the late 1970s. 
As with any group dynamics, individual personalities play a big part in the how effective an 
organisation can be. Alliances and feuds at State Council thus had the potential to be deep 
seated and of long duration. 
"Most commercial fishermen are pretty direct and don't go much on being subtle. 
You see, daily decisions can be life or death and once you make them, you stand 
by them." 
Interview with Fisher, Maryborough (central Qld), 1987 
on negotiating with industry. 
Trying to reach consensus on issues of direct economic impact between diverse and divergent 
interests has thus been nearly impossible and again explains the reluctance to move from the 
status quo. 
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The Politics 
How do you identify what it is that determines the choices that individuals make and how they 
should be interpreted? The application of cost-benefit analysis has been used by some to 
account for all benefits incurred or accmed to individuals as a result of a public choice to adopt 
a particular policy (Culyer, 1974). However, the dangers in that approach occur when cost-
benefit analysts estimate "subjectively-valued but objectively immeasurable entities," so that the 
whole analysis converts from "... one that can claim potential agreement among competent 
scientists, to one that is purely subjective, not to the actual decision makers but to the economist 
who offers his normative advice," (Buchanan, 1969). 
Policy makers attempting to use the cost-benefit approach are faced with the question of which 
individuals and which of their preferred objects of choice (including extemalities) they need to 
consider. The value judgements of the policy maker then become important, as does the degree 
of pragmatism that he/she may choose to adopt. The more pragmatic, the more likely of 
excluding socially important values. 
Of course this presupposes that the policy maker has a knowledge of the stmcture and values 
of the policy system such that altemativb policies can be evaluated before and after they are 
decided upon. This has been the attraction of superimposing economic theory into the inner 
workings of political decision making. As Wildavsky (1966) has observed: 
"Political rationality is the fundamental kind of reason because it deals with the 
preservation and improvement of decision stmctures ... the political problem is 
always basic and prior to the others ... a course of action which corrects some 
economic or social deficiencies, but increases political difficulties must be 
rejected." (Pg.307) 
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So what approach should be applied in the case of policy making in the Queensland east coast 
prawn fishery? Should policy decisions be made by a pre-informed, calculated, synoptic 
judgement, or be the outcome of a bargaining skirmish between vested interests in partisan 
groups in a pluralistic system (Wildavski, 1966)? 
It is hard to deny that Queensland pravra fishery management policy has remained essentially 
unchanged since 1986. Participants (prawn fishers, managers, scientists) are agreed that excess 
effort, the potential for undemtilised (latent) effort to become active and the incrementalism of 
technological change, together mean that management policy must address the issue of 
containing and reducing real fishing effort. The diversity of the fishery (petite bourgeoisie 
versus capitalist attitudes, the multispecies nature of the resource and the complexity of industry 
and govemment policy development) continue to subvert progress. 
DISCUSSION 
The organisational complexity of fisheries management in Queensland - govemment and 
industry - contributes to policy development and decision making being incremental and largely 
responsible for paralysis in policy making in the Queensland east coast prawn fishery. Holm 
(1995) has argued that bureaucracies can be efficient solutions to predefined problems, whereas 
the new institutionalists consider them to be social constmct, mle systems (Jepperson, 1991) and 
examples of non-govemed behaviour. 
Hohn (1995) has argued that when groups of independent, rational, individuals act independently 
and in thek own interests, then the outcome is an example of the "prisoners' dilemma"; that is, 
the best option for each individual produces a suboptimal solution for the group as a whole. It 
is likely that govemment and industry organisations are currently producing a suboptimal 
solution. It has been argued (Zucker, 1988) that the stability of organisations increase with their 
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interconnectedness to other organisations. Those affected by an organisation will be committed 
to it by the resources they have invested in its reproduction (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). 
Changing this culture (and interest groups) would require organisational change and a 
redistribution of income, power and status. 
It is relevant in examining the evolution of fisheries management in Queensland, to reflect on 
the role played by marketing and the Queensland Fish Board. The QFB was established in a 
period when seafood gluts (mullet in particular) had fishers and marketers in conflict. Between 
1950 and 1970, the QFB was institutionalised and remained a taken-for-granted part of the 
Queensland industry. Then, during the late 1970s and 1980s the QFB declined. Major changes 
to the catching sector including the discovery of prawn resources, mechanisation and adoption 
of new technology, development of transportation and market globalisation all combined to make 
the industry more efficient but also less flexible. This was particularly apparent as the prawn 
fishery tied up new capital and diverted interest from altemative fisheries. 
Fishers who previously had been price takers, willing to accept the equivalent of 10 cents per 
kilo for mullet, suddenly found themselves able to target lucrative export markets with prawns. 
This period also coincided with the catching sector organising. Thus whilst the origins of the 
QFB were an answer to the market crisis^ the process by which it flourished and then declined 
was formed through organisational forces, particularly the QCFO. The changes to the QFB were 
also perceived along basic ideological lines of the Queensland polity: the conservative Nationals 
seeking to protect primary producers, prop up the QFB and maintain the status quo; the 
opposition Labor politicians seeking the reform of the QFB. The crisis in the fishing industry 
thus became channelled through the political system and redefined during the process. 
Interestingly, parallel events occurred during the same period in the intemational arena, including 
Norway (Holm, 1995), Newfoundland (Alexander, 1977), Iceland (Jonsson, 1980) and the Faroe 
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Islands (Toftum, 1994). In all these countries, impacts of intemational recession had encouraged 
the involvement of the state in orderly marketing of fish because of a loss of faith of the free 
market solutions (Holm, 1995). As with the QFB experience, the fishers in these countries 
subverted govemment policy. In the case of Norway, for example, the so-called Main 
Agreement signed by the Govemment and sector interests in 1964, regulated the conditions for 
state subsidies to the fishing industry. The main aim of the scheme was for fishing industry 
stmctural rationalisation with investment support and buy-back programs as the main 
instmments. During the period 1964-1990, the subsidies escalated to about 20 per cent of the 
value of the annual catch, of which most (80 per cent) went to income support. Thus the effect 
was basically to act as an economic safety net, buffering fishers from resource and market 
fluctuations (Holm, 1991). The same argument could be made about the Commonwealth boat 
building subsidy operated by the Australian federal govemment in the Gulf of Carpentaria fishery 
(QCFO newsletter, Febmary 1982). In this scheme, the Commonwealth Govemment attempted 
to protect the ship-building industry by offering to subsidise by 27.5% the costs of the 
constmction of vessels over 150 tons or 21m in length (Anon. 1982). The effect on the prawning 
industry was to distort pattems of investment by attracting capital and to encourage vessel 
replacement. For large companies, the subsidy virtually allowed a "free" vessel for every four 
built and caused a flow-on problem for fisheries where the replaced vessels were relocated. 
> 
The thmst for reform of markets and marketing in the fishing industry also coincided with a new 
ideological climate. In the 1980s liberalist ideas gained currency in many Westem nations. 
Deregulation and privatisation of public assets were at the centre of the "New Right", the 
economic rationalist school. They believed that the state should withdraw and let market forces 
work (Marchak, 1991). The fishing industry - with subsidies, legislative protection against 
competition and orderly marketing - was an obvious target. In Australia, the movement was 
focussed through the Hawke federal Labor Govemment's 1989 fisheries policy paper, "New 
Directions" (Kerin, 1989), a fisheries prescriptive approach with economic efficiency as its 
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comerstone. The policy argued that commercial fishers had been given exclusive use of a 
common property resource, that the main objective of sustainable management should be to 
maximise economic efficiency in the fishery and that resulting excess profits (economic rents) 
should be retumed to the community. Essentially, the policy provided the implementation of 
Garrett Hardin's (1969) "Tragedy of the Commons" argument. 
Hardin (1968) forecast the inevitability that rational fishers, exploiting "common property" 
resources, would be tom between individual and collective interests. Since each fisher gains the 
full value of the fish they catch, there is no incentive to save a fish for tomorrow or next year, 
since a competing fisher may catch it. By themselves, rational fishers are therefore compelled 
to increase their effort whilst there are fish to be caught even though they know that such action 
may deplete the stock. Thus Hardin (1968) argues that the system itself must be changed 
through privatisation of common property. 
Proponents of the Hardin view and privatisation, believe that the "tragedy of the commons" will 
be averted if "commons" is converted to "private ownership", a "Rousseauesque" view that 
somehow such ownership will transform exploiting, self-interested individuals into a conserving, 
public-spirited group acting in the interests of society (Feeny et al. 1990). In the case of prawn 
fisheries, prawn fishers are motivated by Catching prawns for money and the competitive desire 
to catch the pravras before another fisher does. Attitudes vary with individual positions in the 
class position spectmm - capitalism to petite bourgeoisie. It can be argued that the allocation 
of a property right and the exclusiveness of that right, can shape the class relations mix of prawn 
fishers. An example is the early or late implementation of a limited entry policy - a "half-way 
house" in the govemment intervention - full property right continuum (McGoodwin, 1990). 
The development of a pravra fishery in Queensland radically altered the organisational ecology 
of fisheries management in that State. The change from regulated (Queensland Fish Board) to 
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deregulated markets (accelerated by the change from marketing mullet to prawns, or low 
value/high volume to high value/lower volume), the split in govemment regulatory responsibility 
between the QDPI and the QFMA and the establishment of the QCFO have all occurred in these 
cmcial twenty-five years. 
A catalyst to this development has been the economic globalisation of the prawn fishery via 
export markets, transportation, financial deregulation and intemational commerce. Capitalist 
fishers have survived and benefited from such change, whilst the smaller operator, the classic 
petite bourgeoisie, largely has not. 
It is those tensions between the extremes of the prawn fishery class spectmm and the resultant 
differences in attitude to management policy, together with a lack of organisational leadership 
in govemment, which has paralysed policy development and implementation in the Queensland 
east coast prawn fishery. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PRAWNERS, PRAWNING AND POLICIES 
Introduction 
This is a study of prawn fishers, their occupation and the regulation of that occupation. The 
genesis of the study has been a desire to retrospectively examine the effectiveness of prawn 
fishery management policies and whether they have been successful. The approach has been to 
contrast management of Australian prawn fisheries and to examine the management of the 
Queensland east coast prawn fishery in particular. 
The study contrasted the nature of prawn fishers with policies (nationally), so as to appreciate 
the general, and then examined values held by prawn fishers in Queensland, so as to appreciate 
the specific. The nature of the fishery (people, vessels, prawns, markets) was dissected to expose 
the issues that have given rise to these values and policies were then examined in the light of 
"organisational ecology", that is how such organisations interact with fishers and develop 
policies. 
It is widely accepted that the fundamental purpose of fisheries management is to ensure 
sustainable production over time from fish stocks through regulatory actions (policies) that 
promote economic and social well-being of fishers and industries that use the production 
(Hilbom and Walters, 1992). To achieve this purpose, management authorities must identify and 
then justify politically, and enforce, a suite of restraints on fishing activity. The choice as to 
appropriate management policies is made first on biological sustainability grounds and then on 
social, economic and political grounds. 
In practical terms, social issues and political concems shape many policy decisions with 
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economic and biological objectives given secondary billing. Thus, successful management must 
include addressing social issues and political concems, as well as biological sustainability. The 
economic efficiency objective is much in evidence in management plans, but there are few 
examples of explicit policy initiatives. 
Australian fisheries management has been greatly influenced by the United Nations Law of the 
Sea discussions in 1982, and the declaration of world-wide 200 nautical mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) has been instmmental in the federal govemment assuming overall 
management responsibility for Australia's EEZ. Our constitution, and the federation of 
Australian States system of govemance, has generated intense debate over jurisdiction of aquatic 
resources between the federal and state govemments. This has culminated in the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement, an agreement between the federal and state govemments that, wherever 
possible, fisheries resources should be managed by a single jurisdiction, federal or state (Smith, 
1997). In the case of Queensland, the east coast prawn fishery jurisdiction lies with the 
Queensland Govermnent. 
The state of world fisheries resources is precarious (Garcia and Grainger, 1997). Biological 
advice has been ignored and fisheries have collapsed, for example, Pemvian anchovetta and 
North Sea Herring (Hilbom and Walters,' 1992); the world fishing fleet currently has a global 
overcapacity of 40%, resulting in an estimated economic waste of $US 54 billion (Garcia and 
Grainger, 1997) and governments and society are starting to question what has gone wrong. 
Now, as never before, world fisheries management policies, and their underpinning paradigms, 
are under scmtiny. 
The state of Australian fisheries resources is generally better, but failures have also occurred, 
with eastem gemfish and southem shark being recent examples. As with the rest of the world, 
ownership of resources and exploitation levels have been major elements of debate between 
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govemments and fishers. Decisions on ownership, it has been shown, may influence class 
position among fishers and such class position may also be reflected, in tum, to attitudes towards 
other management policy. 
Fishing is an economic activity, and vessel ownership may be viewed in the Marxist sense of 
ownership of the "means of production". Fishing is also both an economic occupation, and a 
social class in the Weberian sense, and this study sought to define whether the social class of 
fishers may have been influenced by policy decisions that had codified property rights with 
subsequent capital penetration. 
Early definition of property ownership in two Australian prawn fisheries has influenced the class 
position of prawn fishers. In those prawn fisheries subject to immediate limitation on further 
entry, the right to fish has been quickly capitalised, as evidenced by the higher proportion of 
wage labour. Thus in Westem Ausfralian and South Australian fleets, vessel ownership is more 
aggregated than in Queensland and New South Wales. Certainly some differences could also 
be expected as a consequence of differences in geography. For example, the remoteness of 
prawn fishing grounds in Westem Australia and to a lesser extent, Queensland, would explain 
the hours worked, housing ownership, gender and level of training, compared to fishers in New 
South Wales and South Australia, who gbnerally fish close to their home ports. 
However, other differences - age distribution, employment, family stmcture, ethnicity and 
income probably do reflect real societal differences mfluenced by policy, since such policy 
decisions have shaped the ownership stmcture of prawn fishing fleets and ultimately capital. The 
social class that is prawn fishers generally, are the petite bourgeoisie, since they comprise 
independent commodity producers who use their own, limited capital, to buy or establish a prawn 
fishing business, and then apply their own labour to catch prawns. Like capitalists, they own 
and control the means of production (though the "capital" is limited). Like the working class. 
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they use their own labour (though they may also employ others). Generally, negligible surplus 
value is extracted from employees - the generally accepted pathway for "tme" capitalism. 
In the case of prawn fishers, policy decisions at the commencement of the fishery in each state, 
set the value of the right to harvest prawns, and thus potential capital (fixed-vessels, gear; and 
circulating-prawns, profits). The absence of fully developed capitalism in fishing (ie. major 
employers) is partly due to it being a part of the capitalist economy that is not conducive to 
wage labour. This is due to the means of production (prawn fleets) and the means of circulation 
(prawn markets) not being easily controlled by capitalists. In the Gulf of Carpentaria prawn 
fishery, however, production has become regulated by seasonal closures and circulation 
controlled by company ownership of limited processing and export market facilities. Fully 
developed capitalism through aggregation of production capability (fleets) and markets 
(processing) has occurred in this fishery. 
In the case of the Queensland east coast prawn fishery, the seasonal closure regime allows 
fishing to continue on parts of the coast, and so production is not completely regulated. 
Similarly, overall, marketing is diversified and fragmented (Glaister, 1990; Elmer, 1992), whilst 
ownership of the means of production is largely dispersed across the operators, with little 
evidence of aggregation by capitalist cortpany concerns. Thus, unlike the Gulf of Carpentaria 
pravra fishery, the Queensland east coast prawn fishery would not seem to be following the Gulf 
of Carpentaria, with regard to capital penetration. 
However, as has been demonstrated, the Queensland east coast prawn fishery is an amalgam of 
smaller, discrete "fisheries", pursued by diverse fleets, supplying district markets. A point that 
is further developed below. 
However, many prawn fisheries have continued in diverse ownership since catches (and hence 
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circulating capital) have shown dramatic annual variation largely driven by environmental events 
linked to ENSO (El Nino - Southem Oscillation), the major weather-generating phenomenon 
in the southem hemisphere. Banana prawn fluctuations are the best example, as was seen in 
Figure 4.2. 
When considering Queensland prawn fishers and fishery specifically, there has not been the 
sudden policy-driven, ovemight codification of the ownership of fishing rights seen in the 
Westem Australian and South Australian prawn fisheries. Thus the accumulation and 
aggregation of capital (through ownership of the means of production) into a few hands has 
generally not yet occurred in Queensland's prawn fishery. The majority of Queensland prawn 
fishers are owner-operators who have invested in the means of production and have used their 
own labour. In other words, independent commodity producers both using their own capital and 
applying their own labour to produce commodities, the petite bourgeoisie. 
If the number of employees can be used to differentiate fisher activities (see Clement, 1986) as 
petite bourgeoisie (less than four employees or small scale producers) "small capitalists" (10 to 
100 employees or large scale producers) and "capitalists" (more than 100 employees), then New 
South Wales and Queensland prawn flshers are petite bourgeoisie, but with some small 
capitalists, South Australian prawn fishers can be similarly categorised as petite bourgeoisie with 
some small capitalists whilst Western Australian prawn fishers could be said to be a mix of 
petite bourgeoisie, small capitalists and capitalists. Clement (1986) suggested that small scale 
producers have a low division of labour and control their immediate labour processes. 
Intermediate (4 to 10 employees) and large scale producers have increasing division of labour 
and decreasing levels of control. 
Garcia and Grainger (1997) have described an evolution of development as advocacy for growth 
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in the 1960s; a concem for equity in the 1970s; strong advocacy for economic liberalism 
(deregulation) in the 1980s and concem for sustainable development in the 1990s. Despite 
slightly different timing, the same progression is evident in world agriculture (their Table 1, pg 
633). Thus on a world scale, they advocate an analogy between the redistribution of ocean 
resources through the establishment of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and property rights with 
that of the redistribution of land resources through agrarian reforms. This is an interesting 
parallel and one worth further detailed examination since such agrarian reform has not been 
universally applauded. 
However, to continue the analogy, the industrialisation of agricultural sectors has inevitably 
included both mechanisation of production and capitalisation of markets. The introduction of 
larger vessels and the capitalisation of markets in Queensland (vertical integration, ownership 
of processing facilities and tied export markets) have created an environment for the split 
between large (more capitalist) and small operators (small capitalist/petite bourgeoisie fishers -
the same class, but different orientation). Key policy decisions - those of vessel replacement 
and closures - remain central to this dichotomy since they are fundamental to the question. 
Fishers views are divided with approximately a quarter supporting restmcturing, and nearly all 
citmg poor prices (externality) and catch rates (directly attributable) as major issues. Fishers 
identifying concems as to "resource sustainability" and "profitability" as being important, want 
to restmcture, whilst those (generally smaller operators) who do not, wish to maintain the status 
quo. 
The lack of concurrence from prawn fishers on policy options is not surprising when results of 
questionnaire, interviews and discussions with individuals are considered. Attitudes were largely 
influenced by personal economic circumstances (debt levels, tumover) and class position. 
Artisanal-level fishers wanted to retain status quo conditions, whilst potential capitalists wanted 
the opportunity to further capitalise their businesses. These mutually-exclusive prescriptions 
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thus meant no one was satisfied with proposed changes. It is not surprising then, that managers 
continue to defer policy development. 
The policy decisions regarding vessel replacement and closures in the Queensland prawn fishery 
are especially significant since vessel replacement would allow aggregation of ownership of the 
means of production whilst a closure regime would reduce variability in catches - both measures 
likely to encourage capitalisation of the fishery. What is optimal is a value judgement, but what 
these results suggest is that the policies of immediate limitation have contributed to a higher 
socio-economic well-being of Westem Australian and South Australian prawn fishers compared 
to those operating under (initially) no limitation in Queensland and New South Wales. The 
concem of value judgements is that which individual decision makers and which of their objects 
of choice (including extemalities) count? Does it come down to the pragmatist view (lowest 
common denominator) - which approach generally excludes much that is socially important? 
In other words, has society in each of these states benefited equally? Is the management of the 
prawn fishery for the benefit of the fishers or the publics? 
But what of the resource base, should such capitalisation be encouraged? The failure of banana 
prawn stocks in several locations together with evidence of declining catch per unit effort with 
increasing effort (Table 4.3) suggest that increasing efficiency in the east coast prawn trawl 
fishery would not be sustainable in the long term. The strength of the Japanese export market 
is questionable, particularly when the potential for aquacultured prawns to impact this market 
is considered. The efficiency of a closure regime is complicated by the multispecies nature of 
the resource - biological parameters such as spawning times and growth rates vary between 
species, ensuring that optimal closure times are different for different species and for different 
latitudes of the coast. Thus it is unlikely there is a definable, statewide, eclectic (in a species 
sense) seasonal closure. 
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What of vessel replacement? The cessation of new vessel entry and the effective capping of 
replacement (via the 2:1 replacement policy) has allowed a policy-vacuum to develop. Capital 
investment in existing hulls (technology, new engines and other adaptations) means that effort 
continues to increase, albeit incrementally. At the same time, Queensland petite bourgeoisie 
prawn fishers (since the majority are owner operators) are unable to acquire the appropriate 
means of production to optimise their own operation since the capital disincentive (purchase and 
surrender of a second vessel entitlement) is prohibitively expensive. No mechanism exists so 
as to allow individuals to marginally increase or decrease their commitments. So Queensland 
fishers, whether they tend towards capitalism or identify as more artisanal petite bourgeoisie, are 
in suspended animation. The diversity of attitude to management policy means that consensus 
will never be reached and that major tensions exist between fishers and organisations. This 
dichotomy of views on policy cannot continue. 
CONTRADICTIONS 
Administration 
A commercial fishers body has existed in some form since the early 1960s (Chapter 3), and in 
its present form since 1980 (QCFO). The main stmcture includes 26 branches, each of which 
sends a single delegate to the annual or special State Conferences. The original branch 
boundaries incorporated approximately equal numbers of fishers, but not prawn fishers. 
Demographic changes, particularly the northerly drift of prawn fishers, has resulted in an uneven 
spread of fishers (particularly prawn fishers) across branches, thus branch delegates to State 
Council each represent different numbers of fishers. 
The State Councillors (not all prawn fishers) are able to overtum the recommendations of the 
Trawl Committee (a subcommittee of State Council comprising prawn fisher delegates from each 
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branch) even though such a recommendation may have been reached unanimously. Thus all 
prawn fishers of a particular branch may strongly desire the branch delegate to State Council to 
vote in support of the recommendation, but they may be frustrated by having a non-prawn fisher 
voting against their wishes. Altematively, delegates from a block of branches representing few 
prawn fishers can frustrate the majority of prawn fishers from larger branches. 
As was seen by examination of vessel replacement and closure policies, class position influences 
attitudes and values of prawn fishers, and individual location on the capitalist - petite 
bourgeoisie spectmm. Thus since the QCFO seeks consensus on all management issues, there 
is an institutionalised barrier to change. Given also that many councillors have been 
representatives since the inception of the QCFO, the organisation is conservative and resistant 
to change. Such incrementalism may have worked in the 1960s and 1970s, but the rapid change 
sweeping all industries in the 1990s through economic globalisation, means that fishers must 
embrace change or wither. 
Small Scale Versus Large Scale 
A large part of the complexity of the east coast prawn fishery lies with the zoogeography of the 
State. The vast coastline covers an eno'rmous range of latitude (tropical to subtropical) and 
includes such a range of habitat that it is not surprising that there is a bewildering range of 
marine creatures living withm that area of coastline. The species of prawn changes from the 
Cape York area of predominantly brown and grooved tiger prawns, to red spot king and banana 
prawns off Townsville, through to mixed king, tiger, banana prawns off Rockhampton and finally 
to predominantly king prawns offshore from Brisbane and mixed species within Moreton Bay 
to the southem border of the State. 
Each of these species has quite a different biology and, for example, are reproductively active 
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at differing times of the year. Thus juvenile prawns for each species become abundant in 
inshore catches at different times of the year. Thus to define a closed season in order to protect 
small prawns from premature capture, it needs to be area (and species) specific. Statewide 
measures are thus inappropriate, and management policies need to include measures which are 
area specific. 
The diversity of vessels and their target markets (export, domestic, bait) ensures that multiple 
and generally conflicting management objectives are likely to be pursued by different fishers in 
different areas. Some will seek most abundant small prawns, others less abundant large prawns 
and still others, medium grade prawns. This debate often resembles elements of the bourgeoisie 
versus petite bourgeoisie debate (discussed later). 
Recent concems have been expressed as to the long-term impacts of trawl gear on the ecology 
of fishing grounds. Studies have shown "trashing ratios" (proportion of discards to retained 
species) as high as 20:1 in unfished or virgin grounds, down to 5:1 for heavily fished grounds 
(Kennelly, 1995). Even a discard rate of five times the retained catch is high, especially when 
most management agencies profess support for the principles of ecologically sustainable 
development (ESD). A fundamental element of ESD is the maintenance of biodiversity or 
ensuring that the pristine suite of fauna is not altered, a tall order on a trawl ground. Thus the 
trend to greater effort being expended would appear to have potential for conflict with 
conservation needs for maintenance of ecological values. Again, it could be argued that smaller 
vessels towing smaller, lighter trawlmg gear would catch less discards and impact the ocean 
bottom less. Given the growing importance of green issues in the political process, smaller 
vessels, particularly in the inshore areas, may be more attractive to management authorities than 
a fleet of larger, industrial vessels. 
And what of the fishers in this milieu? One obvious dichotomy is that of the magnitude of the 
operation - the artisanal versus the industrial fisher. Fishers value the process of fishing (the 
work) and their independence (qualitative results from interviews). What they like least is 
dangerous weather and economic pressure. One technique of countering the economic pressure 
is to obtain an altemative guaranteed source of income - to become a "part timer". This 
approach is much resented among other fishers because it increases the pressure on them to 
either do likewise or to work harder to compete. Part-time work is seen as a cop-out, a solution 
by fishers who cannot make the grade. A common altemative job is farming, which is ironic 
since this strategy (part timing) is also a strategy adopted by this group (Newby et al. 1981). 
So can such a dichotomy between small and large scale prawners persist? Advanced 
industrialised societies require enterprises competitively geared to profit making, adaptable to 
changes in markets and technology and stmctured for efficiency in production. What of the 
traditional sector - essentially small scale, family based and economically protected? Berger 
(1981) argues that there is a place for such classes and that they can survive and grow. One 
could argue that the prawn market has naturally differentiated into discrete markets, that the 
larger competitive units target the lucrative (though capricious) export markets of Japan and the 
European Community. The domestic market is increasingly subject to incursions by cheaper 
local and foreign aquacultured product. However, small scale fishers can still hawk prawns and 
bycatch to their local communities and supply local businesses (fish shops, restaurants) and the 
bait market. Such market differentiation could also be a product of a division of labour market 
through the sophistication of the harvesting machinery (small vs. big), though fishers are able 
to adapt to technology quickly. Further research is needed to quantify such division. 
Is the choice to remain small and/or globally uncompetitive a strictly class decision or one more 
closely linked to a choice about technology? It is a fallacy that hunter-gatherer societies 
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maintain a static relationship with their natural environment. Technological innovation, 
economic progress and change are integral features of the human condition. However, given 
prawn resources are finite, the adoption of technology means that the same prawn catches can 
be taken more quickly with less vessels. Or, put another way, if resources are currently fully 
exploited, adoption of technology may increase the chance of over-exploitation and fishery 
collapse. 
The debate as to what constitutes the petite bourgeoisie has challenged sociologists for many 
years. The general definition of the petite bourgeoisie places the class as an intermediary 
position in the marxist dichotomic class model of bourgeoisie (major owners of the means of 
production) and proletariat (working people who do not own any of the means of production). 
In other words, the petite bourgeoisie own their means of production but also work themselves. 
Class stmctures can readily be defined for prawn fishers who have control over economically 
valuable prawn resources (power over their vessels, the skills and training to successfully capture 
prawns and the labour to be able to man the vessel). Within the broad occupation of prawn 
fisher, further definition, both economically and socially, can allow the identification of classes 
and status groups (mutually recognised aggregations) (Wright, 1976). 
Prawn fishers on the east coast are vulnerable to change, particularly sudden and dramatic 
changes in the economy (booms and recessions). Rapid changes in interest rates or fuel prices 
or other economic parameters can have a marked impact on the viability of their businesses and 
contribute to the sense of life being a constant stmggle. In the smaller ports such as Urangan, 
Gladstone, Innisfail and Maryborough family webs and neighbourhood are probably more 
significant than in larger, more cosmopolitan ports such as Caims, Townsville or Mooloolaba. 
Smaller, isolated communities have few contracted workers and employment arrangements are 
generally personalised. The skipper will work alongside the deckhand, though certain tasks may 
be allocated and ritualised (deckhands cleaning nets, skippers deciding fishing locations). 
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Frequently the labour force appears to be recmited from local networks of kinship, friendship 
or neighbourhood. 
An outcome of such networking is that basic beliefs, pattems of social and occupational values 
and diversity in attitudes and interests are given stmcture by the experiences of the prawn fisher's 
life. Invariably fishing communities develop prawn fishers who travel to other ports and the 
belief system is enriched by exposure to different beliefs. However, in the case of small scale, 
petite bourgeoisie prawn fishers who remain within the local community, the leaning toward a 
"life style" existence can be strong. 
Thus in a small local community, such as Lucinda, the work of a prawn fisher contains the social 
network, so that like meet with like (Lommitz, 1978). Such fishers are inherently conservative 
and resistant to change of any kind. Resisting change is almost normative and it requires 
profound changes in economic and political conditions to transform social consciousness and 
overcome resistance to action. Thus fisheries management for example requires small, 
incremental changes, rather than rapid, massive change, in order to be successful. 
Finally, what of the administrators? There is still no clear vision for how the fishery ought to 
be managed, no altemative policy prescriptions, nor clear statement of what the fishers should 
expect in the future. It is clear from statistics presented earlier in this study, that there is far 
more fishing effort (vessels) for prawns on the east coast than is needed to take the annual catch. 
In other words, there is an excessive fleet capacity. Whilst approximately a third of the 800 
strong fleet could be considered "life stylers" (personal observation), three quarters of the catch 
is taken by a quarter of the fleet. There thus exists a capacity for under-utilised effort to 
become effective effort. Yet management policy options described in various Discussion Papers 
and Situation Reports continue to promote the status quo. Why is this? 
257 
The Queensland institutions have strong links to the agrarian politics of mral Queensland. As 
previously mentioned, some sugarcane farmers and graziers have diversified into prawn and other 
forms of fishing. The relationship with industry political leaders has become very close and 
again, the maintenance of the status quo, the dominant paradigm. The dominance of the QFMA 
by representational biases until the replacement by an "expert" Board, has seen the same effect -
status quo. 
CHALLENGES 
Resource Problems 
The Queensland coast is undergoing massive development. Critical habitat upon which prawn 
production depends is being destroyed. River systems are being altered by the erection of water 
storage barriers. Less than 5% of coastal systems remain unaffected. Altered flow regimes 
mean that fresh water discharge, essential for some prawn species, has been irreversibly 
dampened. The complete aimihilation of the banana prawn fishery following the constmction 
of a barrage on the Fitzroy River is an example. 
Clear felling of native bush in river catchments for agriculture has allowed massive increased 
sediment loads in coastal flowing rivers and the addition of fertiliser and pesticide-rich mnoff 
into these systems. Highly destmctive agriculture practices such as the so called "ponded 
pastures" in the Rockhampton area (where coastal mangrove and saltmarsh have had seawater 
intmsions halted by man-made dykes) have severely impacted estuarine aquatic productivity by 
exposing acid sulphate soils. Massive seagrass diebacks as a consequence of environmental 
stresses, water quality declines from coastal developments and acid soil mnoff, agricultural 
practices and urbanisation and threats to traditional fishing grounds by Marine Park declarations, 
have combined to present a sober picture for the Queensland prawn fisher. 
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As was seen in Chapter 5, abundance trends for some prawn species raise the question of 
sustainability. Are the prawn resources showing early indications of overfishing? Biological 
scientists assume that the high reproducibility, fast growth rate and rapid generational period 
together mean that most prawn species are capable of tolerating heavy fishing pressure. In other 
words, with high fishing mortality, relatively few prawns need to survive to successfully 
reproduce the stock. If that is tme, incremental declines in abundance (measured by declining 
catch rates) could suggest long term, incremental degradation of the environment, which could 
ultimately cause stock collapses. 
Increasingly, the prawn fleet is more mobile. Isolated pockets of prawning ground along the 
coast have been gradually subsumed by almost continuous trawling activity as technology has 
created the ability for prawn vessels to work around reef areas previously considered too 
dangerous and difficult. This tendency may threaten reef-dependent species such as red spot 
king prawns. Such mobility has also meant that ports are less isolated and service other than 
only local vessels. Technology has also allowed rapid response to reported aggregations of 
prawns, so that aggregations that previously would have supported local vessels for weeks, are 
exploited by the fleet and only last for days. 
Most significantly, abundance trends (measured by catch rates) may have been masked, since 
constant catch rates may have been a consequence of increasing area fished, ff there are now 
no new areas remaining to be discovered (that is, the total trawling area is now finite), then catch 
rates may now start to decline. In other words, overfishing may now be apparent. 
Some species which have strong estuarine-dependent early life history stages or those dependent 
on other threatened habitat such as seagrass have increasingly greater threats to their long-term 
survivability. 
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Policy and Class Relations 
The management of the east coast prawn fishery is plagued by diffuse and mutually exclusive 
management objectives. Capitalists argue that market forces should be allowed to determine the 
survival of the fittest. Pursuing this argument to its logical conclusion, the coastal fisheries for 
small prawns (domestic and bait markets) should be closed, and a fleet of say 200 efficient 
vessels be allowed to harvest the catch. Petite bourgeoisie fishers on the other hand, argue that 
to maximise employment and the well-being of small local communities, that large vessels 
should be banned, gear limited and local co-management arrangements put in place. The local 
clan or occupational guild would then decide on management mles. Straddling those divergent 
views, are the contradictory demands of export, domestic and bait markets. 
Both Marx and to a lesser extent, Weber, conceptualised class and class relations, in a realist 
sense, as unobservable generative mechanisms, not merely differences in income, wealth or 
occupational prestige, enjoyed by different groups. Class stmctures were thus viewed as 
producing inequalities, but the meaning of class did not lie in these pattems of inequality, but 
more in the realist, generative sense of Marx and Weber (Baxter et al. 1991). 
It is this more empirical view of class as stmctures, which regulate collective choices, decisions 
and distributional outcomes, which has been of interest in this study of prawn fishers. In the 
words of Baxter et al. (1991), the power of such an analysis has allowed classes of prawn fishers 
to be placed in an overall societal dynamic, based on the ownership of the means of production. 
Such ownership, we have seen, has first shaped class position, and then affected the material 
circumstances of prawn fishers. Results of this study suggest class position in tum has 
influenced their attitudes to management policies. 
If this is the case, what does this insight mean for the architects of fisheries management policy? 
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The obvious interpretation is that the values and attitudes differ so much between the larger, 
export-oriented fishers and the small-scale artisans, that compromise and agreement on policy 
is unlikely. A solution may be to separate the two groups of prawn fishers through a 
combination of zoning the fishery and vessel replacement policies. The former would reinforce 
the class boundary, the latter would both speed the trajectory towards capitalism, whilst still 
preserving the artisanal operations for those who wished to remain at that level of production. 
A zoning policy could physically separate the largely export oriented fishery north of 22°S 
(Broad Sound, between Mackay and Rockhampton) from the largely domestic oriented fishery 
south of 22°S. There is a marked biological discontinuity which occurs at this area, produced 
by changes in major currents and a break in the Barrier Reef (the Hydrographer's Passage). This 
change causes prawn species differences north and south of this area. For example. Red Spot 
and Blue Legged King prawns north and Eastem King prawns south. There is presently a 
comparative paucity of trawlable ground and thus, fishing effort (Figures 4.8, 4.9) deployed in 
this area, ensuring that a boundary line would not divide a fishing ground. Such a zoning policy 
could permit the development of different, biologically and economically sound management 
policies (timing of seasonal closures so as to maximise species specific prawn size and export 
value in the north, and optimise supply to the domestic market in the south). This is not a new 
idea and was promoted as early as 1985'. However, it was only ever floated in isolation, not 
addressing boat replacement. 
A boat replacement policy could allow upgrading of vessels, subject to a financial cost, so that 
fishers seeking to increase their share of the catch would need to purchase fishing power from 
another fisher, so as to ensure the nett total fleet effort remained constant. Such fishing power 
or effort regulation could be, for example, in the form of trading in metres of trawl net, vessel 
units or actual fishing time. The penalty could be incurred at the time of transfer and 
additionally, could even include a sacrifice of additional effort to account for technology 
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increases. The greatest difficulty would be in making the penalties reflect effort so that boat 
replacement did not result in a nett increase of the fleet effort. Petite bourgeoisie could then 
elect to either embrace capitalism through the aggregation of ownership, or choose to remain at 
their existing level. The combination of such a policy with a policy on zoning, would likely 
cause polarity of the fleet north and south into larger scale and a mix of medium to smaller scale 
operators, respectively. 
The challenge in such policy formulation is the recognition that class position influences prawn 
fishers' attitudes to policy. As Wright (1989) has noted, class relations may define the basis 
upon which interests are formed and collective action negotiated, but the outcome of that process 
cannot be predicted from the class stmcture itself. Understanding prawn fisher class relations, 
however, is a step toward better policy formulation. 
In assessing fisheries management difficulties, Estellic Smith (1990) noted that ".... the extent 
to which a group whose members hold diverse viewpoints can produce a workable management 
plan that does not violate their respective axiomatic models (but need not necessarily reflect 
them), determines the degree to which industry members co-operate in making the plans work.". 
By physically separating (zoning) fishers of very diverse attitudes, it may be possible to develop 
management policies that both work and deliver on management objectives (optimal markets or 
full employment, whichever is desired). 
The complex fishery that is the east coast, clearly needs to be defined and managed by its 
component parts, not as it is at present, by the lowest common denominator. 
The Fishers 
There is a potential within the fishery for a massive increase in effectively deployed effort. 
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Participants need certainty as to management direction. What is the correct size and 
configuration of the pravra fishery? If fishers choose to remain as "lifestyle" fishers, should they 
be "protected" from the ravages of the increasingly sophisticated high-tech capitalists? Should 
the fleet be economically efficient or socially reasonable? Should managers consider the 
influence of class position on prawn fishers attitudes to management policies? 
The debate over north versus south is not new. In an article in the QCFO newsletter in 1981 
(Scott, 1981), the chairman of the Townsville Branch observed: 
"The fishing grounds of North Queensland have always attracted southem 
fishermen who temporarily leave their home grounds to try their luck elsewhere. 
In the past, when the industry was in good shape the few extra boats did not 
matter greatly. 
Now, however, a sudden exodus of vessels from the south to the waters of North 
Queensland is creating serious problems of over-crowding and overfishing, ....". 
Again, in 1984, the northem QCFO branches sought to force an industry-wide referendum 
(Anon, 1984) on a north-south zoning proposal. A vote by Branch delegates at the previous 
month's QCFO State Council, had seen a close vote in support of zoning. However, when it was 
subsequently referred to the membership, the proposal was defeated. The long-standing QCFO 
position of "all Queensland waters for all Queensland fishermen", prevailed. 
Such consensual, status quo outcomes of debate among fishers is not new but is at variance with 
the modem leaning toward the concept of industry self-govemance of fisheries. Arguments 
against government-centred regulation have included examples of the failure to preserve stocks 
and maintain economic viability of fleets as well as the destmctive, antagonistic relationships 
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inherent between managers and fishers (Townsend, 1995). It could be argued that industry 
organisations also have difficulty in taking decisions and in the case of Australian prawn 
fisheries, class position can influence the degree of agreement achievable for policy direction. 
In evaluating any policy prescription, it is assumed that participants have explicit knowledge and 
have adopted some shared objectives (Manzer, 1984). The difficulty in the case of the east coast 
prawn fishery is that fisher representatives (Councillors) have different attitudes and agendas 
(influenced by their class position) and represent different groups of fishers with diverse views 
(again influenced by class). Fundamental tradeoffs between multiple objectives inevitably lead 
to fisher community conflict (Charles, 1988). Peyton (1987) has noted the same problem in the 
management of recreational freshwater fisheries. Thus a simple reliance on industry self-
govemance may not produce a better outcome than the current government-centred model. 
East coast prawn fishers are owner-operators in the main, self-employed individualists who are 
reluctant to embrace change. Interviews (Chapter 5) identified major employment concems of 
prawn fishers and particularly the split between capitalists ("survival of the fittest") and 
lifestylers ("status quo" and "full employment"). The latter desire is a consideration for petite 
bourgeoisie generally (Mullins, 1994), since v/hen petit bourgeois employer operations fail, then 
both employers and their employees become unemployed. In many of the smaller ports, 
altemative employment opportunities do not exist, and families have to move to find work. 
However, even given differences in preferred management options, in the main, most prawn 
fishers on the east coast belong to the petite bourgeoisie. Unless massive restmcturing allows 
capitalist companies to buy out the individual owner operators as has occurred in the Gulf of 
Carpentaria fishery, the east coast fishery will continue to be dominated by the views of the 
petite bourgeoisie. The zoning proposal would allow capitalism to dominate the north (through 
fleet restmcturing) and the petite bourgeoisie to continue in harmony in the south. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In any assessment of the effectiveness of natural resource management schemes, variability due 
to Mother Nature is always a consideration. The wet season of 1974 (including the Brisbane 
floods) was followed by the biggest prawn catching season on record. No amount of fine tuning 
through management plans could alter the outcomes of that natural event. In addition, the 
defining characteristics of the petite bourgeoisie - self reliance, individualism, competitiveness, 
the ability to use productive property (vessels) with their own labour, a keen sense of 
precariousness - mean that consensus on management direction is always going to be difficult 
to achieve. 
Where there is a lack of explicit fisheries policy direction, a multiplicity of fisher agendas and 
economic self interest clash, and contradictory management results. In some Australian prawn 
fisheries, the process of transformation from a regulated, organised fisheries sector with regional 
fleets to a globally focussed free market industry with mobile fleets, will continue. The question 
fisheries managers must ask is: who benefits and at what distributional level are citizens enjoying 
the benefits? The community, the economy or the capitalists? Should the loss of control of the 
means of production (or altematively, the aggregation of the means of production) be 
encouraged? ^ 
The problem with total reliance on market systems is their inability to address social and 
environmental concems, particularly when common property resources such as fish are being 
transacted (McEvoy, 1986). The beneficiaries driving the market can be remote from the 
market's ramifications. In addition, at least in the case of the Queensland east coast prawn 
fishery, there are suggestions of early signs of overfishing such as declines in catch rates per 
area. 
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Problems with adequate policy development are manifest in demonstrable failure in achieving 
sustainable fisheries. Evidence for this statement is not only local or even regional stock 
depletion, but global reductions in fish catches and an agreement that globally, fishery over-
exploitation is occurring (Mace, 1997). Mace also advocates a reduction in fleet capacity 
(restmcturing), implementing access rights, implementing a precautionary approach, expanding 
environmentally-sensitive aquaculture and developing effective policies and institutions to 
achieve the above. 
Throughout this study and in particular, the detailed case of the Queensland prawn fisher,it is 
apparent that policy decisions can influence the nature of class position of fishers. These fishers 
fall broadly into the class of petite bourgeois. A combination of globalisation of markets and 
transport, a strong component of owner/operator involvement and the natural variability of 
stocks, together have mitigated against penetration of capital. 
Development of the Queensland fishery has been predominantly though the efforts of the petite 
bourgeoisie. It is possible now that the dimensions of the fishery (fleet, production capability, 
infrastmcture) are defined, that this class could be impacted through restmcturing by capital 
penetration and a consequential increased use of wage labour. Such rationalisation of the fleet 
will mean fewer jobs in coastal communities and consequential dislocation and social adjustment. 
It will also mean fewer members (and hence cash flow) for the industry peak body, the QCFO. 
It could also be the only way that the fishery will continue. Globalisation of the fishing industry 
world-wide has been via markets and capitalisation of the means of production (Eythorsson, 
1996 and Vanderpool et al. 1986). The allocation of property rights in fish, and the 
transformation of those rights into capital, has been a common evolution. Fisher-owned inshore 
fleets are shrinking, with many survivors forced to lease rights from larger, company operations. 
Is that the way the Queensland east coast will go? 
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The policy option described earlier (zoning, boat replacement) could be a solution. In Iceland 
(Eythorsson, 1996), globalisation of the fishing industry has had some state-wide benefits, but 
at the cost of multinational ownership of the industry. For example, processing has moved from 
shore-based establishments to onboard vessels, with a consequent loss of employment. There 
has also been a shift from labour-intensive petite bourgeoisie operations to capital intensive 
large vessels. Again, economic and geographical centralisation of fisheries in Iceland, has been 
at the loss of control of the means of production. Thus the controlled capitalisation of a sector 
of the Queensland prawn fleet (and no nett increase in effort), coupled with the simultaneous 
maintenance of a section of the inshore fleet (the petite bourgeoisie) through zoning and 
replacement policies could be an altemative management option. 
Prawn fisheries are a recent phenomenon and, as with many industries, are impacted by 
globalisation. In Queensland, the prawning industry has relied on the petite bourgeoisie, and this 
class is strongly represented. It seems likely that, as with the prawn fisheries of South Australia 
and Westem Australia, as capitalism penetrates the fishery, this class may decline in importance. 
It may be pmdent for fishery managers to ensure its survival for sustainable fishery management 
reasons. 
What is needed is for further sociological Iresearch of both prawn fishers in particular, and fishers 
generally, in this country. The link between fisheries policy acceptance and class relations, could 
be a useful starting point. As Harris and Vanderpool (1986) have put it, "Fish catchers ... are 
ready adaptors ... but are often resisters to management...". The question is, why? 
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APPENDIX 1 
^^  
A > ^ 
CONFIDENTIAL AND WITHOUT PRE.TUPICE I I I M l " I * * 1 
i . In your view, should management of the east coast trawl fishery be mainly concerned 
with (mark one only): 
(i) Looking after the resource and letting fishermen fend for themselves. 
(ii) maximising the profitability of fishermen even if this means increased 
intervention, 
(iii) Ensuring the present fleet stmcture remains unchanged. 
J, What is the major problem facing the east coast trawl fishery (Mark up to 3 in order 
of priority). 
Ill Prices received for product 
(ii) Costs in operating a trawler 
(iii) Reduced catch rates 
(iv) Too many boats (competition) 
(v) Interest rates (general economy) 
(vi) Other (specify) 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(V) 
one); 
Now 
Twelve months 
Two years 
Three years 
Not at all 
Very 
Certain 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
Certi 
2^  
Z 
2. 
1. Do you consider your own trawling operation will be economically viable in (circle 
ain Unknown Uncertain Very 
Uncertain 
S 4 5 
3 4 5 
S 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
4. Is your own operation best described as (tick one) 
Beam Trawl 
Otter Trawl 
Other 
I, Do you believe an industry funded stabilisation scheme which offers minimal incentive 
and which reduces the number of vessel numbers over time is warranted? 
YES NO 
6. Would you be prepared to contribute to a low cost stabilisation scheme? 
YES m 
7. Should the east coast trawl fishery (mark one_ only): 
(i) be managed as a single complex fishery with access for all fishermen who 
hold an east coast licence (present arrangement) 
(ii) be zoned so as to restrict access to only fishermen endorsed for that one zone. 
(iii) be zoned but allow some mechanism for access to more than one zone. 
8. Do you agree with extensive seasonal closures being implemented for other than 
biological reasons (e.g. maximising the size of prawns), (mark one) 
YES NO 
9. What are the causes of your current problems? 
/•^'£^ •••' i'p 


